Maintaining Family Ties -
Preference divergence between sister parties

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Maintaining Family Ties: Preference divergence between sister parties

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The German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) have a long history of collaboration. They co-invite leaders to each other’s party national meetings, agree on cooperative electoral arrangements and consistently form governments as a single unit. Due to this high level of cooperation, scholars often treat the organizations as a single unit. The implications and foundations for this decision are relatively unexplored. Observers regularly note that the parties’ preferences are mostly similar, but that their relative policy emphasis diverges: the CDU places greater importance on economic policy and the CSU places greater stress on social issues. We argue that the parties’ preferences consistently diverge over time. Following a spatial logic, we argue that the parties choose leaders that hold strong preferences on each party’s primary ideological dimension to counter balance the preferences of the sister party. We demonstrate shifts in both parties’ positions using speeches from CDU and CSU party national congress meetings over a 60 year period. We find evidence that treating sister parties as a single unit may be reasonable under some conditions, but a difference in priorities likely lead these parties to act as separate organizations under some circumstances.
Party competition creates strange bedfellows because democratic governance incentivizes groups to cooperate. Parties coordinate electoral and government formation strategies with their erstwhile competitors to maximize their potential for controlling government in the future. Election rules often structure the shape and content of this coordination. Small and large parties in France, for example, often reach agreements to avoid direct competition for the same parliamentary seats (see for example, Golder 2006; Spoon 2011). Despite knowledge of short term or irregular agreements between parties, less is known about the influence of long term cooperation on larger parties’ internal politics.

So called sister parties such as the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Catholic Socialist Union (CSU) defy common explanations of inter- and intra-party politics. Building on V.O. Key’s tripartite framework, we define sister parties as political parties that act separately at the organizational level (party-as-an-organization), yet consistently act unified at the electoral and government level (party-in-the-electorate and party-in-government). The CDU and CSU, for example, are neither completely distinct, they form a common faction in parliament and run coordinated election campaigns, nor completely identical, they hold separate party organizations. Questions remain over how the parties’ preferences relate. Is it reasonable to treat sister parties as a single party-in-the-electorate and party-in-government, when each party acts organizationally separate?

We explore an answer to this question by assessing evidence from parties’ national meetings. In particular, we examine the extent to which the parties’ organizations hold distinct policy goals. Do the parties’ preferences move in tandem or do they balance the goals of their expected electoral and coalition partner. If the
parties exhibit distinct goals at the organizational level this would undermine claims for treating the party in electorate and party in government as unified.

More broadly, we argue that consistent cooperation at the electoral and governmental level changes the incentives that structure parties’ organizational decision-making. By consistently linking their electoral and governing fortunes, party coalitions can form the appearance of an institution like status. Despite their regular coordination, sister parties can represent distinct electoral constituencies, often defined by geographic as well as policy differences. We expect that sister parties seeking to protect and distinguish their separate interests often shift their preferences in opposing directions and counter-balance the policies of their siblings. Ultimately, sister parties engage in a game that not only reflects shifts in their own members’ goals, but also moves in the opposite direction as their coordinating party.

We demonstrate evidence for our theory using speeches from parties’ national congresses in Germany. The case of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Catholic Socialist Union (CSU) in Germany represents an extreme version of cross party coordination. Despite distinct party organizations, platforms and leaders, the parties so closely cooperate (they form a single faction in the German parliament) that they are often treated as a single party by academic treatments or referred to as “sister parties” in the popular press. Evidence of preference divergence by these otherwise ideologically close parties, would indicate strong support for a theory in which cooperating parties use their policy statements to distinguish their independent goals.

The results from our analysis hold important implications for competition in advanced democracies. Representation requires choice between ideological
competitors. Collusion between parties limits citizen choice. Evidence of a dynamic representation process would demonstrate the means by which parties maintain their ties, yet actively promote the goals of their distinct constituencies. The results would also question the simplifying assumption required to treat the German CDU and CSU as a single party for studies of election campaigns and policy-making.

Partisan Cooperation and Competition

Borrowing V.O. Key’s framework (e.g. Key 1955), we conceptualize sister parties as parties that consistently and regularly share substantial elements of their functions in the electorate and in government, yet maintain distinct organizational boundaries. Following this definition, sister parties exist throughout the democratic world. The German CDU and CSU are likely the most famous and successful sister parties, but other examples exist. The various factions of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, for example, likely qualify as a sister party under this definition and the Cooperative and the Labour parties in the UK regularly coordinate in government. The French Rassemblement pour le Republique and the Union Democratie Francaise acted as sister parties in the 1990s by forming combined platform and governing together before becoming a single party in the 2000s. The continued tension between internal factions of the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire might suggest that the parties might function as sister parties again in the future.

The existence of sister parties challenges the simplistic notion that democratic politics always reflects a clear choice between ideological competitors. Sister parties are not alone in coordinating their electoral and governmental strategies.
Ideologically distinct parties often purposefully collaborate to increase the chance that they both enter into government. Partisan coordination follows logically from election rules and parties’ majoritarian requirements for government formation.

Theories of party system change stress that the largest parties in many systems collude to keep out new competitors (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995 and 2009; but see also Koole 1996). From this perspective, the largest parties in the system use their control of government to set up electoral rules such as state financing and electoral thresholds that limit new parties’ ability to compete with established organizations. Some research suggests support for this perspective, although the evidence of active collusion between the parties is limited (Katz and Mair 2009). Many institutional reforms appear to benefit the largest parties, but primarily benefit incumbent politicians within those parties (e.g. McElwain 2008).

Other forms of cooperation reflect parties’ efforts to maximize their likelihood of entering government in response to electoral and government formation rules. In mixed electoral systems such as Germany, for example, smaller parties encourage their supporters to vote for ideologically close larger parties on the majoritarian list and for themselves on the proportional list (Bawn 1999; Gschwend 2007). This split ticket voting increases the likelihood of an ideologically close post-election parliament by supporting parties that are more likely to gain a plurality of votes on the single member district while still contributing to the smaller party’s seat share through the proportional allocation of seats.

Even in single member district elections, parties coordinate to increase the likelihood of winning an ideologically close majority in parliament. Parties on the ideological left in France agree to not directly compete against each other in select
districts to avoid splitting their vote. In the second round ballot, parties then lend their support to the most ideologically close party (Golder 2006; Blais and Indridason 2007; Spoon 2011).

From an electoral standpoint, parties likely benefit from coordination. Parties’ electoral fortunes are often linked. Voters perceive coalition parties’ positions as less distinct than their platforms would indicate (see for example, Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Adams and Wlezien 2015). Even ideologically distant coalition partners’ statements can legitimate challenger parties’ policy positions (Meguid 2005 and 2008). Furthermore, perceptions of opposition parties’ competencies depend on evaluations of the government (Green and Jennings 2012).

Upon entering government the incentives for parties to coalesce increases dramatically. Multi-party parliamentary systems motivate parties to negotiate lasting bargains on a range of issues to create stable governments (see for example Laver and Shepsle 1996; Müller and Strøm 1999). Minority governments are faced with greater motives to coordinate and cooperate with parties in parliament (e.g. Huber 1996). Coalitions incapable of supporting policy compromises lead governments to end prematurely (Warwick 1994; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene 2015).

While research has shown clear evidence of party coordination at the electoral and government levels, little research theorizes on how parties’ organizational preferences relate. Furthermore, in contexts where parties regularly work together, it is unclear how cross-party coordination impacts intra-party politics? Foreknowledge of policy compromise alters potential policy payoffs intra-party groups expect from the policy formation process.
Party Organization, Intra-Party Politics and Leadership Selection

Scholars recognize that intra-party politics plays a preeminent role of parties’ policy messages, electoral campaigns and behavior in government. For example, intra-party debates and factions influence the selection of party leaders (Ceron 2013; Greene and Haber 2014), party manifestos (Meguid 2008; Spoon 2011; Lehrer 2012; Bäck et al. 2014), the selection of cabinet ministers and cabinet formation (Laver and Shepsle 1990; Bäck 2008; Ceron 2014; Greene and Jensen 2014), policy change (Huber 1996; Huber and Shipan 2002; Ceron 2015; Haber 2015), and even coalition termination (Laver 1999). The drivers of intra-party politics likely reflect the interaction of their external political environments and institutions, historical experiences in government and internal decision-making structures.

Researchers have shown that substantial evidence that institutions structure parties’ and candidates’ incentives. Single member districts, for example encourage candidate centered election campaigns (Carey and Shugart 1995). To and even greater extreme, election rules can encourage the creation of more fractionalized parties as exemplified by the Liberal Democratic Party and the Single Non-Transferable Vote in Japan (e.g. Cox 1999). These institutions also dictate the relative importance of activists and leaders in parties’ decision-making structures (Schofield and Sened 2006).

Candidate and leadership rules impact parties’ campaigns broadly. Parties with open primaries for candidate selection, for example, face decreased activist mobilization compared to parties where (Kernell 2015). Furthermore, leadership
selection rules and levels of intra-party support both determine party leaders’ tenure at the party (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller 2013).

Changing political conditions have also led to shifts in parties’ internal characteristics and rules. In response to decreasing levels of party membership in much of Western Europe (e.g. Tan 1997), parties have opened their intra-party debates and decisions to wider audiences and party supporters becoming more inclusive (Tan 1997; Scarrow 2014). Not all parties’ memberships are in decline, however, as more consolidated parties tend to have fewer memberships in general (Kölln 2014). Despite the increased size of parties’ internal selectorates, leadership elections have become less competitive (Kenig 2009). Declining membership has led parties to hire more staff, but to pay them less and exhibit greater turnover in staff between elections (Kölln 2015).

Electoral conditions influence the character of intra-party politics more broadly. Harmel and Janda (1994), for example, theorize that large electoral losses can change the distribution of amongst intra-party factions. Harmel et al. (1995) add, however, that electoral change alone does not dictate the effect of leadership change on parties’ platforms. Leadership change and shifts in factional dominance lead to party change more broadly (e.g. Harmel and Tan 2003). By altering incumbent parties’ electoral calculus (e.g. Vavrek 2009; Hellwig 2012; Williams et al. 2015), economic conditions determine the degree of intra-party disagreement prior to an election (Greene and Haber 2014).
Hypotheses

Altogether, this research emphasizes the role of internal rules and electoral politics in motivating intra-party politics. Distinct preferences and politics within parties’ organizations have clear implications for parties’ election campaigns and their behavior in government. By holding distinct party organizations, the politics within sister parties implies that treating them as unified at the electoral and governmental level will lead to biased conclusions.

The existence of separate organizations likely implies separate preferences (see for example, Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981). If sister parties exhibit identical preferences at the organizational level or shift together in tandem, then the reliance on the unitary actor assumption would be less critical. Studies treating the CDU and CSU as a single actor inherently assume this position. Much like the unitary actor assumption for other parties, the use of a single measure of preferences means that the two organizations will act as if they are single actor. Measures of preference derived from the manifesto reflect a compromise position on which differences within the organizational do not matter.

We expect, however, that the existence of separate organizations makes this position untenable. Although they do not directly compete, the CDU and CSU face alternate pressures that influence their internal politics. Regional variation in public opinion, constituent preferences and local preferences likely draw the parties in competing directions. Economic conditions influence regions differently.

Parties that appear too ideologically close likely suffer electorally. Voters’ choices will likely reflect small perceived differences in direction. Evidence on voter
perception suggests that coalition governance might embody this case. **Voters often perceive coalition parties’ preferences as closer to each other than their platforms would predict** (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Adams and Wlezien 2015). Indeed, government parties have to emphasize the salience of issues more strongly for voters to perceive them (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012; Greene 2015).

In turn, party leaders seek to win elections by attracting distinct constituencies. These may be geographically separate as is the case for the CDU and the CSU in Germany, but likely also reflect slight differences in preferences or issue priorities. Appearing too close in this context would limit the effectiveness of parties’ election campaigns. Party leaders, therefore, will likely use opportunities prior to elections to draw clear lines between their preferences.

Furthermore, the logic of coalition bargaining largely insures that any small differences in the parties’ positions will be amplified to influence policy negotiations. Parties likely stake out more extreme positions on an issue to draw policy in that direction in the concluding coalition deal. Parties expecting policy compromise in a future coalition would tactically select statements that would draw policy closer to their true preferences. This perspective assumes that coalitions’ negotiated position is a function of the two parties’ positions. By indicating that the party’s preferences are more extreme in years where the party expects coalition based policy compromises, than the negotiated position will reflect closer to the party’s real position.

In summary, we expect that the preferences of the CDU and the CSU are distinct and vary in opposing ways. This prediction contrasts the assumption that the politics of these parties are the same or vary in tandem. In the next section, we provide a brief outline of the history and politics of the CDU and the CSU.
A brief history of the relationship between the CDU and CSU

The rise of the CDU and CSU relationship begins at the conclusion of the Second World War. Following the collapse of the Nazi Regime in May 1945 multiple inter-confessional Christian conservative parties formed independently of each other across Germany’s occupied zones. The parties consisted mainly of former members of the Centrist Party and other conservative parties active during the Weimar Republic. By 1950, regional associations in Bavaria coalesced to form the CSU while Christian parties in the other parts of Germany had united to form the CDU. Since then, the CSU has operated only within Bavaria, and the CDU has operated in all other states.

The collaboration between both unions dates back to the first national election in the Federal Republic of Germany in August 1949. Following the election, members of parliament of the CDU and CSU joined forces to create a permanent parliamentary party. The CDU/CSU union was the largest faction of the first German Bundestag and formed a coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the national conservative German Party (DP). Since then, no Chancellor has ever come from the CSU. The two CSU candidates who ran for Chancellor, Franz Josef Strauß and Edmund Stoiber, were both defeated by the SPD in 1980 and 2002.

Underlying the joint governing experience, the CDU and CSU have a long history of joint collaboration. They share a common youth organization and run on a joint manifesto during federal elections. Yet, their relationship has not always been amicable. In 1976, for example, the parties nearly ended their parliamentary union, which is renewed after every federal election. Although the CDU/CSU won the
election, they failed to replace the Social-Liberal coalition between the SPD and the FDP. Following the defeat, the CSU Bundestag faction decided to discontinue the agreement with the CDU. The party eventually recalled their decision after the CDU made some concessions to the CSU and threatened to also campaign in Bavaria.

At several occasions, the CSU has also tried to increase its influence outside Bavaria. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the CSU supported the newly formed German Social Union (DSU) with financial resources and political know-how to establish a CSU representation in the states of the former GDR. The CSU’s national congress in Leipzig in January 1990 was also the first time that a Western German party has held a big party meeting in Eastern Germany. In June 1990, 200 supporters of the CSU founded a regional association of the CSU in Saxony.

Despite repeated inter-party tensions, observers frequently describe the CDU and CSU as sister parties. As organizations, they function as entirely independent parties below the federal level with separate leaderships, decision-making bodies and distinct policy goals. As such, they frequently disagree on policy in their public statements and during electoral campaigns.

\[<<<FIGURE 1 HERE>>>\]

Notwithstanding their assumed coherence, the parliamentary factions do not always act in unity either. Figure 1 below shows the level of discipline within the CDU/CSU faction when rolls were called during the 16th and 17th legislature of the German Bundestag. The black line shows the change of factional discipline over time, while the dashed and solid lines show the mean level of agreement and the break between the two legislative periods. The data include every recorded vote including so called ‘free votes’ where factional discipline is not enforced. We define discipline
as the percentage of MPs from both parties that voted with the majority decision of
the faction. A score of 95 percent implies that five percent of MPs from both parties
vote differently than the faction majority.

The graph illustrates that the level of factional unity within the CDU/CSU
varies over time and was lower, and generally much more volatile, during the grand
colalition with the SPD from 2005 to 2009 than during the liberal-conservative
government with the FDP from 2009 onwards. One explanation for this disagreement
likely follows from the SPD’s focus on policies which highlight distinctions between
the two parties.

<<<FIGURE 2 HERE>>>}

These differences are not only at the abstract government level. The public
also observes their dis-unified behavior. Figure 2 further shows how public
perceptions about divisions between the two parties have changed over time using
annual cumulations from the Politbarometer public opinion survey. Since Angela
Merkel took over the leadership of the CDU in 2000, the perceived level of
disagreement between the CDU and the CSU has increased by nearly 30 percent. By
2005, two-third of the respondents thought that the Union was internally divided.
This number decreased when the two parties entered government in October 2005
only to increase again in the run up to the 2009 election.

The history of collaboration and confrontation between the CDU and CSU
suggests that their shared government performance occurs despite organizational
differences. As these two examples further illustrate, divisions between the CDU
and CSU are frequent. In the next section, we use provide an overview of data from
the parties’ national congresses. This data allows us to examine the parties’ underlying organizational preferences.

**Data and Methods**

We collect a new dataset of party leader and member speeches for the CDU and CSU over a twenty year period. In particular, we estimate the parties’ revealed preferences at these meetings by analyzing speeches given at the parties’ national conferences between 1990 and 2011. Party congresses in these parties are usually held once a year and offer delegates a relatively unconstrained platform to voice their opinions. We collected the original transcripts from the parties’ websites and the data archives of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Hans Seidel Foundation.1

Following recent advancements in automated text analysis, we use **WORDFISH** (Slapin and Proksch 2008) to retrieve the relative position of party speeches on the primary dimension of conflict.2 The **WORDFISH** algorithm uses the frequency of word usage to estimate word and document coefficients according to a Poisson distribution. The model then uses these estimates to group documents according to their most common word usage.

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2 We follow Grimmer and Stewart’s (2008) suggestions on how to prepare documents for automatic text classification and transform the documents to plain text, delete headers and footers and everything that is not part of the author’s speech. We also remove stop words, numbers, punctuation, and apply the Porter stemming algorithm to reduce words to their most basic word stems. Finally, we exclude words which occur in less than one percent and more than 99 percent of the documents. This leaves us with roughly 5000 words which we convert into a term document matrix with word counts for all documents.
In the primary analysis, we estimate one model for all 1268 speeches to calculate the actors’ preferences at each meeting on a principle left-right dimension. Based on this model, Figure 3 plots the yearly median position of the CDU (orange square) and the CSU (blue square), the point estimates of the respective leaders from both parties, and a mean position across all congresses (dashed line). Years in which the parties held more than one congress are marked by an underscore. At this point, CSU speeches following 1999 are publically unavailable. As an alternate source of evidence, however, the CDU frequently invites CSU leaders to speak at their congresses. We use the CSU leaders’ position at these meetings as a proxy for the party median following 1999.

Analysis

Our theoretical discussion implies differences between the CDU and the CSU at the organizational level, despite their continued collaboration. The logic of coalition formation expects that parties will simultaneously move apart or together to balance the goals of their sister party. This prediction contrasts one in which each party reacts in tandem or solely in line with public opinion, as in the ‘riding the wave’ hypothesis (e.g. Spoon and Klüver 2014).

We present evidence to support the balancing logic in Figure 3. Figure 3 illustrates that both parties and their leaders have changed their positions based on their speech at parties’ national meetings over time. Most noticeably, the model

3 We anchor the directionality of the model using speeches from Merkel in 2011 and Waigel in 1990 as more left and right respectively.
4 The results do not differ much if we use the mean instead of the median.
exhibits a clear leftward trend in the position estimates, especially when looking at the median position of the CSU congress and the party leaders’ position. The graph also shows that the party leaders’ positions frequently diverge from the party median.

<<<FIGURE 3 HERE>>>

The results presented in Figure 3 suggest that the CDU and CSU and their respective leaders have distinct positions which vary over time. An intriguing development is that shifts in the CSU party leader position at time $t+1$ often shift in opposition to shifts from the CDU at time $t$. The CSU party leader’s position in 1995, 1997 and 1999, for example, shifts more to the right from their past position following shifts towards the left from the CDU party leader in the previous years. More broadly, the CDU party leadership positions stake a relatively consistent leftward trend, whereas the CSU party leaders demonstrate a slightly more varied pattern.

To find out if the positions of both parties change in tandem we estimated the overall change in position for both parties and leaders over time. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the change in median positions for the CDU (orange) and CSU (blue) and their leaders from 1990 to 2011. The shaded areas indicate when the parties were in government while the dashed lines represent general elections.

<<<FIGURE 4 HERE>>>

The two time series show a number of interesting patterns. The difference between the median and party leader positions of both parties decreased over time. This might indicate that the CSU/CSU have become more ideologically similar in government. Second, as the coalition logic would predict, the overall trend of both time series suggests that both parties seemed to have changed their positions in
opposing directions prior to the general election in 1998. From their time in
opposition, however, until the end of their coalition with the FDP in 2009, the CDU
and CSU had changed their positions more in tandem.

Intriguingly, the leaders’ positions have more recently diverged, while the
parties’ medians have not. These differences are driven largely by Merkel’s move
towards the left. This might imply that the parties could be in for a leadership
dispute, which is unsupported by the membership’s positions.

However, without statistical time series analysis it is difficult to draw
conclusions about the differences in terms of the size and the direction of the two
parties’ changes in positions.

Conclusions

We have argued that the relationship between ideological close parties is more
complex than traditional descriptions take into account. Using evidence from two
historically close parties, the German CDU and CSU, we find that preference of party
medians and party leaders expressed at their national meetings appear ideologically
closer in certain contexts and more distant in others. The logic of electoral
competition suggests ideologically close parties distinguish their preference when in
government and in election years to draw policy in their preferred direction. We
provide some preliminary analysis consistent with this approach.

The results from this analysis hold clear implications for the study of party
politics. Researchers often treat sister parties as if they are a single party. Common
data sets, such as the Comparative Manifestos Project only include a single manifesto
for the German CDU and CSU in most elections. Our analysis suggests that studies not fully taking account of the complex relationship between these two organizationally distinct, but regular collaborators might arrive at unexpected results.

Furthermore, the relationships between parties likely hold important consequences for political representation. Classic formulations of the linkages between citizens and party government require that citizens have clear parties to choose between. Sister parties confuse that linkage as multiple ideologically close parties exist. Evidence of parties’ efforts for parties with slightly varying preferences to manage their separate constituencies indicates that the representation process is both more complex than often envisioned, but also still responsive to various constituency demands.
Appendix

Figure 1 Factional Discipline within the CDU/CSU faction.

Figure 2 Perceived Level of Internal Divisions within the CDU/CSU.
Figure 3 Relative party congress and party leader positions, 1990-2011.
Figure 4 Median positions of party congresses, 1990 – 2011.

Figure 5 Median positions of party leaders, 1990 – 2011.
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