The EU as a Global Actor:
‘A Force for Good in the World?’

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The EU as a Global Actor: ‘A Force for Good in the World?’

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From its inception and during the 1960 and 1970s, the European Communities (EC) was a rather irrelevant player in world politics. There was no genuinely common foreign policy and the EC’s role in the world was mainly manifested through a special trade-aid relationship with former colonies. By contrast, today’s European Union (EU) has emerged as one of the most important global forces in global politics, especially in fields such as international trade, environmental politics, energy, development policy, economic integration, democracy promotion, good governance, human rights, and to an increasing extent also in the promotion of peace and security. In fact, the EU’s ‘presence’ is felt more or less everywhere around the globe, albeit more in some sectors and areas of the world than in others.

There are, however, many different opinions about what type of ‘political animal’ the EU is. Critics argue that the EU has a diffuse and ineffective foreign policy, based on no genuinely shared values, and that the EU is an incomplete or merely potential ‘actor’. Critics reconfirm the relevance of Hedley Bull’s famous statement from 1982: ‘Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one’ (Bull 1982). Other scholars are more optimistic about the EU’s role as a global actor in today’s global politics (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Manners 2010). But even among the EU’s proponents there are different interpretations about the nature of its role as a global power and as an actor. Many perceive the EU as an ambiguous polity, and its foreign policy profile is a moving target.

Notwithstanding the ambiguities surrounding the EU’s role in the world,
since around the turn of the millennium there has been more or less an explosion of literature about the EU as a normative and ethical power. Many scholars of this debate claim that the EU deals with the external world in a different way compared to ordinary great powers, which are usually driven by geopolitical interests. This is, the argument goes, because the values promoted internally within the EU, such as social cohesion, the rule of law, democracy, and market economy, are also being projected in the EU’s external relations. As stated by Ian Manners: ‘The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics’ (Manners 2002: 252).

While Normative Power Europe (NPE) has become one of the most widely used concepts in the study of the EU over the past decade (Diez 2005; Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013; Forsberg, 2011; Manners 2002, 2006, 2011; Pace 2007; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; Storey 2006; Whitman 2006) skepticism has also been voiced as to both the usefulness and precision of the concept. As Helene Sjursen states in a special issue of the influential Journal of European Public Policy: ‘Existing conceptions of the EU as a “civilian”/”normative”/ “civilizing” power lack precision and are normatively biased. There may be “normative” or “civilian” dimensions to EU foreign policy, yet it is problematic to imply, as such conceptualizations do, that the EU is a “force for good” without identifying criteria and assessment standards that make it possible to qualify, substantiate or reject such a claim. How can we know that the EU’s pursuit of norms is legitimate?’ (Sjursen 2006: 235; also see Hyde-Price 2006). Sjursen goes on to underline that ‘it is only by presenting clear definitions of what “normative power” is, and consequently what it is not, that we can realistically hope to say something empirical about the argument’ (Sjursen 2006: 236). In the same special issue, Adrian Hyde-Price offers a fierce realist critique of what he sees as the liberal-idealists notions of the EU as a ‘normative’ or ‘civilian’ power, which regard the EU as ‘a novel and uniquely benign entity in international politics’ (Hyde-Price 2006: 217). ‘Central to such liberal-idealists arguments is the claim that the apparent weakness of the Union as an international actor – its lack of coercive instruments and its consequent reliance on declaratory politics and “soft power” – in fact constitute the very sources of its strength’ (Hyde-Price 2006: 217). Hyde-Price argues instead that structural realist theory can shed better light on the emergence, development and nature of EU foreign and security policy co-operation. More recently, scholars have also offered a more critical and postcolonial reading of NPE pointing towards the Eurocentrism and ‘civilizationalist’ hierarchies
that are implicit in the formulation of the concept but yet inherent to the EU’s claims to define ‘the new normal on the international scene’ (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013: 284; also see Manners 2011). As suggested by Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, ‘one may interpret “normative power Europe” as a sophisticated version of the “EU-centric” narrative, in which Europe’s unique transcendence of the state of nature, its atonement for intra-European warfare and the annihilation of the internal other, European Jewry, is achieved by shaping and exporting norms deemed to be truly universal “this time around”’ (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013:284).

There is also a debate about the ‘EU as a global actor’, which is rather separate from the debate about NPE. While the latter asks questions about ‘what type of power is the EU’, the former asks questions about ‘what type of actor is the EU’ and its qualities and characteristics as an ‘actor’. There have been an increasing number of studies about the EU’s actorness during the two last decades (Allen and Smith 1990; Ginsberg 1999; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010). Similarly to the debate about NPE, the literature about the EU as an actor emphasizes that the widening of the EU’s external policy is closely linked to the internal conditions within the Union (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Another similarity is that many (but not all) scholars in the two discourses perceive the EU as a sui generis actor in the global sphere. But while the literature on NPE is focused on the EU’s power, the literature on actorness is more concerned with the ‘capacities’ of the EU as well as the coherence and cohesion of its institutions and its policies.

This volume critically interrogates the role of the EU as a normative power and as a global actor from different theoretical, disciplinary and thematic perspectives. The book is an outcome of the 2013 European Research Day (Europaforskningsdag), hosted by the Centre for European Research at Gothenburg University (CERGU). The purpose of the European Research Day was to gather scholars to debate the EU’s role in the world. Under the somewhat provocative title ‘The EU as a Global Actor: A Force for Good in the World?’ the presentations raised pertinent questions regarding the ideological construction, self-image, function and consequences of the EU as a global power/actor from a historic as well as contemporary perspective and in various policy fields.

This collection contains three papers that focus on important themes raised during the European Research Day, followed by a final chapter by the keynote speaker of the event: Professor Ian Manners. In the first chapter, Anja K. Franck and Patricia Lorenzoni critically interrogate Manner’s much
cited idea of NPE – though tracing the historical representations of European exceptionalism. In doing this, the chapter highlights ‘the power that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power and how the EU constructs an identity against the image of others in the “outside world”’ (Diez 2005: 614). The chapter emphasizes the relevance of a postcolonial interpretation of the EU’s role in the world. While Europe’s colonial history sometimes surfaces there has in fact been little serious engagement with how colonial narratives influence contemporary representations of the EU as a normative power. The absence of postcolonial/decolonial theorization in literature about NPE illustrates not only the denial of Europe’s colonial past, but also how the EU has been able to productively use ‘breaks with the past’ to form its identity as a ‘new’ global actor – thereby effectively avoiding to engage with the way in which colonialism is an inherent feature of the EUnoeran project.

In the second chapter, Ann-Kristin Jonasson asks to what extent the EU democracy promotion policies have been successful in promoting democracy in southern and eastern Mediterranean. Drawing on in-depth and comparative analysis of two neighbouring countries – Jordan and Turkey — Jonasson identifies a number of shortcomings and weaknesses in the EU’s democracy promotion towards these countries. One of the EU’s weaknesses is related to the EU’s lack of credibility and tendency to speak with a forked tongue. The study shows that although the EU Commission attempts to be a ‘force for good’, many EU member states tend to guard their self-interests instead of promoting ‘common values’ like democracy. Jonasson also shows that the EU does not discuss what democratic values stand for in the local context. Indeed, the EU’s democracy promotion entails something totally different in the case of Turkey relative to the case of Jordan.

In the third chapter, Söderbaum analyzes the EU’s role as an actor in two policy domains in which the EU have very high ambitions (peace-building and development cooperation) towards one of its major partners (Africa). Söderbaum’s study reveals that the EU’s organizational machinery provokes institutional divisions and bureaucratic ineffectiveness in both policy fields and in different sub-regions in Africa. These similarities are rather surprising given the widely different institutional configurations within the EU in the two different policy fields. Indeed, the tensions between the EU’s central institutions (especially between the Commission and the Council) and some EU member states play out quite similarly in development cooperation as well as peace-building. These incoherencies are closely related to the EU’s failure to develop a systematic relationship with other international actors as well as with African counterparts. These internal incoherencies seem to be
a major explanation of the EU’s underdeveloped external policy approach. Söderbaum’s study concludes that (as a result of these weaknesses in the EU’s approach and strategy) the Union often tends to give more attention to rhetoric and establishing symbolic presence instead of real achievements and implementation on the ground.

In the concluding chapter, Ian Manners provides a ‘Copenhagen reflection’ on the EU as a global actor within the context of what is termed the Normative Power Approach (NPA). Manners starts out arguing that the NPA must be understood within the context of two decades of Copenhagen critical social theory. Thereafter, Manners combines both a reflection and response to the three contributions in the book by Franck and Lorenzoni, Jonasson and Söderbaum, respectively. The chapter rounds up with a reflection on what the book as a whole says about the study of the EU as a global actor in a Nordic context. According to Manners, the CERGU European Research Day and the book demonstrate just how well developed the study of the EU as a global actor has become in the Nordic countries over the past two decades.

References


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‘We are the good guys!’
Postcolonial reflections on the European Union as a normative power

Anja K. Franck and Patricia Lorenzoni

At the Delegation of European Union Commission in one of the Asian capitals, the Delegation official leans back in his chair: ‘So, are we going philosophical [now]?’ he asks in response to the question of how he views the European Union (EU) as a power and its role in the world today. Up until then the interview has largely revolved around the ongoing trade negotiations with the country in which he is placed. The question now posed is, agreed, less concrete but it is, nonetheless, highly relevant. The EU has made it an explicit trade policy objective to promote sustainable development through its external trade policy. The trade policy document ‘Global Europe: Competing in the world’, launched by the European Commission in 2006, states this with clarity:

As we pursue social justice and cohesion at home, we should also seek to promote our values, including social and environmental standards and cultural diversity, around the world (European Commission 2006: 5).

What does this tell us about the EU’s role in the world today? At the EU Delegation the answer is clear. It tells us, the Delegation official states: ‘That we [the EU] are the good guys.’ He continues:
We are the good guys. Absolutely. We are the good, unfortunately not strong enough, guys. When I look at what countries like Japan, Korea and China and even Australia and New Zealand have done in terms of negotiations in this region, or in other regions for that matter, you know these people are more hard-nosed than we are. They go in, I mean let alone the Chinese in Africa of course I mean that is … [waves his hands], these people go in and negotiate real trade deals [he emphasizes real], for their own interests. They don’t burden their agenda with sustainable development, civil society /…/ human rights or freedom of expression /…/ I think this really sets us apart from the rest of the world.\(^1\)

The explanation of the EU as ‘the good guys’ prompts a number of questions. One being if we should then understand ‘Europeans’ as ‘inherently good … compared to the rest of the world?’ Responding to this fairly provocative question, the Delegation officer elaborates:

I think so. Yes, I think so. /…/ I think our diversity is our strength and weakness at the same time. We have 28 member states, some of which are more hard-nosed than others, some of which are more protectionist than others, some are more free-traders than others /…/ It is our strength, because we can really be ecumenical, but it is also our weakness because it makes our negotiation position much more difficult. So, how do I see the role of the EU in the world? Whenever I give a speech, on any subject in this country, I always start by saying: Allow me to do some propaganda. I always start by saying that the EU is the greatest peacemaker in the world. We have won the Nobel Peace Prize not for nothing. We may not have won the Nobel Prize for economics with the Eurozone crises [he laughs] but I am extremely proud of what the EU has done, is doing, and is trying to do. /…/ I may be naïve but I really do believe that the EU is a force for good.

The interview at this EU Delegation also raised questions regarding Europe’s colonial past in the region – and how this influences (or not) contemporary relations between the EU and it’s Asian partners. The answers given to such questions reveal that while the colonial past is sometimes brought up (in relation to trust) between negotiating parties, it is not a prominent issue for the EU. The EU Delegation head states: ‘Because the past is the past. We have

\(^1\) Removed from this citation (marked with /…/) are the specificities that could reveal the particular trade agreement negotiation at hand.
turned the page, right?’ When asked to elaborate, he responds:

It’s not Europe versus the world or the former colonial masters versus the world. It’s the West versus the world. It’s the rich white West versus the world, regardless of colonialism and the colonial past. The superiority complex that we have and the inferiority complex that they have is just a fact of life.

While the above only serve as one example of how EU officials view the role of the EU in its external relations, the message conveyed regarding European exceptionalism has been a persuasive element of both public and academic debate around the EU’s role in the world today. Throughout this chapter we trace the historical representation of European exceptionalism, directing particular attention towards Ian Manner’s notion of Europe as a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2011, 2013). The focus here upon representation borrows inspiration from Thomas Diez (2004, 2005) and his suggestion that we need to pay attention to the power that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power. According to Diez, the success of this representation is not only ‘a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set by the EU’ but also something that ‘constructs an identity of the EU against the image of others in the “outside world”’ (Diez 2005: 614). While the idea of ‘Europe’ is, of course, complex and multifaceted, what we will focus upon is a notion of Europe as unique in its universality – and therefore bearer of a responsibility towards the rest of the world. The study should thus not be read as an attempt to capture all aspects of normative power approaches, but rather as an attempt to point to certain problems and silences in contemporary scholarship that might open up for a deeper understanding of what it means to represent Europe as a normative power.

**Approaching ‘Europe’ as a Normative Power**

Since Ian Manners first published his pioneering article on ‘Normative Power Europe’ in 2002, the concept has been the topic of vivid debate (cf. Diez 2004, 2005, 2013; Forsberg 2012; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Hyde-Price 2006; Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006; Pace 2007; Rosamond 2005; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; Storey 2006; Whitman 2006). While Manners have developed the concept in numerous articles (Manners, 2006a, 2006b, 2011, 2013), its essential elements remain more or less the same; Europe’s normative power does not rest on military nor purely economic might, but rather upon ‘ideo-
logical power’ or the ‘power over opinion’ and, importantly then, upon: ‘the ability to shape conceptions of “normal”’ (Manners 2002: 239). The EU’s role as an international actor is in view not shaped by what it does or says – but rather by ‘what it is’ (Ibid: 252). The fact that the EU is constructed on a normative basis (i.e. upon democracy, rule of law, social justice and international human rights norms) therefore predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics (Ibid). Importantly, however, the norms promoted by the EU through its external policies, are not necessarily viewed as specific EU policies, but rather as universal in character and, as such, as being beneficial or progressive to all involved parties (Storey 2006).

While the historical context in which the ‘European project’ was formed has been argued to accelerate the EU’s ‘commitment to placing universal norms at the center of its relations’ (Manners 2002: 241), postcolonial interventions in the normative power debates have remained remarkably scarce (for a notable exception see Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013)). In the following paper we therefore hope to contribute to address this lack.

Post(-)colonialism can be understood in several different ways. Sharp (2009) proposes that we can think about this in terms of post-colonial approaches (with a hyphen) that primarily refer to the time period after colonialism and postcolonial theorizing (without a hyphen) that moves beyond the sole focus upon the political and economic impacts of colonial rule, towards an analysis that considers ‘the importance of the cultural products of colonialism, particularly the ways of knowing the world that emerged’ (Sharp 2009: 5). This production of knowledge, thus, has geopolitical dimensions that are in the present as much as in the past. In addition, problematizing the terminology of the ‘post’, for it running the risk of reinscribing a colonial temporal logic, Mignolo (2000) has further suggested using modernity/coloniality as mutually constitutive concepts for the analysis of how colonial relations operate in the present tense, rather than as a legacy of a past deemed less desirable.

**Genealogies of the ‘European Project’**

In the motivation of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee 2012, it is stated that ‘with successive enlargement, the Union has continued to spread peace and democracy on the continent, by taking in new member-states.’ Europe, so it seems, in itself represents certain values, and the EU is the present embodiment of this ideal Europe. Consequently, the enlargement of the Union is understood as an expansion of what the EU per definition is: peace and democracy, grounded in the historical moment of birth of the EU project. Also
in academic discussions of normative power, the role of the EU as a ‘force for peace and well-being’ frequently takes center stage (Diez 2005: 620). The difference between the EU and historical empires as well as contemporary global powers trying to simply promote their own norms, Manners (2002: 240) suggests, derives from that:

The EU was created in a post-war historical environment which reviled the nationalisms that had led to barbarous war and genocide. Because of this the creation of Community institutions and policies took place in a context where Europeans were committed to ‘pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’.

This is a powerful (and persistent) representation of the European Communities/Union in EU studies (and beyond): the war-torn Europe which rose from the ashes and atrocities committed during World War II to form a Union based on the idea of peace and liberty for all. As such, the EU project represents both continuity with a European tradition of humanism, and discontinuity with the horrors immediately preceding it. Looking for similar representations in contexts of cultural and intellectual debate, we find them given new urgency as response to crisis and unrest. If the EU has successfully promoted itself as an embodiment of ‘Europe’, the Eurozone crisis turn into not only a European crisis in the sense of it taking place in Europe; it is a crisis for Europe. This perspective was powerfully articulated in a manifesto published in a number of European newspaper in January 2013, and signed by several prominent intellectuals, among them Bernard-Henri Lévy, Umberto Eco, Julia Kristeva, Salman Rushdie and Antonio Lobo Antunes. The manifesto is a desperate plea for the very belief in Europe as a countermeasure to current turbulence:

Europe [...] is dying, Europe as an idea. Europe as a dream, a project, a plan. The Europe that was celebrated by Edmund Husserl [...] in Vienna shortly prior to the Nazi disaster. Europe as will and representation, as vision and place for construction, the Europe that our parents created, that became a new idea which brought an until then unknown peace, prosperity and democracy for the peoples after the war (Lévy et. al. 2013).

This plea must be put in context to the haunttings of National Socialism evoked by the entering in the Greek Parliament of the Golden Dawn. We should, however, be attentive to how the text performs a break between a European
project created by ‘our parents’ on the one hand, and the terrors of the ‘Nazi disaster’ on the other. Fascism appears as a modern variation of what *media tempestas* became in renaissance imagination (see Mignolo 2002: 940); an exception of history, from which a true Europe now need to be reborn.

In this narrative, in which fascism turns into a contradiction to Europe and European integration a response to fascism, colonial histories of EU member states are also occluded. Moving back a decade to perhaps more optimistic times, we might look at the reports from the Prague Castle Conferences in the early 2000s, jointly organized by Tony Blair’s London-based think-tank Foreign Policy Centre and the Prague-based Institute for International Relations. While the 2001 conference stated that ‘Europe’s founding fathers had a vision of peace, prosperity and democracy – which against the odds they achieved’, the 2003 conference was held under the heading: *Can Europe be a Force for Good in the World?* One of the main concerns this year was the spreading of European ideas and values:

[...] the question of what it is to be ‘European’ may become open to new answers. Participants [in the conference] foresaw a period in which identity is defined less by ethnic or geographical factors than commitment to certain values, rising the possibility of elites outside Europe becoming more ‘European’ than some of the minority populations within it. [...] Europe must, therefore, ask how it can manage and direct the spread of its ideas (British Council 2004: 13).

Now, from a historical perspective, the answers hinted in the text are far from new. Rather, they echo answers given to colonial évolutés during the 19th and the 20th centuries, as well as questions on the belonging of and the need to civilize certain populations within Europe – be it Roma, Saami, peasant or working class, to mention a few (Lorenzoni 2008). Producing a category of non-European Europeans, the text thus turns certain kind of integration issues (or rather, segregation issues) into a question of the ‘management and direction of ideas’.

By the time of the conferences, the Czech Republic was negotiating its own entry into the European Union. Referring to ‘Europe’s founding fathers’ the 2001 conference identifies the EU with ‘Europe’ and places the Czech Republic as still outside but about to join Europe. European states can, so it seems, revive their ‘Europeanness’ by membership in the Union.

Let us, for a moment, turn back to the exclusion of colonial histories
in narratives of ‘Europe’ as a peace project. While the Czech Republic was outside the new Europe when it was founded, what scholarly work has only recently begun to take seriously into account are that whole regions not conceived of as ‘European’ were nonetheless within. Let us listen to the words of French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, who in 1957, after the conclusion of the Rome Treaty negotiations, stated:

I would like to insist upon the unity of Europe: it is now a fact. A few days ago we jumped over the last hurdles that were on its way, and now an even broader unity is being born: EURAFRICA, a close association in which we will work together to promote progress, happiness and democracy in Africa (quoted in Hansen and Jonsson 2011:445).

In 1957 France was still a major colonial power and, not to forget, fighting a war in order to keep Algeria as a French département. Following the participation of colonial troops in WWII, and the deception in the colonies when confronted with the refusal of the metropoles to recognize claims for independence, the 1950s was a period of colonial unrest and uprising. No project of European integration could possibly ignore the question of colonial rule. The Treaty of Rome, rephrasing this questions into terms of partnership, consequently confirms ‘the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ (Preamble of the Treaty of Rome). This was written at a point in time when the signatory states – Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands – held over 20 colonies, most of them in Africa. Adding the countries that would later join to form the European Union, we can see that in 1957 they held over 80 colonies, the last one gaining its independence in 1984.

A silence surrounds the colonies when the project of European integration is commonly represented today. For if the EU today is composed of countries with a colonial past (a pastness that can, however, be disputed), the European Communities was a creation in which colonial powers – and therefore the colonies themselves – indeed was part. While colonies where struggling, often violently, for independence, European integration was from metropolitan perspective seen as a possible means to safeguard the bonds between metropole and colony. The notion of ‘Eurafrica’ was the most powerful expression of this desire (Hansen and Jonsson 2015).

The legitimacy of European colonial rule was based on a notion of Eu-
Europe as bearer of a specific responsibility towards the world, the *mission civilisateur* that burdened Europe with the task of reshaping the world in its own likeness. This mission also had an internal side, directed towards the civilizing and modernizing of population groups considered ‘backwards’. ‘Europeanness’ in this respect did not necessarily follow from dwelling in Europe, not even if one had done so for generations. This is the very same conditioned Europe evoked not only by the Prague Castle Conference, but also by Eco et al. when they refer to Husserl’s Vienna lecture. The lecture was held in 1935, at the eve of the Nazi terrors, and later published as *Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man*. After stating that while the US in a ‘spiritual sense’ belongs to Europe, ‘Eskimos, Indians or Gypsies’ do not, Husserls says:

[In Europe] lies something unique, which all other human groups, too, feel with regard to us, something that apart from all considerations of expediency, becomes a motivation for them [...] constantly to Europeanize themselves, whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, for example Indianize ourselves (Husserl 1965: 169).

The desire of the Other to become the Same is a central figure in the legitimating narratives of European colonial rule; the need for the Other to become the Same, the only hope for the Other being in the possibility of becoming the Same. Europe, by embodying this sameness, is therefore unique in its universality. In another context, of another European – as well as colonial – war, English novelist D. H. Lawrence writes in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell in 1916:

I become more and more surprised to see how far higher, in reality, our European civilisations stand, than the East, Indian and Persian, ever dreamed of. [...] The East is *marvellously* interesting for tracing our steps back. But for going forward, it is nothing. All it can hope for is to be fertilised by Europe, so that it can start on a new phase (Lawrence 2002:608, italics in original).

What is remarkable with this celebration, is that it is written in the middle of WWI. However critical Lawrence was of militarism, the war did not shake his firm belief in the universal character of European civilization. The East, in its particularity, has a value as a past. But with the unfolding of the universal present, identified with Europe, it looses all strength.

Through European intellectual history, the inquiries as to what it is that
makes Europe uniquely universal, runs as one of the strongest themes. In his 1905 study *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* Max Weber, with sensitivity to time and place, addresses European exceptionalism not only as given, but also as a question of origin and point of view of the scholar. The introduction reads:

A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value (Weber 1974:13).

Weber thus links the urge to ask the question about the origin of the scholar (‘a product of modern European civilization’), and hints to the inevitableness of selective interpretations of history (‘as we like to think’). However, the text itself, by accepting the premises relativized in the introduction, immediately closes the window previously opened, and reaffirms the universality of Europe – and America as extension thereof. We can regard this as symptomatic. Indeed, Weber is writing not only of colonial America, but also in the heydays of European imperialism. What is occluded by the closure performed in his text is the indispensable relation between claims to universality and military power (cf. Chakrabarty 2000). The power of Europe to *successfully* represent itself as universal then becomes an enigma. Weber seeks his solutions not in geopolitical but in internal cultural factors; rationalities and values represented as specifically European.

Such an idealization of history had already decades before Weber’s study been powerfully performed by Hegel, for whom military enterprise (such as Napoleon’s war of expansion) is transformed into a mere function of a Universal Spirit, creating history by movement in space and time. In his *Philosophy of History* from 1831 Hegel writes:

The world is divided into *Old* ad *New*; the name of *New* having originated in the fact that America and Australia have only lately become known to us. But these parts of the world are not only relatively new, but intrinsically so in respect of their entire physical and psychical constitution. [---] The history of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History. [...] The History of the World is the discipline
of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience to a Universal principle and conferring subjective freedom (Hegel 1861:84, 109-110, italics in original).

The connection between subsumption into the universal – represented by Europe – and freedom, is as clear as it can be. Looking at another passage, now from Hegel’s earlier Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), he in interesting ways elaborates on the specificity of the European mind:

... the European mind opposes the world to itself, makes itself free of it, but in turn annuls this opposition, takes its other, the manifold, back into itself, into its unitary nature. In Europe, therefore, there prevails this infinite thirst for knowledge which is alien to other races (Hegel 2000: 43).

The purpose of these examples is not to construct an artificial identity between such diverse writers and thinkers such as Hegel, Weber and Lawrence. What we wish to show is how the representation of Europe as the embodiment of certain (universal) norms, gaining its power to act in the world through these norms, is a main line of thought in European modernity, and thus has a history considerably older than the current project of European integration. Dussel (1995) traces the genealogies of this European exceptionalism as far back as to early modern Christian expansion in the Americas. The dialectical operation of the mind described by Hegel, Dussel reads as a secular rearticulation of how the modern ‘I’ operates by subsuming the Other in the category of the Same. The year of 1492 is for Dussel a birth moment for this modern ‘I’ that defines itself as conqueror, distancing itself from the world in order to be able to take possession of it. In early modern times, the *I-conqueror* is articulated most strongly in the Spanish expansion westward, made sense of as an expansion of the Christian realm, and soon also as the ‘discovery’ of a ‘new’ world to be transformed into Christian likeness. Expansive universalism implies a negation of the alterity of the Other, reducing the Other to a non-fulfilled variation of the universal Same.

In modern post-Enlightenment times, the subsumption of the Other as a non-fulfilled Same, operates through what Fabian (2002) has termed a ‘denial of coevalness’, that is, the placing of the Other in another time than the one inhabited by the modern subject (as in civilized vs. primitive, modern vs. traditional etc). Dussel’s point, interesting for our argument, is the ideological continuity between Christian narratives of salvation and secular narratives of
civilizing/modernizing through the spread of universal values. By representing themselves precisely as breaking with (Catholic) barbarism of the past, secular colonial projects could rearticulate themselves as new embodiments of the universal. Two things are at stake here. Firstly, the constitutive role of colonial expansion in the creation of ‘Europe’, understood not only as a geopolitical entity, but also, to speak with Eco et. al., as ‘will and representation’. And secondly, the very pastness of the past.

Concluding Reflections on the Implications for Normative Power Europe Approaches

The absence of postcolonial/decolonial theorization in normative power Europe approaches, according to Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis (2013: 284), attests to ‘just how effective the denial of Europe’s pre-world-war colonial past has been since the inception of the EU project’. In fact:

Europeans have managed to create and fine-tune their Union over the past 50 years in a fascinating kind of ‘virgin birth’ – as if the new entity had nothing to do with the past of its most powerful Member States. In short, Eurocentrism stubbornly survived European imperialism (Ibid).

In an attempt to address this denial, we have shown the ideological continuity not only in the history of an exceptionalist notion of Europe, but also in the repeated discursive breaks with the past. By breaking with a past turned obsolete, ‘Europe’ can renew its mandate to act in the world as bearer and promoter of universal norms. The precondition here is the pastness of the past, as reaffirmed by the EU Delegation official in the interview that opened this article. The past has to be dead and buried. To paraphrase Derrida (2006: 9) on the presence of the ghostly: It is necessary to make sure that the past is really past. Let it stay there, and move no more!

In the case of the EU, the break with the past is performed through the reproduction of 1957 as a mythical birth moment taking place within Europe, rather than in and between European empires. This Europe then, is represented as something new – the materialization of the dream of peace and democracy held by the founding fathers – separating colonial pasts form the project of European integration. As Bhambra (2013: 10) suggests:

The European project [...] now assigns all unbounded histories to
the histories of individual states, and not to the history of Europe. Colonialism becomes the past property of individual national-states to be displaced by a new narrative of European integration free from the stain of colonialism. By erasing the colonial past, however, the postcolonial present of Europe is also disavowed.

As shown above, however, articulations of a normative responsibility towards the world are historically articulated on a European level as much as on a national. Several scholars, Manners included (cf. Manners 2013), have in recent years stated the need for further postcolonial scrutiny of normative power Europe approaches. While welcoming this, we perceive it as problematic how such propositions have largely asked questions around how ‘past European failures and crimes (such as colonialism, nationalism, world wars, the holocaust and inequality) … are part of the normative power narrative’ (Manners 2006: 174), rather than engaging with the fact that the ‘new’ Europe was from the very beginning a colonial creation (Hansen and Jonsson 2011). That is: the fact that European integration was founded not on a colonial past – but on a colonial present.

If coloniality, as argued by among others Dussel (1995) and Mignolo (2000), is inseparable from European modernity and universalism, in the sense that modern ‘Europe’ was both materially and ideologically created through its (colonial) relation to the rest of the world, then colonialism cannot be easily understood as a ‘failure’ possible to separate from ‘good’ modernity. This, in turn has wide implications for the notion of the EU as a normative power. Provocatively phrased, we can then understand colonialism (despite the phrasing of commitment to equal and just development in various policy agreements and documents) as an inherent feature of the European project. And, paraphrasing Manners’ proposition from 2002, this predisposes it to act accordingly in global politics.

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Quarterly, 101:4 Fall, pp. 927-954.
The EU’s Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: Shortcomings and Perspectives

Ann-Kristin Jonasson

To its south and south-east, the European Union (EU) borders on a range of countries, which – for different reasons – have not been marked by a democratic political order. Arguably, one exception from this is Turkey, a candidate to the EU, which started accession negotiations in October 2005. Turkey definitely has its share of democratic problems, even if accession negotiations have triggered considerable political reform. Even if many of the southern Mediterranean countries since 2011 have seen popular uprisings against the entrenched autocracies, outcomes have been mostly disappointing from a democratic point of view.

Over the years, the EU has worked, not least as a part of its security strategy, to promote democracy in this region. Indeed, the Mediterranean region is of vital strategic importance to the EU, and it has identified the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries as prioritized areas in its external relations (European Council 2003). But to what extent have the EU democracy promotion policies been successful in making for democracy in this part of the world?

In recent years, academics have pointed out that the EU democracy promotion in the area has largely failed, leaving the authoritarian states basically intact (Youngs et al. 2008; Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta 2009). According to Youngs, ‘[o]verall the EU is failing to meet the challenges of a more complex international environment for democracy and human rights, having declined
fundamentally to reassess its democracy support in either qualitative or quantitative terms’ (Youngs et al. 2008: 2).

Recent events have led the EU to reconsider its policies in the area. Indeed, from all the EU institutions there have been far-reaching calls for a new approach. However, so far most analysts find little new in this approach, instead basically regarding it as more of the same (Echagüe, Michou and Mikail 2011; Pace and Hassan 2012; Alian 2012; Youngs 2012). Serious shortcomings are thus still attached to the EU’s democracy promotion policies. In this chapter, a number of such shortcomings are identified, based on an in-depth analysis of how the EU works with democracy promotion in two neighbouring countries – Jordan and Turkey.2

The EU has devised two major policy frameworks in relation to countries in its vicinity – Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). While Turkey is involved in the first, Jordan is involved in the second. By selecting one country from each programme, comparisons between these policy frameworks can be carried out. The differences between Jordan and Turkey in relation to the EU open up for interesting comparisons. While Turkey, vowing commitment to the values of the Union, aspires for EU-membership and therefore has to meet the Copenhagen criteria (one of which focuses on democracy), Jordan has no such aspirations. However, also relations between the EU and Jordan – which have grown more important over the years – are based on democratic commitments. In both cases, the EU has the explicit objective to work for further democratization. Thus, from the point of view of this study, both countries can be classified as cases for EU democracy promotion, in line with the general definition, which covers ‘all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes, democratization of autocratic regimes, or consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries’ (Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). However, it is important to note that EU democracy promotion starts at different levels in the two countries. While Turkey is ranked as partly free in the Freedom House ranking, Jordan is ranked as not free (Freedom House 2014).

By selecting countries included in the two major EU policy frameworks for its Mediterranean neighbours, conclusions can be drawn regarding shortcomings as well as perspectives of democracy promotion. This is interesting both from a theoretical, an empirical and a policy-perspective.

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Shortcomings in the EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion

Lack of Credibility: Saying one Thing, Doing Another

The EU’s policies to promote democracy in its neighbouring countries around the Mediterranean have been greatly impaired by its lack of credibility. In relation to ENP countries, like Jordan, the EU itself has admitted to falling ‘prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region’, and to supporting those instead of democracy (Füle 2011). Thus, while constantly appealing to democracy and human rights, the EU has long sustained security and stability, rather than made for democracy.

In Jordan, this double agenda on the part of the EU has been met by a matching double agenda: While the Jordanian government has welcomed the support for democratization, little has been done to realize it. This lack of action has been supported, and indeed rewarded, by the EU, effectively letting down pro-democracy activists seeking its support. If the objectives of stability and security on the part of the EU have clashed with the objective of democracy, the former have invariably won out – both in Jordan and generally in the ENP countries (e.g. Youngs et al 2008; Tocci et al 2008; Emerson and Youngs 2009; Svensson 2009, Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011 and Pace and Hassan 2012). Recently, it has become clear that the EU still supports the Jordanian regime, which is not boosting the EU’s credibility as a promoter of democracy.

Also in Turkey, the EU suffers from a lack of credibility, given that there is no guarantee of Turkish membership, regardless of whether all conditions are met. Instead, this final decision rests in the hands of the member states, some of which are decidedly against Turkey’s membership regardless of its achievements.

If the project of democratization pursued is not credible, since it rests on other objectives than democratization, this is inauspicious for its chances of success. Research shows that if other competing objectives are prioritized, democracy will invariably lose out (Grimm and Leininger 2012). Lack of credibility of the project of democratization also seriously erodes the concept of democracy, making it useless in international relations. Such erosion of democracy as a concept is not only regretted by defenders of democracy all over the globe, it arguably also has a negative impact on the chances of reaching stability and security. The need for genuine democracy to make for stability is
stressed by the EU itself, as it is admitted that “old stability” wasn’t working. That is why we need to build a new “sustainable stability”, built on ‘deep democracy’ (Ashton 2011). After all, democracy is seen as a prerequisite for stability. For that genuine democracy is needed, nothing less will do.

Also the different messages flowing out from the EU contributes to the lack of consistency, and thus credibility, in relation to democracy promotion. While the Commission aims to be a “force for good” and the Parliament often is very critical of different shortcomings in the EU’s democracy promotion, the member states in the Council are prone to guard their self-interests and at least some of them are outright reluctant to prioritize democracy, instead using references to “common values” like democracy for diverse interest-based reasons. This tendency to speak with a forked tongue does not help to build credibility. Nor does the sometimes confused organization of support on the ground contribute to the credibility of democracy promotion. The EU itself admits that there is at times both an unfortunate lack of coordination between policy and assistance on the EU-side, and an unclear structure of cooperation on the partner side (Council of the European Union 2009; Youngs 2012).

Even if the EU, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, has recognized that the lack of credibility in its democracy promotion is a problem, little has however changed in the EU’s policies so far, despite all protestations to the contrary. The EU has a history of alleging to change its policies, while change has proved difficult to effectuate. So far, the democracy promotion policies have continued to primarily reflect the EU’s economic and political interests, not its professed democratic values. However, the window of opportunity is not yet closed. The EU still has a choice: Either it can sincerely prioritize – also in deed – democratization in its neighbouring countries around the Mediterranean, even if it does entail some seriously difficult decisions, or it can continue to prioritize its other interests over democratic values. In either case, the EU should declare its priorities clearly, to re-build its highly tarnished credibility and legitimacy.

‘Common Values’ – Not so Common

Even if the EU rhetorically goes to great lengths in emphasizing the importance of a commitment to common universal values in its projects of democratization, the presence of such common values is far from ensured in the partner countries. Moreover, the EU takes these democratic values for granted and do not discuss what democracy in fact entails with its partners. From the EU’s perspective, the democratic values form the basis of the policies, but
what the values stand for in the local context is not dealt with – it is assumed that both partners subscribe to these “common” values. Instead of being seriously discussed, democracy is used as a slogan under the assumption that its interpretation is shared and unambiguous.

This essential vagueness regarding the “common” values is equally problematic in Jordan and Turkey, given the pivotal role of these values in the EU’s policy frameworks. In the accession negotiations, like those with Turkey, the EU stipulates both values and priorities. However, unless the orientation of the candidate state basically coincides with the EU’s orientation a priori, neither the local orientation towards – nor the local ownership of – the project of democratization initialized are ensured. Only if the orientations coincide, the EU’s priorities can be expected to largely overlap with those of the candidate, and the candidate would by and of itself largely make the same priorities to reach the same democratic objectives as those set up by the EU. However, if it cannot be ascertained to what extent the values and orientation of the candidate coincide with those of the EU, as in the case of Turkey, reform priorities might differ.

Such differing reform priorities indeed seem to be the case in relation to Turkey. These discrepancies lead to a paradox: The objective to meet the EU-criteria clashes with the objective to pursue a process of democratization based on local orientations and values. In this case, the accession negotiations are not conducive to a successful democratization and sustainable democracy, if this is to be based on local democratic orientations, even if they can trigger reforms. This paradox becomes even more acute as the final decision on membership rests wholly in the hands of the EU member states – especially as member states have shown a ‘creeping nationalization’ in relation to the enlargement policy, in particular regarding Turkey, making national concerns increasingly important for the final outcome (Hillion 2010). Thus, the EU sets the criteria, and it is not always clear what the criteria are or how they will be evaluated. To become a member, Turkey has to meet these somewhat evasive criteria, arguably at least partly set for dubious reasons, which are not fully based on a local orientation and ownership. The sustainability of a democratization process induced in this manner is highly questionable.

Also in relation to Jordan, not only the ambivalent nature of the EU’s (double) agenda is inherently problematic for democracy promotion, but also the use of the concept “common values”. In this case, it is not only unclear what these common values consist of, it is also highly debatable to what extent the EU and Jordan in fact can be said to have a similar outlook on democracy. Instead, the EU takes for granted that democracy, as it understands it, is
based on already shared values, citing that “common values” refer to universal values incorporated in various agreements, that most partners – including Jordan – have signed, in particular the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. How these values are interpreted in the local context is not ventured into – contextualization of these values is given no attention by the EU. Instead, the EU generally aims at an engagement with various actors, supposedly ‘leading to a progressive consolidation of accountable, effective and democratic institutions and the internalization of democratic principles and practices’ (European Commission 2009b: 5). The impact of such an approach in making for common values is however unclear. Meanwhile, the “common” values at the very core of the ENP remain highly ambiguous.

Several scholars have deconstructed the EU’s use of the concept “common values”. Dimitrovova point to the inherent contradiction between interests and values in the EU’s policies, referring to that the ‘EU’’s self-perception is centred on exporting and sharing its values with outsiders. At the same time, we can observe less emphasis on common values and more on common interests. When these two aspects are in tension, it is usually the common interests of energy, migration or trade preferences that trump declared values’ (Dimitrovova 2010: 11). Leino and Petrov show that the EU takes advantage of the abstractness of the concept by appointing itself as the interpreter of those values, reminding us that ‘this is … not the first case in which the reference to universal values might be used to cover the actor’s own particular objectives – after all, as Proudhon first famously put it, “whoever says universal values wants to cheat”’ (Leino and Petrov 2009: 669). In relation to the ENP, Pace states that the EU as ‘a normative power/hegemon defines what is normal as well as those that must be “normed”… The logic behind the … ENP strategy may therefore be read as an attempt by the EU to encourage its neighbours to come to understand and emulate the ideas underlying its structural power’ (Pace 2007: 667). Thus, ‘the EU remains the exclusive generator of norms and the sole agent who defines and maintains this norm structure’ (Pace 2007: 667). In relation to enlargement, Stivachtis argues that the EU ‘membership conditionality … can be seen as a new form of the historical standard of “civilization”’ (Stivachtis 2008: 87), presenting a model for others to emulate.

The EU’s use of the concept “common values” is thus highly contested. It is argued that the EU wants to create good neighbours who share its values and standards, and that it therefore emphasizes the orientation to purportedly “common” values such as democracy, controlling their interpretation, when the presence of such common values in fact is highly questionable.

Indeed, it has been difficult for the EU to arrive at a definition of the
“common” value of democracy to be promoted, not least as the EU member states themselves differ on how to conceptualize democracy, which underscores the point that democracy is not such an unambiguous concept after all (cf. Pace and Hassan 2012). However, there have been some efforts. In the 2009 Agenda for action on democracy support, an attempt is made to reach a common definition of democracy, emphasizing ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the principle of non-discrimination… [and] the rights of persons belonging to minorities’, ‘gender equality and women’s rights’, as well as ‘solidarity and justice’, along with an emphasis on ‘elected representatives and political parties and institutions, independent media and civil society’ (Council of the European Union 2009).

Importantly, the EU here thus mixes an emphasis on democracy criteria based on institutions and processes, with distinct liberal traits. Apart from emphasizing the need for contestation and participation, in line with Dahl’s definition of polyarchy, it adds a liberal concern for minorities and women’s rights, as well as some social concerns for solidarity.\(^3\) The way in which democracy promotion is played out in the policy documents and on the ground also reveals a liberal bias, with strong emphasis on individual rights and freedoms and market economics (Pace and Hassan, 2012, Tocci, 2012). This liberal tilt is further evident in what the EU focuses. For instance, it can be argued that the strong support to civil society is informed by a liberal definition of democracy, focusing individual representation over group-based claims (cf. Ketola 2011).

Importantly, as we have seen, the model promoted by the EU is perceived as liberal democratic in the neighbouring Mediterranean states (Pace 2011: 802). However, it can be questioned whether democracy with such a strong liberal leaning is suitable – and thus sustainable – in these contexts. Indeed, liberal democratic values are not necessarily compatible with – and are potentially carrying less palatable rings of neo-Imperialism to – Turkish and Arab settings.

In general, liberalism as a political ideology has hitherto reaped little success in this part of the world, where values are more conservative, infused by Islam (Pace 2011). In fact, perceptions of many issues related to democracy vary greatly between the EU and its Mediterranean partners – the role of religion in public life, the role of civil society, individualism vs. collectivism, role of women, limits on personal freedom and freedom of expression, and so

forth.\footnote{For example, both liberal and Islamist thinking limit the freedom of expression, but in very different ways – while the liberal definition e.g. protects against incitements of racial hatred, the Islamist definition e.g. protects against religious denigration.} Here, freedom is defined on the basis of home-grown understandings of citizenship, rights, social justice and welfare (Pace 2011; Pace and Hassan 2012). What is more, liberal democracy in the EU’s version comes with strong connections to economic liberalism, which is not necessarily in line with local ideals (Tocci 2012). Also the liberal outlook on the civil society often fails to resonate with the local context (Ketola 2011).

I argue that sensitivity to the local context in the promotion of democracy is necessary for success. Thus, democracy needs to be contextualized and based on local values to be sustainable. This is difficult without actually discussing the core matter: What democracy in fact entails? In this situation a pertinent question may be asked in relation to the supposedly “common values”: \textit{What} values are in fact shared by \textit{whom}?

Moreover, the question is what kind of democracy the EU is promoting? Is it democracy as a decision method, irrespective of what values that will emerge? Or is it a democracy infused with liberal values? In relation to Turkey, the issue is clear – the EU here promotes the liberal democratic values that it itself is (purportedly) committed to. The prevalent lack of orientation towards those same liberal democratic values in Turkey thus becomes decidedly troublesome.

In relation to Jordan (and other Arab states), the evidence here suggests that the EU tries to square the circle. On the one hand, the EU stresses that it ‘does not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political reform…’ (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011: 2), and that reform should be ‘based on the respect for every partners’ specificities…’ (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2012a: 2). On the other hand, the EU pledges that ‘it will insist that each partner country’s reform process reflect a clear commitment to universal values’ (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011: 2–3). In doing so, the EU emphasizes – apart from the ubiquitous free and fair elections, freedom of expression and assembly and rule of law – liberal priorities like the civil society, gender equality, fight against discrimination, respecting freedom of religion and protecting rights of minorities and refugees, as well as market economy (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011).
However, free and fair elections might not coincide with a prioritization of issues like gender equality, fight against discrimination and protecting rights of minorities. The difference between promoting liberal democratic values and promoting democratic institutions and processes is potentially immense. Making the Jordanian majority embrace liberal democratic values – along the stated government strategy – is a gargantuan undertaking. Introducing a democratic process, in which the people can vote for a government of their liking, based on currently held values – along the Islamist vision – could be next to instantaneous.

If people in the neighbouring Mediterranean states are allowed to formulate their own version of democracy, chances are that it will not be of predominantly liberal variety – and not readily in line with the EU’s values. In this context, it can be asked how much the EU is willing to compromise its liberal values to further democratic institutions and processes? What is to be prioritized by the EU – a local concept of democracy, based on local values or democracy based on liberal values? What is to be the basis of the conditionality – priorities defined by liberal democratic values or democratic institutions and processes? Indeed, to what extent will the EU support a locally based democracy leading away from liberal values? This is a challenge presently facing the EU in its southern neighbourhood.

If the EU is not prepared to compromise its liberal interpretation of democracy, this would suggest that there are limits to the EU’s democracy promotion in this region, at least in the foreseeable future, as it would only have prospects for success in countries already oriented towards liberal democratic values, making it a lost cause on most Mediterranean neighbouring states. However, the EU may choose to promote a broader democracy that might even challenge liberal democratic values, by ensuring that local values are taken into account, moulding local democratic orientations by way of ownership and dialogue.

Lately, in the EU’s new response to the Arab spring, more emphasis on inclusive development and social welfare can be detected (Alian 2012). Also in the 2012 Strategic framework and action plan on human rights and democracy, it can be noted that while the heavy emphasis on human rights are primarily of liberal kind, it also explicitly refers to economic, social and cultural rights, indicating the influence of a more substantive, social definition of democracy (Council of the European Union 2012). This can be interpreted as a step in the direction of a broader definition of democracy. To what extent the liberal outlook on democracy is now being remodelled through the new concept of “deep democracy” remains to be seen. However, still these defi-
tions are not a result of local consultations, based on local aspirations, but emanate from Brussels (Pace and Hasssan 2012; Alian 2012). To what extent is consideration given in the EU-devised policies to what the partners want?

The lack of dialogue on democracy with the partner societies further aggravates the problems of coming to terms with what democracy in fact entails on the ground. The analysis shows that the EU primarily communicates with the partner governments. However, the governing elites are prone to take a patronizing attitude towards ordinary citizens, pursuing their own agenda, instead of acting in line with voter preferences. In its attempts to reach society at large, the EU focuses on relations with civil society organizations. However, the evidence shows that this focus is not without problems. Civil society is not always “civil”, but often has rather substantial ties to the regime. Further, it is often elitist, with little connections to the man on the street. What is more, the structure of the EU’s project-based support benefits those organizations that know how to play the game, rewarding organizations already familiar to the EU, effectively making them EU-partners. These problems make the reach of the EU into society through NGOs questionable. The EU neither goes to greater lengths in approaching the political opposition. This makes the opposition feel left out of the EU-sponsored democratization project, in a way that risks its support.

In order to address the issue of values, a dialogue with the partner societies is of utmost importance. Even if the EU realizes this and increasingly has emphasized it, it has largely failed in pursuing such dialogues. As the EU communicates first and foremost with elites in the partner countries, elites with often strong Western inclinations, and as dialogue between these elites and ordinary citizens often is scarce, it can be questioned to what extent the concerns among the people at large are at all considered in the communication with the EU and, for that matter, to what extent the people are familiar with the EU and what its efforts on democracy promotion amount to.

By refraining from venturing into a broadly based discussion on what democracy in fact entails and how it can be contextualized, but instead taking it for granted, assuming the presence of “common” values and pursuing its own interpretations thereof, the EU does not increase the chances for democracy promotion to be successful, I argue.

The Limits of Conditionality

Also when it comes to the construction of the EU’s promotion of democracy towards Jordan and Turkey, there are obvious similarities in approach. In
particular, the heavy emphasis on conditionality stands out. This similarity is little surprising, given that the ENP was largely moulded on the experiences from the successful 2004 enlargement. Indeed, as stated by the Council representative (Jordan), the ENP took advantage of the cadre of EU-officials that had worked with the enlargement and put them on a new task, using the same methods. However, the wisdom of making prescriptive conditionality – based on criteria set by the EU – central to the EU’s policies for democratization in Jordan and Turkey can be discussed, as both the new context of enlargement and the ENP-context differ from the earlier experiences. Indeed, the results show that great problems are connected to the use of prescriptive conditionality as a tool for promoting democracy.

I argue that a local orientation towards the democratic values laid out in the project of democratization is of vital importance for it to be successful. Conditionality, which includes a measure of coercion to make the partner stick to the ostensibly agreed objectives, is problematic in this regard. Indeed, the use of conditionality implies that the orientation towards the democratic values is limited a priori. If such an orientation had been sufficiently ensured, the conditionality would arguably not be needed. Of decisive importance is then how extensive this orientation is. If there is too big a gap between the partner countries’ democratic orientation and the conditions to be met, especially if the differences touch upon issues related to national identity and national sensitivities, it can be questioned to what extent the use of conditionality can be successful, as partners are likely to stick to their orientations (cp. Richter, 2012).

On the evidence from Jordan and Turkey, conditionality – which is based on the idea that strategic calculation will make for shifts in attitudes – seems to fail in making the partner countries switch from embracing a democratic orientation according to a logic of consequentiality to embracing it according to a logic of appropriateness. Conditionality thus does not seem conducive to an internalization of democratic norms and values in those cases (Checkel 2005; Björk Dahl 2006; Kubicek 2005). While Jordan basically fits in Kelley’s ‘cannot be enticed’-segment, due to the regime’s lack of democratic orientation which renders conditionality largely ineffectual, Turkey portrays a mixed record, embracing a democratic orientation for identity reason on a discursive level, but for strategic reasons in practice, which places Turkey in Kelley’s ‘can be enticed’-segment, rendering conditionality potentially useful, but difficult (Kelley 2004). However, also in Turkey, conditionality has largely failed to make for an attitudinal re-orientation in relation to democracy.

Conditionality is also deeply problematic for local ownership, which is
another crucial element for success of the project of democratization. To start
with, prescriptive conditionality per definition implies implementation of
policies that would otherwise not have been implemented. Instead of having
originated in the partner country itself, the policies covered by the condition-
ality are initiated from the democracy promoter, and are thus not locally
owned. Conditionality precludes ownership, unless it is based on an a pri-
ori orientation towards the reforms in question (in which case conditionality
arguably would not be needed, except as an extra incentive). Conditionality
is thus only likely to promote a change of the system, if there is an a priori
orientation towards such a change. If there is no such orientation, as is par-
ticularly clear in the Jordanian case, conditionality is not likely to promote a
change of the system. After all, conditionality is based on cooperation with
representatives of the present system, who are not likely to work for real
change (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011).

Even if conditionality might enable the introduction of democratic re-
forms, the analysis indicates that there are limits to how far conditionality
works. As red lines are strong in the partner countries, conditionality arguably
only works if a domestic orientation can be mustered to support the policies
covered. If not, implementation will be problematic and partner countries are
likely to veer as conditionality is lifted, of which there are clear signs in Tur-
key.

Scholars argue that the reason why conditionality worked in the EU en-
largement in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC’s) was that
a democratic orientation similar to that required by the EU was already an-
chored in society at large. Implementation of the required policies was in line
with this orientation, at least to the extent that consolidated democracy is in
place today. According to this argument, the EU factor was of limited impor-
tance in the CEEC’s – they would have democratized anyway and thus were
easy wins for the EU (Burnell 2008; Johansson-Nagués and Jonasson 2011).

Since then, the developments in the CEEC’s show the limits of this policy
in the face of insufficient orientation, proving that the conditionality in the
enlargement is not such a quick fix after all. In particular, ‘[t]he cases of Bul-
garia and Romania show clearly how, when the force of conditionality ends
upon accession, there was earlier a degree of forced and unsustainable com-
pliance with the European norms, which is reversible’ (Emerson and Youngs
2009: 23). Based on a number of studies, Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig con-
clude that ‘historical legacies function predominantly as deep conditions’ for
compliance – or lack thereof – in the CEEC’s after the EU-accession (Cirtau-
tas and Schimmelfennig 2010: 437). If counteracted by historical legacies,
chances are that conditionality thus fails to maintain policy change in the long run. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier point out that for countries that are not democratic front-runners to start with, ‘EU democratic conditionality [is] not sufficient to bring about democratization and democratic consolidation’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 214).

Prescriptive conditionality further obviously implies an unequal partnership. Policies set by the democracy promoter are to be implemented by the partner and then monitored by the promoter, typically by way of progress reports in the case of the EU. In this process, local ownership is obstructed, as ownership stipulates that the partner takes responsibility for the results. Monitoring should therefore heavily involve the partner government. I argue that the more the partners are involved in, and practically own, the process at full length, the greater the prospects for success for democracy promotion. The EU however largely keeps monitoring to itself, thus in this sense precluding full ownership.

Moreover, the logic of conditionality requires that rewards are given when they are due, unless credibility is called into question. As pointed out by Richter, credibility is (together with consistency) the hallmark of conditionality – without credibility, the logic of conditionality is lost (Richter 2012: 512). In turn, this requires that the bench-marks are clear-cut and time tables precise. This has not been the case neither in Jordan, nor in Turkey. Indeed, the benchmarks have often been of little consequence and the EU has left a lot to be wanted in terms of consistency. In Jordan, the EU continues to support the regime despite obvious democratic shortcomings, whereas in Turkey, the EU does not guarantee membership, even if the conditions are met. Again, the EU retains control.

Instead of furthering ownership, conditionality – at least when orientation is not ensured – aims at making partners follow the prescriptions of the democracy promoter. Democracy promotion in itself implies that the partners are unable to manage on their own, whereby the promoter gets the upper hand as the expert. I argue that the ownership, and thus sustainability, of a process of democratization conceived in this way must be questioned.

Also from the perspective of dialogue – another vital element for the project of democratization to succeed according to my argument – conditionality must be questioned. As noted, conditionality presupposes an unequal relationship. This does not set the right arena for a true dialogue, nor does the “take it or leave it”-logic that conditionality implies. Indeed, conditionality – unless it is based on genuinely shared values – is in many respects the very antithesis of dialogue.
Conditionality thus works against orientation, ownership and dialogue, which I argue to be of importance for democracy promotion. It can thus be questioned whether conditionality – which is at the core of all EU democracy promotion – really is the best way to further democratization. The effectiveness of conditionality in making for democracy has also been challenged by other studies, pointing at problems with credibility, consistency, compliance patterns and consequences (Richter 2012). In particular, to be successful, conditionality depends on consistency and credibility, which has not been the hallmark of EU conditionality in relation to its Mediterranean neighbours. This has in turn made for serious problems in continuing to apply conditionality in the post-Arab spring context (Tocci 2012).

Even if the EU insist that conditionality is necessary as it is a legal requirement and that the discussion on its effectiveness is irrelevant, because ‘of course we should make it effective’ (EEAS official), the EU’s approach is problematic. As the results suggest, democratic values are difficult to transmit unless there is fertile ground for them in the partner country. Thus, results here contradict Björkdahl’s conclusion that ‘the EU has the power to persuade others to conform with EU normative standards. The Union is in a strong position to exert a normative influence by way of its vast number of approaches and its capability to combine attractive positive incentives with harsh negative sanctions to an extent few other actors can match’ (Björkdahl 2005: 264). The results here suggest that such normative influence can be exerted only if there is a broadly based local norm orientation a priori.

Indeed, a local democratic orientation is thus essential for the EU’s ability to be a normative power, and conditionality is only effective to the extent that such an orientation is in place. This makes the EU a potential normative power, where the potential is realized to different extents in different settings, depending on the a priori attitudes of partners.

**Focus on Democratization of the System – or Democratization within the System?**

Even if there are many important similarities between the EU’s approach to democracy promotion in Jordan and Turkey, one major difference stands out. Indeed, the EU’s democracy promotion entails something totally different for Turkey than it does for Jordan. In Turkey, a full conversion of the political system into a full-fledged consolidated democracy is expected, while the EU seems content with even the slightest steps of democratization within the system in Jordan – stopping short of real democratic reform – which hopefully
makes for democracy eventually.

There are thus great differences between the conditions put up – and entirely different levels of intrusion. By entering on accession negotiations, Turkey has accepted to undergo substantial change in line with the requirements set, while Jordan keeps more room for manoeuvring on its part. There is also a great difference in the prize to be won. In case of enlargement, there is the golden carrot of membership. In the ENP, what are at stake are somewhat ill-defined closer relations to the EU. The EU thus puts the bar at different levels in evaluating democratic progress in the two countries, arguably with very different consequences for actual democratization. As decidedly more is asked from Turkey, there is a potential that more could be accomplished there. However, the sour relations indicate that the EU influence in this regard has waned.

These differences obviously explain the different moods of cooperation. While relations with the EU are portrayed as successful in Jordan, they have been regarded as less so in Turkey for some time. The Jordanian government is content with its cooperation with the EU on democratization, which has levied little pressure on it. The Turks, on the other hand, are increasingly fed up with what is seen as the EU’s bossiness.

Both approaches carry their own problems as ways to promote democracy. Along the reasoning pursued here, the approach to Turkey depends on the domestic orientation to and ownership of the project of democratization. As the results show, neither the orientation nor the ownership are straightforward in the case of Turkey, raising serious questions on to what extent the accession negotiations make a successful project of democratization in Turkey.

In the case of Jordan, both the EU and the government purportedly work for democratization within the system, not of the system itself. This is a major shortcoming in the EU’s approach to democracy promotion, I argue. The EU seeks legitimacy for such an approach by referring to that ‘[i]n contrast to other countries in the region … protesters in Jordan did not call for regime change but rather for reform of the existing political system’ (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2012b: 2). The argument put forth by the EU is that working with the government might lead to eventual changes within the system, which is as far as it can go. Hopes are that a long-term *gutta cavat lapidem*-approach, constantly bringing up issues of democracy, will erode the authoritarian system in place, and make way for democratization (cf. Moberg, 2009). In doing so, they point to the democratic commitment of the representatives of the regime. On their side, the government emphasizes the importance of democracy and
swears allegiance to democratization – as soon as conditions are right.

Some analysts argue that chances are favourable that authoritarian regimes that have allowed some liberalization develop into fully blown democracies. Especially holding elections is seen as conducive to democracy. Hadenius and Teorell argue that ‘[a]uthoritarian regimes are heterogenous, diverse in both their resiliency and their tendency to democratize. As our analysis shows, limited multiparty authoritarian governments hold the greatest prospects for democratization…’ (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 154).

Other analysts disagree, claiming that (semi)-authoritarianism is a stable system, which does not lead to democracy. According to this argument, the Jordanian government repeats an age-old argument against democracy, used by Communism as well as former colonies to justify one-party rule: The “transitional” argument fully endorses the democratic system as the most legitimate rule, but states that the people are not yet ready for it. Only when certain conditions are in place, rule can be safely turned over to the people. However, experience shows that in such cases, regimes have rarely themselves worked for a transformation of the authoritarian rule into a real democracy (Karvonen 2008). Instead, even more authoritarianism is often the result. Using a democratic rhetoric is thus a classical way for authoritarian states to justify their continued rule.

Ottaway terms such systems semi-authoritarian, emphasizing that these ‘are not imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement and consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails’ (Ottaway 2003: 3). Along the same lines, Brumberg refers to liberalized autocracies, that are pursuing ‘transitions to nowhere’, stating that '[t]his is the biggest problem liberalized autocracy creates: It snares regimes in an “endless transition” (marhalla intiqaliyya mustamirra) that eventually robs each new generation of what little hope it had when a new king or president invariably inaugurated a “new” era of reconciliation, openness, and reform’ (Brumberg 2003: 13). According to this argument, supporting democratic change in such a regime amounts to supporting the authoritarian regime itself and the perpetuation of a quasi- or pseudo-democracy, i.e. institutionalization of a less than democratic system.

The evidence presented here supports this argument, as does the Arab uprisings. So far, little real democratic change has been seen in Jordan, de-

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5 Ottaway defines semi-authoritarian states as ‘ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits’ (Ottaway 2003: 3).
spite the alleged democratic commitment of the regime. As the EU contents itself with minor reforms within the system, the chances are slim that any real democratization of the system, uprooting the all-powerful role of the king, takes place, at least as a result of the EU’s democracy promotion. The Arab uprisings did not come about as a result of a change within the system. They clearly show that what is sought by the people is a change of the system itself. Subsequent developments, for instance in Egypt, also show how difficult such change really is.

The Way Forward: Perspectives of EU’s Democracy Promotion

The EU’s democracy promotion is thus facing serious challenges in both Turkey and Jordan. How could these challenges be dealt with? The results of this analysis indicate that some of these problems are inherent in the logic of democracy promotion and difficult to tackle, unless this logic is remodelled. However, some things can be done.

First and foremost, I argue, the basic lesson from democratization theory needs to be remembered: Democracy springs from the local context. Any country needs to work for a reasonably common orientation towards democracy, leading to a national agreement on the democratic foundations of the state, anchored throughout society. As has been argued here, a country needs to democratize in line with its own values – on the basis of its own priorities – for democracy to become sustainable. After all, it is the country itself that is to consolidate its democracy, and that has to be done in accordance with local parameters, not the EU’s. To what extent these coincide can only be determined by the country itself. If the EU is serious in its support for democracy world-wide, it should recognize this.

Thus, in Turkey, democratization cannot only rely on EU-pressure and be dependent on the accession negotiations. Democratization – rooted in broad segments of Turkish society and moulded on local values – needs to be prioritized over EU-membership. Whereas democratization necessarily precedes EU-membership (even if it does not guarantee it), primarily seeking EU-membership does not necessarily breed democratization. If political reforms are designed only to fulfil the EU’s demands, irrespective of their resonance with domestic values, democracy will be superficial and dependent on the EU’s position. The EU’s position will then determine the future of a democratic Turkey. This needs to be recognized in all quarters. After all, democratic reform should take place for the sake of Turkey, not for the sake of the EU – even if it means that democratization takes another path than that pre-
scribed by the EU, possibly taking Turkey in the direction away from the EU. Triggered by the EU’s incentives, the process of democratization in Turkey must now become anchored in society at large. Recent events, challenging the power of the AKP, might benefit such a process.

Also in Jordan, there is a need for a broadly based democracy debate, aiming at reaching a reasonable domestic consensus on democracy including all citizens, whether of Transjordanian or Palestinian origin. Needless to say, the only route to democracy in Jordan is reducing the monarch’s constitutionally entrenched role in favour of genuine popular representation, no matter how unstable the political context.

Apart from recognizing these basic premises from democratization theory, there are however some things that the EU can do to promote democracy. Most importantly, the EU must prioritize democratization if democracy promotion is to be successful. If other competing objectives are prioritized, the evidence clearly indicates that democracy will lose out (Grimm and Leininger 2012). If objectives like stability and security are believed to result from democracy, democratization must be supported with no strings attached. If the EU does not actually aim for – and thus prioritize – democratization, democracy promotion is to little avail.

In this work, focus should be on encouraging a domestic dialogue on democracy, breeding locally held democratic orientations. As has been argued here, a domestic orientation towards democracy is the *sine qua non* for the success of democracy promotion. In doing so, the EU should acknowledge that democratic orientations might look different – encompassing different values – than in Europe (Pace 2011). Indeed, as is pointed out by Hamdok, ‘countries will of necessity be differently democratic’ (Hamdok 2008: 48). The EU must therefore decide whether it is to promote a particular European liberal democracy, or whether it defines democracy in a broader manner, potentially including non-liberal traits.

If the EU continues to pursue conditionality, the country itself should preferably set its own criteria, resting on its democratic orientations, leaving the EU to decide what to support. If the EU continues to pursue prescriptive conditionality, basically setting the criteria, the partner country should however be deeply involved in this process. Such criteria should be set without (much) flexibility of interpretation, and the EU should be gracious in granting leeway regarding how reforms are to be carried out. This would ensure greater local ownership of the process, but such ownership should obviously be based on democratic orientations. Importantly, any conditionality must be consistently applied by the EU to uphold credibility. Progress must be re-
warded and – crucially – deviations sanctioned.

The EU should thus be more ready to listen to its interlocutors. It should become more responsive to how the partner countries look upon their own democratization process and be ready to discuss what democracy means in the local context. Only by genuinely discussing – through a mutual, dialogue-based process – values like democracy and how they can be contextualized, progress towards common values in any real sense can be made.

Instead of being self-assured that it is providing all the right remedies (if only the partners would go through with them) in a way that might be construed as Orientalist (Alian 2012), the EU must listen to what people need, and offer the assistance requested, if in line with the EU’s objectives. Instead of imposing prescriptions, the EU should make known what it has to offer, but leaving the partners to ask for it. In doing so, the EU should take care to point out that democracy is good politics and what benefits it has brought (Norris, 2012). It should emphasize the importance of creating clear constitutional checks and safeguards, establishing commonly accepted red lines for democracy (Dahl 1989). However, in line with the argument pursued here, the precise definition of these should be based on domestic democratic orientations. Indeed, there are different varieties of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011).

The EU should take care to make its efforts known to – and be open to discuss those with – society at large on an equal-footed basis in the partner countries. To encourage a broadly-based process of democratization, making for the local democratic resolve and orientation needed for democratic success, the dialogue on the merits of democracy must reach beyond the government, and the civil society elites connected to it, especially if the government is not (fully) representative of the people. Importantly, also the opposition – of what shade it might be – should be actively involved in the dialogue. Obviously, this includes also Islamists. Indeed, the significance of Shahin’s statement is more relevant than ever: ‘Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process’ (Shahin 2005). Even if a dialogue with oppositional forces might be construed by the government as meddling in internal affairs, a democracy promoter should insist on the importance of such a dialogue, lest the democratic commitment of the government is called into question.

Even if the government remains the EU’s prime interlocutor, the political opposition and civil society, as well as the local society, should be consulted to a larger extent in the project of democratization laid out. By such inclusion of societal segments also beyond the elites, the democracy promotion itself
could become an inclusive national process, making for a genuinely rooted process of democratization. After all, the whole societies in the partner countries are affected by the project of democratization. In essence, dialogue is the tool *par excellence* to make for a democratic orientation as well as for local ownership in the partner society.

The EU has recognized many of these shortcomings and it has pledged to make amends, not least by involving the broader society and consider realities on the ground in the democracy promotion. Still, implementation is key: The EU – and its member states – must make good its pledges. What is more, the structural problems at the core of the EU’s democracy promotion policies remain, importantly how to ensure a democratic orientation and local ownership under prescriptive conditionality and how to reach out beyond the elites.

The EU’s democracy promotion is allegedly informed by the quest to diffuse democracy, aiming at making others subscribe to the EU’s project of democratization. But to what extent is this orientation shared in the partner countries? The EU’s project of democratization is perhaps not the answer to everyone’s dreams. Grappling with making its democracy promotion successful, this should be considered by the EU as it is declared that, in the words of an EEAS official: ‘What we have, we want others to have’.

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Interview

The European Union as an Actor in Africa: Comparing Development Cooperation and Peace-building

Fredrik Söderbaum

The European Union’s (EU’s) external relations and foreign policies have expanded dramatically since the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the EU through the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Today the EU has relations with virtually every country and most regions in the world. The EU has become a force in international affairs, especially in trade, development cooperation, the promotion of regional integration, democracy and good governance, human rights, and to an increasing extent also in security policies.

Yet, differing views abound about what type of political animal the EU is, about its nature as an actor, and the impact of its external relations (Manners 2010). Clearly, today’s EU was not designed to become a global actor, and sceptics argue that the EU still has diffuse and ineffective foreign policies, being divided between the interests of its member states and with no genuinely common values; in essence, that the EU is an incomplete or merely potential ‘actor’ on the world scene (Hyde Price 2008). Even among the proponents there are different interpretations about the nature of the EU’s foreign policy and its ‘actorness’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Hill and Smith 2005). As a result, the EU is often perceived as an ambiguous actor (polity or power) and its foreign policy profile appears to be a moving target. Nevertheless, a large number of other scholars continue to argue that today’s EU has become a force on the world scene and that it is gradually becoming more unified and
coherent, albeit more in some policy areas and counterpart regions and countries than in others.

This chapter analyzes the EU’s role as an actor in two policy domains in which the EU wants to be portrayed as ‘a force for good’ and towards one of its major partners. The EU’s policies in the field of development cooperation and security policy are often regarded as ambiguous and pluralistic, not the least because in these policy fields decision-making is either ‘shared’ between EU institutions and EU member states, or based on intergovernmental decision-making. Key policymakers, especially from the European Commission but sometimes also from individual EU member states, claim that the making of the EU as an efficient and legitimate global actor across different fields of foreign policy depends on a strengthening of the EU’s central institutions, instruments, and policies, where the Commission or the Council must, so the argument goes, play a leading role (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Such attempts at centralization and communitarization of decision-making and policy are contested, however, and it is therefore important to analyze the tensions and paradoxes between the EU’s central institutions and those of the individual EU member states as these are played out in the different policy areas. Following on from the above, the fundamental question addressed in this chapter is to what extent and under what circumstances the EU is acting as ‘one’ in its relations with Africa in the two policy domains under study. More specifically, is the EU best understood as a single and unitary actor, as a dispersed actor, or even as no actor at all in its relations with Africa? Does this vary across the two policy areas being studied?

The two policy areas analyzed in this chapter are particularly interesting because of the varied historical, political, legal and institutional configurations within the EU, but also since they are rarely compared (in spite of an impressive amount of research on each of the policy fields). The study also makes a methodological contribution through the combination of extensive interviews from within the EU’s machinery in Europe with fieldwork in distinct sites and countries in Central and Southern Africa. The next section discusses the concept of the EU as an actor and the general framework guiding the analysis in the two subsequent sections.

Conceptualizing the EU as a Global Actor

Following its increasing outreach in world politics there have been an increasing number of studies on EU as an international actor and its actorness during the two last decades (Allen and Smith 1990; Bretherton and Vogler
Actorness for a region is not necessarily the same as for nation-states, although there are of course certain similarities. One unique feature of regional actorness, compared with nation-states, is that it must be created by voluntary processes, and based on dialogue and cooperation rather than ‘coercion’ and hierarchy. Furthermore, the EU can act as a collective actor in international affairs and be seen as ‘one’ by both outsiders and its own citizens, for instance, when signing a trade agreement or disbursing aid. However, being an international and global actor is more demanding than simply being or performing as a regional organization and community. The fact that the European Commission does ‘something’ — for instance disbursing aid — is not enough for a claim to possess actorness (purposive capacity to act), at least not for the claim to be a ‘global’ actor. Similarly, highly stated ambitions and a normative agenda are not automatically translated into actorness, which Christopher Hill (1993) elegantly showed in an influential study about the EU’s ‘capabilities-expectations gap’.

An important distinction in the literature about the EU as an actor is between presence and actorness (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Hettne 2010). The two are closely related. Presence stems from the fact that simply by existing, and due to its relative weight (demographically, economically, militarily and ideologically), the Union has an impact on the rest of the world. Its footprints are seen everywhere. The EU is for example the largest donor in the world and the size of its economy is comparable to that of the US. The EU is also setting up a military capacity to be used outside the region. This provokes reactions and creates expectations from the outside. Presence is a complex and comprehensive material variable, depending on the size of the actor, the scope of its external activities, the relative importance of different issue areas, and the relative dependence of various regions upon the European market. A stronger presence means more repercussions and reactions and thereby a pressure to act. In the absence of such action, presence itself will diminish. The crucial question is to what extent the EU’s strong international presence is actually transformed into a purposive capacity to shape the external environment by influencing the world (i.e. actorness): In this case in Africa.

Actorness implies a scope of action and room for manoeuvre, in some cases even a legal personality, which is however rare in the case of regions. It suggests a growing capacity to act that follows from the strengthened presence of the regional unit in different contexts. Indeed, literature on EU actorness is very clear on that the EU’s external policy is closely connected to
endogenous and internal conditions, especially coherence and coordination within the Union (Hill and Smith 2005; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Hettne 2010). This link between the internal and external is evident in the EU’s official policy documents and treaties, which repeatedly stress that without a unified, coherent, consistent and coordinated external policy, the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor will be called into question.

Even if more general questions about the EU’s power and identity of course may influence the EU as an actor and its actorness, the framework adopted in this chapter focuses in particular on institutional and vertical coherence: the unity of EU’s central institutions and the relationship between these central institutions and the EU member states (Nuttall 2005). More specifically, institutional coherence refers to the way the EU’s central institutions relate to one another (e.g. Commission, Council, Parliament and the Court). Vertical coherence indicates the degree of congruence between the external policies of EU member states and the EU’s central institutions. Thereby, a variety of coordination mechanisms are at work in the making of the EU’s foreign policies, such as the community method, the open method of coordination between the EU and the member states, the intergovernmental method, or a strictly national system of foreign policies, which takes place outside the EU’s structures.

Especially vertical coherence draws attention to that it is crucial how we conceptualize the EU as an actor. Whereas the EU is often reduced to its central institutions (the Commission, the Council), and how these institutions perform in the world, this is not the case here. Instead, the EU as a ‘actor’ refers both to the EU’s central institutions and the member states. The focus on institutional coherence draws attention to the interplay between the EU’s central institutions, while vertical coherence problematizes the interplay between EU and the member states. Many member states, for example Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK), have developed rather comprehensive Africa policies covering most policy areas. These Africa policies are first and foremost formulated as national policies, although they are often reinforced through common or shared EU policies/instruments. Two EU member states, the UK and France, stand out since they have the most comprehensive policies with Africa in the policy areas covered in this chapter. Other member states, such as Sweden and Denmark, are deeply engaged in development cooperation but less involved in security (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010a).

The UK and France deserve a special mentioning. The UK’s policy stance towards Africa is fairly similar to the EU’s stance, and to some extent it has,
at least on a general level, become significantly Europeanized in relation to the overall ideological and political content of foreign policy as well as in terms of foreign policy making (Williams 2002). However, the UK will keep devoting special attention to its own distinctive security, development cooperation and energy policies, as well as in terms of its maritime strategy, the promotion of the English language and the maintenance of colonial ties and cultural preservation. Yet, ‘British’ and ‘EU’ foreign policies are not mutually exclusive activities, and like many other EU member states, the British government has drawn upon its increasingly close relationship with the EU to supplement its own bilateral (and other multilateral) efforts to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

France also plays a significant role in Africa, especially in its former colonies, through extensive aid programs, commercial activities, military agreements, and cultural impact. Quite a few observers criticize the relationship as neo-colonialism under the name Françafric, stressing France’s support of various dictatorships, among others: Omar Bongo (Gabon), Idriss Déby (Chad), and Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo-Brazzaville). In addition, France is very active in peace and security operations in its former colonies. Of 12,000 French troops engaged in peacekeeping operations around the world, nearly half are deployed in Africa in both military and advisory capacities. Despite these contributions to peacekeeping operations, the French economic and political influence in Africa is likely to continue to decline, particularly in light of Africa’s growing ties with, for example, China (Touati 2007).

**The EU as a Global Development Actor in Africa**

As eloquently described by Franck and Lorenzoni in this volume, the EU’s development policy is rooted in the colonial relations of its member states. From the mid-1960s the then European Community (EC) established special relations with its ex-colonies beginning with the so-called Yaoundé Conventions. These relations were constantly expanded under the aid and trade agreements of the Lomé Conventions from 1975 on, which were then passed into the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 development policy was formally introduced as an area with ‘shared competency’. Following nearly a decade of dubious performance in this area, negotiations between the Council and the Commission resulted in a joint policy statement in 2000 stipulating the principles and objectives of the EU’s development policy. After the European Parliament was brought into discussions, these principles and objectives were revised
in 2005 in the so-called ‘European Consensus on Development’ (European Union 2000, 2005). This consensus also took into account external events such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001.

The EU’s objective to become a global development actor has been stimulated by efforts to consolidate the EU internally within the Union as well as by global and multilateral developments. Indeed, the EU’s official brief is to systematically and constructively exploit the potential for complementarity and synergy within the Union and to assist the member states in developing their own aid systems and the EU’s joint position in the multilateral aid architecture. One mantra repeated in Brussels and most other European capitals is that EU is the world’s largest donor. Yet, this is chiefly a rhetorical strategy to build the EU’s identity, because it is only the case if the EU multilateral aid is lumped together with the separate national aid budgets. As will be seen below, there is rather little evidence that the EU’s central institutions and the national aid agencies are genuinely working together as ‘One’.

The debate about a common EU development policy carries a particular emphasis on the delineation of roles between the EU and the member states. The so-called ‘added value’ of the EU and the European Commission is an important, but also contested, element in the discussion on EU’s development policy. According to the Commission, ‘Community action is more neutral than action by the Member States, which have their own history and are bound by a specific legal system. Community solidarity and the Community’s integrated approach to cooperation are undoubtedly major assets’ (European Commission 2000: 4). The Commission also claims to provide ‘added value’ through its ability to formulate and defend a common European position globally (European Commission 2004: 7). Against this background, the Commission’s priority of promoting a common European position within global and multilateral coordination initiatives, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the MDGs becomes apparent (OECD/DAC 2005a). The EU’s official view is that it should strive toward being a single unified actor at all ‘levels of governance’ in the development community (on the multilateral, interregional, regional, as well as country level) (European Commission 2004: 6-7).

There is a reasonable and at times relatively sophisticated degree of coordination in the international donor community in Africa (OECD/DAC 2005a, 2005b; Delputte and Orbie 2014). This type of coordination is above all taking place within multilateral frameworks (and outside EU structures per se), such as the Paris Agenda, the MDGs, Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and
a variety of budget support mechanisms or sectoral or thematic approaches. While the European Commission is in itself seen as a donor committed to the implementation of the global commitments on aid effectiveness, the EU is not recognized as a feasible aid coordination platform in itself, and the European Commission is mainly acting as one among the other donors in the larger (non-EU) donor-wide coordination platforms. Although there is a general impression that the EU Delegations are active participants in these platforms, this does not give them an opportunity to act as a ‘driving force’ for EU coordination. The donor coordination groups are not restricted to EU donors only (members are for example Norway, Canada, USA) and not all EU donors are participating (Delputte and Orbie 2014). Importantly, the EU Delegations are not playing a different role than other committed donors such as the Nordic Plus countries, they are ‘just like one of the other donors acting in the donor forums’ (interview with donor representative, Lusaka, Zambia, February 2011). In theory, the role of each agency depends on its comparative advantage, constructed upon a functional logic. The Division of Labour is organized on a sectoral or thematic basis, in which each sector is led by one or more ‘leads’ or ‘lead donors’. Following this principle, every donor can act as a lead. In practice those donors with special competence or special commitment to a particular sector are normally considered as better prepared to perform as ‘leads’. The European Commission is a large and influential donor in these processes, but the EU does not perform well as a coordinating mechanism (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010b; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012; Delputte and Orbie 2014).

However, it is fair to say that there is a certain degree of success of EU-based coordination, especially regarding coordination of general policy, both in Brussels and on specific policy issues on the country level in many African countries. With this said however, it is safe to say that the EU cannot be understood as a viable coordination mechanism on the ground. As a senior official of the Delegation of the European Commission in Mozambique points out, describing the Commissions’s role in the field of HIV/AIDS:

The Commission is almost a Byzantine bureaucracy in certain respects... All the others harmonize including the Norwegians, the Dutch, the Irish. And they ask me that as we have agreed in principle on some many things, why can’t you also take part in this? I try to tell them that it is not because we don’t want to, but we have rules. But I know they still think this is an odd position. (Interview, Maputo, February 2005).
The problematic role of the European Commission is shared by other bilateral donors. One donor representative described the Delegation of the European Commission as ‘probably the most difficult donor to cooperate with because of its unique and bureaucratic administrative routines and funding mechanisms’ (interview, Maputo, February 2005). Another EU member state representative described the Commission as ‘someone who likes to go his own ways and always follows the dictates from Brussels instead of supporting existing coordination efforts’ (interview, Maputo, February 2005). Differently expressed, in contrast to the EU’s official rhetoric and the ambitions of the European Consensus on Development, the EU is, by and large, not functioning as a platform for coordination between the EU member states (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010b; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012). Since individual EU member states can and do continue to conduct international development policy according to national priorities and preferences a complete communitarization of international development cooperation is not politically desirable for many EU member states and would presumably be of questionable value for a number of developing countries (Grimm 2010). Hence, on the ground in Africa, the European Commission can most of the time be understood as ‘just another donor’, and within the EU family as ‘the 29th’ member state, conducting its own aid policies, rather than serving as the hub for donor coordination within the EU as a whole. Thus, the EU demonstrates weak actorness in this policy field, and it can hardly be said to be acting as ‘one’ (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010b; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012).

The lack of coordination is certainly tied to internal differences and contradictions within the EU. One traditional line of difference is between liberalist and free trade-oriented position of the DG Trade and those EU member states who argue that free trade is the best strategy for growth and development, and the more ‘development-friendly’ member states who argue that the special needs of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) must be taken into account (Elgström 2009: 452). The Nordic countries belong to the ‘development-friendly’ group, which results in that divergences cannot simply be categorized along the liberal-protectionist axis.

Previous research on the functioning of the EU suggests that divergences among member states may not only impact negatively on the Council, but may also make the Commission weak, by watering down Commission proposals to the lowest common denominator (Elgström and Larsén 2008: 7). However, Elgström and Larsén’s (2008: 3-4) study shows that differing preferences among member states in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations provided the Commission with significant autonomy vis-à-vis
the Council. The Commission’s autonomy was further reinforced ‘due to its informational and procedural advantages given by its institutional position as sole negotiator’ (Elgström and Larsén 2008: 3). The same authors emphasize a second main conclusion, namely the importance of Commission unity. According to previous research in the field, internal fragmentation within the Commission may negatively affect its effectiveness and assertiveness vis-à-vis member states (cf. Carbone 2007). It is well established in academic research that there were some tensions between DG Trade and DG Development/DG Agriculture during the early phases of the EPA negotiations with Africa (which also impacts on development cooperation). Yet, these conclusions are tied to the field of trade and the EPA negotiations rather than development cooperation more broadly.

The Commission’s failure to be a coordination mechanism within the EU reflects its inability to present to member states its comparative advantage and a coherent ‘value added’ proposition relative to other coordination mechanisms and regional programs. Indeed, it is not clear what the EU can do more effectively than the individual member states, nor in what way it enhances aid effectiveness.

It appears plausible that the EU’s ambition to be a coordination mechanism in the field of aid is first and foremost tied to its self-serving ambition to manifest its own identity (especially the self-serving statement to be the world’s largest donor, which in reality is more or a chimera). A senior policy advisor of a EU member state concurred: ‘Development policy is a tool for the Commission to build the EU as a global actor’ (interview, Stockholm, January 2007).

The failure of the EU to act as ‘one’ in development cooperation is also related to competing ‘identity claims’ in the donor community (and of course the shared competence). Development cooperation remains a scene for the manifestation of international identities, not only for the European Commission but also for individual member states. The attempts for a centralized and common European Aid policy with the Commission in the driver’s seat compete with other identity-driven ambitions of bilateral donors, such as France and UK, but also most other large EU donors such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, who are generally considered as role models in the field. To the extent that development policy is driven by the ambition to manifest one donor identity, these efforts can be seen as a threat to other donors’ identities. Coordination efforts under the banner of a common donor identity, such as the EU, limit the visibility of the individual donors and member states. As one donor official put it: ‘A donor who does not give is not a donor’ (interview,
Harare, 2005).

The urge to maintain and strengthen a donor identity may undermine aid effectiveness and donor coordination. But this is not always the case. At least to some extent, the identity motive may explain the particular type of donor coordination known as ‘lead donor’, which is a kind of division of labour where one particular donor is given responsibility for leading a particular sector and the other donors are followers. Being a lead donor enables a donor to manifest its own identity for the sector it is in charge of. Similarly, it appears that donor identities are not challenged as much in the multilateral mechanisms for donor coordination as they appear to be within the EU framework. This may very well be related to the very strong ambitions of the European Commission to control the process, which the national donor agencies, for various reasons, are not accepting. Indeed, since EU donor coordination appear to be driven by political reasons instead of aid effectiveness, several national aid agencies are resisting EU-led donor coordination.

The EU as a Global Peace and Security Actor in Africa

Literature in this area frequently posits the view of the EU as an economic giant but a political dwarf, with the conclusion that its security policy is weak. The EU has nevertheless begun to demonstrate a considerable amount of activity in the security field, especially since the turn of the century. One reason for this lies in the contemporary conceptualization of security, which goes well beyond conventional large-scale military presence to include, for example, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human security and state fragility. In the face of the multiplicity of new threats, the EU member states have been able to overcome some of their internal differences leading to a consolidation of the EU as a global peace and security actor, with an evident global ambition.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in 2003, has become an important framework for the EU, highlighting both present and future global challenges and key threats to international security.7 Human security is emphasized as a central concept guiding the EU’s approach regarding the implementation of the ESS. Questions of human security are high on the European agenda for the African continent due to the fact that conflicts frequently either provoke or exacer-

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6 This section builds on research undertaken together with Meike Froitzheim and Ian Taylor (see Froitzheim, Söderbaum and Taylor 2011).
7 The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, is responsible for developing a new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy that should replace the European Security Strategy.
bate the devastating humanitarian situation in conflict prone areas, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia and Sierra Leone and so forth. In addition, through the discourse on the so-called security-development nexus the EU stresses the relationship between development and security and emphasizes the fact that many conflicts in Africa are tightly linked to state fragility. These two discourses have been developed during the last decade both in Africa-focused strategies and frameworks, as well as on a more general level in the ESS and in the EU’s Human Security Doctrine. In effect this means that the EU can deploy conventional military missions or civilian missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and at the same time rely on various types of humanitarian aid or long-term development cooperation under the leadership of the Commission.

Looking at EU’s involvement in African conflicts, some of the EU’s missions deployed under the CSDP, such as the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission in 2006 and Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003, had limited mandates focusing mainly on the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in geographically confined areas with a short-term perspective. These two missions are often assessed as having achieved their objectives, and the EU appeared as a successful global actor in this regard. Yet, it is equally clear that in view of their limited mandates and short time frame, these operations had only marginal impact on the conflicts and to long-term peace-building.

The CSDP missions with a more comprehensive mandate and long-term perspective, such as the EUPOL and EUSEC RD Congo, can be problematized on a number of accounts. Importantly, their weaknesses are often directly linked to the limits and inefficiencies of the EU as an actor. To put it bluntly, the EU’s complex institutional set-up invariably results in overlapping and competing competencies, institutional divisions, personal agendas and turf wars (Frotzheim, Söderbaum and Taylor 2011). The overlapping of responsibilities and the rivalry between different European actors (including the member states, especially France and Belgium) are then compounded by coordination weaknesses and institutional incoherencies springing from structural issues related to the nature of the various mandates and diverse instruments of the EU’s agencies, in particular the rivalry between the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. In addition, there is a systematic lack of coordination between the administrative EU centres in Brussels (and the various European capitals) and the operational levels and EU representatives on the ground (Christiansen 2001; Gegout 2009a and b;
Lurweg 2011; Froitzheim et al 2011; Smis and Kingah 2010). Furthermore, although the EU tries to be present ‘on the ground’, inadequate exchange of information between the Delegations hamper effective policy design and implementation. Dysfunctional EU security governance also arises due to the multitude of actors, an overlap of bilateral and EU policies and top-down approaches from Brussels (i.e. vertical incoherence). All this is then further exacerbated by low staff competence resulting from the overrepresentation of inexperienced and junior employees due to the fact that senior experts are very reluctant to be deployed in the extreme working and living conditions of conflict prone areas in Africa (Froitzheim et al 2011).

The weak institutional and vertical coherence also affects the EU’s relations with other actors, which undermines EU’s ability to perform as a global actor in this field. The EU’s official stance is to support a UN-led system and to contribute to a more ‘effective multilateralism’. In most regional conflicts, however, there is a systematic tendency for external powers and donors involved in peace-building to focus on their own ‘visibility’ through implementing highly noticeable projects that promise immediate results rather than following a comprehensive and coordinated – and thus necessarily joint and long-term – strategy. Clearly, there is a tendency for all external powers and donors (including individual EU member states) to focus on specific projects in order to get immediate and visible results as a means to justify the expenditure of resources to domestic constituencies. This seems to result from the fact that in complex environments such as the one in DRC, long-term goals and achievements are difficult to achieve in the short-term. Yet it is in these complex environments where comprehensive and long-term peace-building strategies are needed the most. In this regard, the EU’s main focus is placed on gaining international visibility and a rather symbolic presence instead of a clearly defined and credible strategy how to build peace, which thereby reinforces ineffective rather than effective multilateralism.

A general feature of the EU’s engagements (and for other actors as well) is that peace-building and intervention usually lacks a comprehensive conflict analysis (Froitzheim 2011). As an example, the deployment of the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission was initiated without sufficiently discussing the political and security situation on the ground. The result was that the EU was predominantly perceived as not being impartial but instead was following French-driven policies and siding with the two incumbent regimes in Chad and CAR. The lack of poor preparatory work often results in a lack of knowledge on how to define successful strategies as well as what are the likely consequences of an external intervention and involvement on the ground (Schulz and Söderbaum
2010). In contrast, there tends to be one-size-fits all strategy, which is poorly adapted to the present specific contexts. The most important goal for the EU appears to be seen to be ‘doing something’ and showing a presence instead of ensuring real and lasting achievements on the ground.

In examining the role of the EU in the DRC (which is the conflict with the most comprehensive EU involvement), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the EU’s key political goal is not mainly to solve the myriad problems — if that is indeed possible (Lurweg 2011; Froitzheim, Söderbaum and Taylor 2011). The most important goal appears instead to be to build the EU’s presence and appearance (which of course is an element of actorness). Staved of resources and beset by institutional in-fighting, bureaucratic turf wars and an inability to deal with the very nature of the entity that passes itself off as the Congolese state, almost without exception EU interviewees in the eastern DRC were dismissive of their own organization’s efforts in conflict management, security sector reform and peace-building. For instance, one EU representative based in eastern DRC felt totally cut off from other EU units, and had no idea what either Brussels or the EU Delegation in Kinshasa did with the information that was provided to them (interview, Goma, November 2010). These problems were candidly lamented by another EU representative in DRC who stated that ‘I do not know what I am doing here’ and went on to say that ‘the EU’s involvement is purely political’ (interview, Goma, November 2010).

Conclusion

There are some intriguing similarities across the two policy fields analyzed in this chapter. The study reveals that, with regard to institutional coherence, the EU’s organizational complexity provokes comparable institutional divisions and bureaucratic ineffectiveness in the two policy fields and in different cases. This is somewhat surprising given the widely different institutional configuration within the EU in the two policy areas. Concerning vertical coherence, the tensions between the EU’s central institutions (especially the Commission and the Council) and (some) EU member states also play out quite similarly in development cooperation as well as peace-building. These incoherencies are closely related to the EU’s failure to develop systematic relationships with other international actors/donors as well as with the African counterparts. Indeed, the internal incoherencies seem to be a major explanation for the EU’s underdeveloped external policy approach, in particular the wide gap between the EU’s official policy stance and what takes place in the field in Africa.
In the case of development cooperation, EU Delegations are keen on taking initiatives to promote EU coordination in the field, but face reluctance of many of its member states, especially those that have more developed donor policies. Development cooperation is still a shared competence and the division of roles is not clear. Even when the added value of more EU coordination is recognized in certain areas, EU member states are unwilling to provide the Commission with the necessary capacities to facilitate more coordination. Rather, the Commission is often acting (and also perceived) as the 29th member state, and the much talk about the EU as the world’s largest donor is to a large extent rhetoric, since it refers to both common EU aid and the bilateral aid by the individual EU member states (which in effect have fairly little to do with one another, at least on the ground in Africa). The limits of EU actor-ness is a consequence of the ambiguity surrounding the ‘added value’ of the EU compared to bilateral and multilateral aid as well as the inability of the Commission to lead the process towards more coherence. The internal contradictions and complexities result in a weak partnership with low amounts of African ownership as well as weak donor coordination with other donors outside the EU machinery.

There are some indications that the European External Action Service (EEAS) will provide the Delegations with more formal leverage in the area of aid coordination. As the Delegations of the EU will have a more strategic and political role to play than the former Delegations of the EC, it remains to be seen to what extent they will be able to further promote their added value as the ‘neutral’ and ‘natural’ coordinator amongst EU donors.

The EU’s peace security partnership with Africa has become stronger over time, and the EU is increasingly seen as one peace and security actor on the African continent, not the least through a number of military and civilian peace operations. However, the EU’s impact as an actor and as ‘a force for good’ is severely constrained by failures of inter-institutional synchronization between the Commission and the Council. This is in turn tightly linked to the fact that the EU is rather selective in its involvement in conflict management and peace-building in Africa. Several missions were/are very specific and limited (such as Operation Artemis, EU FOR Chad/CAR) and with only a marginal impact on conflict management and peace-building.

One of the EU’s weaknesses is that it has often lacked the flexibility that is at times needed to mediate and resolve conflicts because of overemphasizing the respect of a particular set of norms. This normative stance has prevented the EU from engaging in a collaborative way with some of the key actors in the conflict, which has consequently reduced the effectiveness of the EU’s
actions. This was visible in the case of the Sudan, where the EU’s insistence that President Al-Bashir and other high profile Sudanese officials be indicted and tried by the ICC put it at loggerhead with the government in Khartoum and even jeopardized the ongoing peace process. Strong norms are not necessarily problematic in themselves. However, the EU’s normative approach is seen as double standard, because it tends to be political (even rhetorical) instead of genuinely normative, and because of the lack of proper conflict analysis. Hence, the EU has to transform the political will of being ‘present’ into actual achievements through increasing both the resources as well as bolstering its effectiveness. This is particularly relevant regarding the various CSDP missions so far, which have been simply too weak and underfinanced to have any real and lasting impact. Some observers have claimed that several of the EU’s interventions are not carried out to help civilians in conflicts or to achieve lasting impact on the ground, but rather to first and foremost promote the EU’s identity and visibility as a security actor: This severely undermines the credibility of the EU as a global peace and security actor.

Somewhat paradoxically, the EU’s normative approach and its selectivity travels well with the fact that the EU actively tries to reduce/downplay its own role in complex conflicts and humanitarian emergencies through buying in to the politically correct policy of ‘African solutions to African problems’. However, the weakness of this policy is that it seeks to transfer responsibility and accountability to African institutions without providing them with enough resources and capacities to solve the complex conflicts. African ownership is thus a chimera and the current solution suits European policy-makers in the sense that the EU’s involvement can be selective and limited, and does not have to take the blame or shame for failure, while at the same time it can boost the EU’s visibility — but without taking responsibility and without providing extensive resources.

Looking at the EU across the two policy fields, there is evidence of the EU as a coherent and unified actor albeit to different degrees depending on various circumstances and institutional configurations. In many regards, however, the EU is not capable of pursuing a coherent and coordinated policy. There are too may diverging interests within the Union, and the negative effect on actorness of the EU’s complicated and even inefficient institutional machinery should not be underestimated. The EU’s actorness is also undermined by its own geostrategic interests. Importantly, any policy based on narrow self-interest meets resistance from within the EU as well as from its partners, which only appears to undermine the EU as a global actor. With this said, however, the most important explanation for the EU’s weakness
as a global actor may not be bureaucratic politics or national/geostrategic interests, but the EU’s quest for identity-building and gaining visibility and presence as a global actor on the world scene. Indeed, there is considerable evidence of that too much of what the EU (particularly the Commission) does in these two policy fields is ultimately aimed at building the EU’s identity and visibility as a global actor. Even if such identity- and visibility-building may be legitimate for certain purposes, the fundamental problem is that genuine actoriness cannot be built mainly around symbolic presence and proud policy declarations that are detached from real achievements and implementation on the ground. In the debate about the EU as a global actor, there is a widespread belief that the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS will help to improve performance and implementation. The analysis in this chapter suggests that institutional reforms may not be able to improve the EU’s performance — the prevailing logic of the EU as a global actor is driven by more fundamental factors, both within the EU’s central institution and in its member states.

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A Critical Copenhagen Reflection on the European Union as a Global Actor

Ian Manners

As the introductory chapter sets out, this volume critically interrogates the EU as a global actor and its normative power in global politics as part of the 2013 European Research Day of the Centre for European Research at Gothenburg University (CERGU). This chapter will conclude this interrogation by providing a Copenhagen reflection on the EU as a global actor within the context of the Normative Power Approach (NPA). The chapter engages in a critical Copenhagen reflection, which means that it takes seriously the insights of critical social theory and the role of cultural hegemony. The chapter argues that the NPA must be understood within the context of two decades of Copenhagen critical social theory, as this is where the approach was born and where I have worked intermittently since 2000.

The chapter is organised as follows: first it will set out critical social theory and a Copenhagen reflection on the EU as a global actor. Second, it engages with Franck and Lorenzoni’s chapter on postcolonialism in the NPA. Third, it interacts with Jonasson’s chapter on the EU and the Mediterranean region through an examination of the EU’s consensual democracy support approach. Fourth, the chapter contemplates Söderbaum’s analysis of the EU and Africa by comparing sustainable peacebuilding and social solidarity in development cooperation. The chapter concludes by reflecting on what the book says about the study of the EU as a global actor in a Nordic context. The chapter argues that the CERGU European Research Day and the contributing
chapters demonstrate just how well developed the study of the EU as a global actor has become in the Nordic region over the past two decades since the Swedish and Finnish membership of the EU in 1995.

**Critical Social Theory**

According to Max Horkheimer’s well known definition, a theory is critical only if it meets three criteria: it must be explanatory, practical, and normative, all at the same time. That is it must explain what is wrong with current social reality, identify actors to change it, and provide clear norms for criticism and practical goals for the future (Bohman 1996: 190).


The reason behind these manifold misunderstandings is probably quite simple – there is little place for critical social theory in international political theory, and there is little place for international political theory in the study of the European Union. As the above quote from James Bohman sets out, within critical social theory a normative power approach should be *explanatory, practical, and normative*, all at the same time. In this respect the NPA is *explanatory* in approaching the EU as a ‘European communion’; a sharing of communitarian, cosmopolitan and cosmopolitical relationships that provide an explanation of the EU as an actor in global politics (Manners 2013a). Sec-

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\(^8\) The phrase ‘normative power Europe’ was reconsidered and last used over 10 years ago as an attempt to move away from Cold War (and neocolonial) approaches to the EU (Manners 2006a: 184). The phrase is not now used by those who understand this move. (check if “not now used” is correct?)
ond, the NPA argues for an analytical focus on the EU’s use of ‘normative justification’, rather than physical force or material incentives, which provides a practical guide for the practice of EU normative power in global politics. Finally, the NPA is normative in arguing that cosmopolitical theory, linking local politics with global ethics, provides a normative basis for critique in global politics.

The origins of the NPA are to be found in a critical Copenhagen context, meaning the interlacing of post-structural securitisation theory, constructivist social identity theory, and Bourdieusian critical theory that have grown in and around the intellectual milieu of Copenhagen over the past 20 years. As Andrew Moravcsik mistakenly argued in 1999, ‘this approach is often referred to as the “Copenhagen school.” It is so named because the force of continental constructivist theories appears to radiate outward from the Danish capital, where it is the hegemonic discourse’ (Moravcsik 1999: 669). What he got wrong was equating the ‘Copenhagen School’ of security studies with the emergent social constructivism in EU studies in the late 1990s (Jørgensen 1997; Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 1999). But what Moravcsik got right was identifying the force of hegemonic discourse found in the critical social theory of Antonio Gramsci (2005) on cultural hegemony. It is this broader sense of critical social theory that is encompassed here, founded in historical materialisms, critical theory, post-structural theories, feminist theories, and postcolonial theories (Manners 2007). Hence the NPA is to be found developed in two research papers from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) – ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (Manners 2000a) and ‘The “Difference Engine” - Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union’ (Manners 2001). These papers wove together, yet antagonised, the works of COPRI staff such as Ole Wæver, Thomas Diez, Lene Hansen and Stefano Guzzini, together with critical social theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 1998), Craig Calhoun (1991, 1995), Stuart Hall (1996a, 1997) and Catarina Kinnvall (1995, 1999). It is within this critical Copenhagen context that a postcolonial engagement with the EU as a global actor must be located, as Europe is literally the creation of the third world.

**Europe is the Creation of the World**

Is it true – as Frantz Fanon claimed – that since its development has required the spoliation of the non-European world, ‘Europe
is literally the creation of the Third World’? (Fanon 1963: 102 in Manners 2000b: 200).

Anja Franck and Patricia Lorenzoni’s contribution to this volume reminds us of the importance of situating any discussion of the EU as a global actor in its post-colonial and postcolonial context. As set out in 2000: ‘[i]t is worth acknowledging the impact of Europe’s colonial past. European states (including Russia) have, over the past 500 years, conquered and colonised virtually every single corner of the world in one form or another…. From this perspective Europe can be seen to be the exploiter of the world, with its relations being characterised by a combination of colonial legacy, predominance in international institutions, and continued exploitation through the forces of globalisation’ (Manners 2000b: 182). More recent scholarship on the EU has reiterated this legacy through emphasising the colonial origins of the EU (Hansen and Jonsson 2012, 2014), the postcolonial move into Europe (Kinnvall 2006a, 2016), and current EU postcolonial relations (Adler-Nissen and Gad 2013, 2014). Following Franck and Lorenzoni, this section draws on the postcolonial work of five critical social theorists used in the NPA in order to improve understanding of the EU as a global actor.

Beyond Fanon’s work, one of the earliest postcolonial scholars to influence the NPA was Stuart Hall and his work on race, identity and cultural studies (Hall 1961, 1977, 1996b; Spivak 2014). Hall’s work sets out how ‘systems of representation and signifying practices’ (Hall 1997: 17 in Manners and Whitman 2003: 390) establish cultural identities found in postcolonial studies, but also how we must be ‘critical of the notion of an integral, originary and unified identity’ (Hall 1996a: 1 in Manners and Whitman 2003: 396). His work on the EC/EU was a critical starting point for understanding the co-constitution of identity effects of EU relations with the rest of the work (Manners and Whitman 2003: 381): ‘Europe’s external relations with its others has been central to the European story since its inception, and remains so. The story of European identity is often told as if it had no exterior. But this tells us more about how cultural identities are constructed – as ‘imagined communities’, through the marking of difference with others – than it does about the actual relations of unequal exchange and uneven development through which a common European identity was forged’ (Hall 1991: 18 in Manners 2014: 263).

The work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has been important for the NPA. As discussed elsewhere (Manners 2013b: 319-320), it is worth reflecting on the extent to which ‘past European failures and crimes (such as colonialism, nationalism, world wars, the holocaust and inequality) [including] historical
failures such as injustice, intolerance, and inhumanity’ are part of the normative power narrative (Manners 2006a: 174). Clearly there is also ‘the obvious postcolonial concern that civilian power Europe is read as a neocolonial attempt to “civilise” the world (again)’ (Manners 2006a: 174). As has been argued, invoking Spivak, ‘Postcolonial theory makes absolutely clear that the term “civilization” is part of “Eurocentric strategies of narrativizing history, so that Europe can congratulate itself for progress” which in contemporary terms invokes the “culture of capitalism” (Spivak 1999: 91, 93)’ (Manners 2006b: 184). Here the difference between communitarian, cosmopolitan and cosmopolitical normative theory becomes important, particularly in the context of globalisation and neo-liberalism (Manners 2013a). As Kinnvall has argued, there is a need to understand the ‘mulifaceted nature of globalisation […] in terms of a global-local nexus of dominance and resistance’ using postcolonial, poststructural political theory and political psychology (Kinnvall 2006b: 11–35; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2010; Manners 2011a: 227). Thus ‘a communitarian emphasis on normative power as promoting European values raises concerns of neocolonial hegemony’, while ‘postcolonial theory and concerns for neocolonial practices must be explicit in attempts to understand how to judge and justify normative power’ (Manners 2011a: 245). As Spivak has emphasised, ‘it is not just Eurocentric communitarian strategies that are problematic, but also the “culture of capitalism” which evokes a wider critique of neo-liberal cosmopolitanism’ (Kinnvall 2008; Manners 2011a: 245; Spivak 1999: 93).

The work of Julia Kristeva on the ‘self as other’ is important for postcolonial understandings in the NPA. As previously discussed (Manners 2006a: 177-8), Julia Kristeva’s Lacanian psychoanalytically-based work has illustrated over the past three decades that the other is always part of the self – an abject-foreigner which is part of our conscious and unconscious selves (Kinnvall 2004):

Abject. It is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object … The abjection of Nazi crime reaches its apex when death, which, in any case, kills me, interferes with what, in my living universe, is supposed to save me from death: childhood, science, among other things (Kristeva 1982: 4).

The foreigner is within us. And when we flee from or struggle against the foreigner, we are fighting our unconsciousness – that ‘improper’ facet of our impossible ‘own and proper’ …
To discover our disturbing otherness, for that indeed is what bursts in to confront that ‘demon’, that threat, that apprehension generated by the projective apparition of the other at the heart of what we persist in maintaining as a proper, solid ‘us’ (Kristeva 1991: 191-2).

To understand the way in which European selves are othered in abject-foreigners, it is worth briefly reflecting on recent EU-wide discourses surrounding the rise of the far-right in or near government in Austria, Italy, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Belgium, Finland, and beyond (together with election successes of the far-right ‘Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy’ and ‘Europe of Nations and Freedom’ groups in the European Parliament). The reactions to Jörg Haider, Pia Kjærsgaard, Francine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Timo Soini, and Jimmie Åkesson, and the hatred they attract are interesting exactly because of the ambiguity between abject-foreignness in questions of immigration, European integration, white supremacy, homophobia, and imperialism. The projection of otherness onto individuals and the social groups they represent is so strong precisely because they are also an abjected and disturbing part of ourselves.

The fifth critical social theorist who has influenced the NPA is Étienne Balibar with his work on race, nation and class and how this has postcolonial connotations. As set out in Manners (2009: 572), the 1980s saw the biological racism of the colonial era adapted to cultural racism for the postcolonial era with ‘colour’ exchanged for ‘religion’ (Balibar 1991: 21; Loomba 2003: 13), with Balibar arguing that:

current racism . . . fits into a framework of ‘racism without races’
. . . It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountibility of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions (Balibar 1991: 21).

The rise of cultural- or neo-racism and neo-nationalism within the context of ‘civilizational Europe’ has been discussed extensively within the NPA (Manners 2009: 571-3), in particular with the observation that ‘the use of civil, civilian, civilianize, civilianizing, civilize, civilization, and civilizing as if they were interchangeable makes their use highly problematic...
‘civilizing’ is far too encumbered a term to be used in any self-reflexive discussion of European relations with the rest of the world’ (Manners 2006b: 184).

In addition, Balibar’s notion of Europe as a ‘vanishing mediator’ is important in a postcolonial context (Manners 2006a: 174-5). Balibar takes Fredric Jameson’s ‘vanishing mediator’ a step further by giving it the meaning of an EUtopia or myth where the EU becomes the anti-systemic mediator – ‘a transitory institution, force, community … that creates the conditions for a new society by rearranging the elements inherited from the very institution that has to be overcome’ (Balibar 2003). In contrast to the concept of exceptionalism, the extent to which the EU becomes a ‘vanishing mediator’ helps to judge the claim to normative power. If the successful exercise of normative power with reference to external points of international reference (such as the UN) leads to a more ‘universal’ acceptance of those norms, then the expectation would be that the EU would become less, not more powerful. It would, in effect, increasingly vanish through its mediation. It is for this reason that the terms ‘sui generis’ or ‘unique’ have not been used in the NPA – ‘any and all of the norms discussed in the NP approach are not uniquely European, and neither is Europe itself’ (Manners 2006a: 180). Clearly, the idea of ‘universal’ is problematic, but following the work of Edward Said, it is understood as particular/culture transcending norms such as human rights, justice, and human dignity that are found in generally agreed statements of principle such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Manners 2006a: 170 fn. 25; Triggs 2003; Ebadi 2004).

Following the postcolonial work of Fanon, Hall, Spivak, Kristeva, Balibar, and Said, the NPA returns to the question raised by Pierre Bourdieu which he believed ‘ought to be at the centre of any reasoned utopia concerning Europe: how do we create a really European Europe, one that is free from all the dependence on any of the imperialisms?’ (Bourdieu 1998: 129–30 in Manners and Whitman 2003: 397; Manners 2007: 83; Kinnvall 2016: 157). This question is very similar to that set out by Gurminder Bhambra who argues against neo-colonial cosmopolitanism and in favour of ‘a properly post-colonial cosmopolitanism [which] would make a difference to the ways in which we approach contemporary forms of exploitation of those represented as ‘outside’ Europe. By acknowledging historical connections, we make the contemporary issues we face shared ones, providing the basis for more adequate and more inclusive ways of addressing them’ (Bhambra 2016: 201). As the creation of the world, the study of the EU as a global actor should acknowledge this reality, in particular through recognising the EU as a ‘Europe-
an communion’; a sharing of communitarian, cosmopolitan and cosmopolitical relationships that provide an explanation for the EU as an actor in global politics, for good or for bad (Manners 2013a).

**European Union Consensual Democracy Support**

Ann-Kristin Jonasson’s contribution to this volume on EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region serves as a good analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU as a global actor. Jonasson’s chapter, together with Söderbaum’s on development cooperation and peace-building, analyse three of the nine principles covered in the current NPA research programme including sustainable peace-building, consensual democracy, and social solidarity in development cooperation (Manners 2002: 242-4; 2008a: 47-55).

The Treaty of Lisbon amended the Treaty on European Union to include a general provision on the Union’s External Action referring to seven substantive principles it seeks to promote, including democracy. It has been argued that there is a particular EU-specific conception of democracy underlying its democracy support activities. But it is also clear that assessing the substantive processes and practices of EU democracy support within the dense interconnexions of international programmes of other actors and agencies, as well as interactions with rule of law, human rights and good governance support, is particularly challenging.

Consensual democracy is the operating principle within the majority of EU member states and includes proportional representation electoral systems, coalition governments and power-sharing among parties (Manners 2008a: 50; 2013c: 252). Similarly, the EU itself is a consensual form of polity, with PR and power-sharing in the European Parliament, non-majoritarian voting (either qualified majority voting or unanimity) in the Council, and power sharing among all the member states. Equally important is the need for democracy support to be consensual amongst the EU and its partners. Thus the NPA advocates that the EU should be engaging in socialisation rather than imposition, which should be seen as being a part of an open-ended process where the EU thinks and reflects on the impact of its policies with the partner countries, in particular through encouraging local ownership. Local ownership is crucial in ensuring that the EU’s relationship is one that is ‘other empowering’ rather than replicating some of the self-empowering motivations of much foreign, development and humanitarian policy (Manners 2010b: 42).

The EU has helped to spread consensual democracy into Central and
Eastern Europe as part of the transition and accession processes. The trinity of democracy, human rights and rule of law, as the Lisbon Treaty suggested, is to be consolidated and supported in the EU’s external action. The treaty indicates at least three ways in which democracy is to be supported: first, internally, through the provisions on democratic principles, including democratic equality, representative and participatory democracy, and the role of national parliaments; second, through the solidarity clause, which the EU and its member states can invoke to protect democratic institutions from any terrorist attack; and third, through enlargement and accession, as well as neighbourhood and development policies.

It can be suggested that the substance of EU democracy support contains elements of *horizontality, hierarchy, depth* and *sustainability* (Manners 2011b). The NPA sets out the close interdependence between the principles, actions and impact of EU democracy support. Besides the substantive empirical insights of case study analysis, the NPA attempts to address the very real analytical difficulties of assessing the substantive impact of EU democracy support. In this way it becomes possible to analyse the ‘*horizonal’* importance of the EU’s ‘wider policy’ of support for the ‘indivisible’ core norms of democracy, rule of law and human rights included in the Lisbon Treaty’s general provision. Similarly, the status of democracy in the ‘*hierarchy’* of EU principles, beneath that of sustainable peace, should be examined. Thirdly, the ‘*depth’* of the EU’s commitment to the support for ‘consensual democracy’ must be considered. In this respect it is important to examine whether support for consensual, rather than majoritarian, democracy is a form of more substantive democratic support in the way it reaches deep into the democratic, rather than electoral practices of the ‘promoted’ country. Finally, the question arises of whether the substantially longer terms of EU engagement in cases of democracy support, over decades rather than days, leads to more ‘*sustainable’* democracy.

The NPA also helps address the challenge of comparing, judging and reflecting on the democratic substance that the EU supports. By deploying three modes of critique – transcendental, immanent, and pragmatic – the tripartite NPA makes a contribution to the question of whether and how to compare with the democratic substance that EU member states, other actors and other international organisations support. What Jonasson’s chapter makes clear in the cases of Turkey and Jordan, as the failure of all the Arab uprisings apart from Tunisia demonstrate, is that EU ‘deep democracy’ support must move beyond election assistance towards a much broader understanding of consensual democracy with all its economic, social and cultural connotations.
Sustainable Peacebuilding and Social Solidarity in Development Cooperation

Fredrik Söderbaum’s analysis of the EU and Africa through comparing sustainable peacebuilding and social solidarity in development cooperation illustrates the interinstitutional tensions between EEAS-driven peacebuilding and Commission-driven development cooperation.

Sustainable Peacebuilding

Within the NPA, the prime EU principle is sustainable peace addressing the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the experience of ensuring that war ‘becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’. The EU policy emphasis is placed on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement as elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention (Manners 2008a: 48-9; 2013c: 243-4). However, the EU’s growing civilian and military operational capacities also have a sustainable peace mission with a focus on ‘peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (see Björkdahl 2011, and Björkdahl et al 2016). While the first objective of the Union is to promote peace, the rest of the Lisbon Treaty suggests that such an objective is to be achieved in at least three different ways. First, peace between European states is achieved through membership of the EU itself, intended to ensure that the peace in Europe of the last 60 years is sustained into the foreseeable future. Second, close and peaceful relations based on cooperation with neighbouring countries are promoted through special relations with the Union’s neighbours. Third, peace and international security are generally promoted through the EU’s external actions, including the provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) such as ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation’.

A question arises over where the balance of emphasis is to be found between addressing the causes of conflict in a peaceful way, and the ability to use force in peacekeeping and genocidal situations (Manners 2008b: 33-4).
Similarly, there is the associated question of whether this is best done through international cooperation, regional peacekeeping operations, or an UN-authorised force. In addressing these questions of the balance between conflict prevention and conflict management, a number of scholars have looked at the EU in the context of the exercise of normative power. Annika Björkdahl and Ana Juncos have both emphasised the normative power of the EU in South-eastern Europe, where the there is an ‘asymmetrical relationship between the EU as a norm-maker and Macedonia as a potential norm-taker’ and arguing that ‘a parallel process has taken place in the last decade facilitating the (re)integration of [Bosnia] in the European mainstream and the (re)invention of the EU as a regional normative power’ (Björkdahl 2005: 277–8; Juncos 2005: 89). Sonia Lucarelli and Roberto Menotti have suggested that such normative power currently excludes certain forms of coercive actions, such as punishment and ‘pre-emption’, but must be seen as part of a distinctive political dynamic that is leading towards a greater acceptance of a wider notion of intervention in the EU (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006: 162–3). As Thomas Diez et al have illustrated in the case of border conflicts, the EU is able to exercise normative power through membership and association negotiations, which in some cases has led to ‘a long-term socialisation of policymakers into European normative discourses’ (Diez et al. 2006: 572–3 and 586–7).

The notion of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) representing an UN-sanctioned military force willing to promote human security is a common representation of normative power (Terriff 2004; Matlary 2006; Liotta and Owen 2006). For the European Commission, human security means a concern for individuals, not states, and encompasses both freedom from fear (for example conflict and human rights abuses) and freedom from want (for example poverty and disease) (European Commission 2005a: 2; Ferreiro-Waldner 2006: 103–7). Interestingly, the origins of the 2003 European Security Strategy are informed by this understanding of human security, in particular with its references to the ‘complex causes’ of terrorism including ‘the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises’ (Council of Ministers 2003: 3; Glasius and Kaldor 2004; Liotta and Owen 2006: 97).

**Social Solidarity in Development Cooperation**

Within the NPA, an extensive understanding of social solidarity becomes clear in references in the objectives of the Lisbon Treaty to ‘balanced economic growth’, ‘social market economy’, ‘full employment’ and combating ‘social exclusion’, as well as promoting ‘social justice and protection’, inter-
generational solidarity, and social solidarity among (and between) member states (Manners 2008a: 53; 2013c: 224). The principle of social solidarity goes beyond intra-EU relations to inform and shape EU development and trade policies, as the Lisbon Treaty suggests with its references to the Union’s contribution to ‘solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty’. In addition to promoting equality, the third objective of the Lisbon Treaty is to promote social solidarity through a variety of treaty areas, including intergenerational solidarity, interstate solidarity and labour solidarity. Intergenerational solidarity emphasizes the role of families and the state in providing practical, financial and social support across the generations. Interstate solidarity involves a spirit of mutual solidarity between member states in order to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as in response to terrorist attack or natural or human-induced disaster. Labour solidarity is concerned with the promotion of labour rights and protection, including core labour standards and fair trade, and can be found entrenched in the twelve articles in the solidarity title of the Charter, as well as in the reference to ‘free and fair trade’ in the Lisbon Treaty.

But to what extent does this EU principle translate into relations and policies with the developing world? As previously suggested (Manners 2008b: 25-6), this is extremely difficult to evaluate as EU development policy largely consists of EU donor member states and the EU Commission working through the OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee). Similarly, the EU is not the only actor in the field of development assistance, with a wide variety of state, international and non-governmental organisations active. Finally, there is the highly charged question of whether trade (i.e. freer market access), aid (i.e. greater financial aid), or good governance (i.e. better instruments of government) is the best way to promote development.

A number of scholars have examined EU development policy in relation to the NPA, including issues such as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement; the 2001 ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) initiative; the 2002 Monterrey process; and the European Commission’s idea of a development ‘policy of solidarity’. In a critical review of EU development policy, Andy Storey makes the point that ‘there may be some reality in the idea that Normative Power Europe is in action in the EPA negotiations’, but that the EU promotion of good governance is too narrowly focused on liberal democracy and market economies which ‘may not correspond to the developmental needs of African economies’ (Storey 2006: 343). In other words, Storey suggests that the EU has normative power, but that in devel-
opment policy it has a preference for promoting norms of freedom and good governance at the expense of social solidarity. Peter Hilpold has argued the importance of the principle of good governance in the Cotonou Agreement for promoting human rights and democracy through a preference for positive measures and a recoupling of developmental assistance with its normative foundations (Hilpold 2002: 66–7, 71). In his studies of the EBA initiative and the Monterrey process, Jan Orbie argues that ‘EU trade policy discourse . . . shows a normative bias towards the achievement of [goals such as] sustainable development and global rules’ (Orbie 2004: 4). He suggests that EBA trade policy ‘may well be an important EU instrument for achieving the . . . goal of development of the South’ (ibid.). Orbie discusses the way in which EU self-perceptions ‘as a leading and benevolent actor played a role in the EU decisions towards Monterrey [including] a remarkable shift towards more integration in European development policy’ (Orbie 2003: 1). Orbie shares Storey’s concerns for the (neo)liberal promotion of multilateralism and the extent to which the EU is unable or unwilling to resist US hegemony (Orbie 2003: 26; 2004: 415).

The movement from the Lomé Convention’s emphasis on privileged partnership to the Cotonou Agreement’s focus on conditionality, differentiation and regionalisation has been criticised by Storey, Orbie and others. The Lomé and the ACP relationship prior to 2000 was motivated by the desire to promote social solidarity and discourse ethics through unconditional and undifferentiated aid and dialogue while being selective in excluding developing societies in the rest of the world. In the post-Cold War world such ‘paternalistic, neo-colonial attitudes undermined the principle of equality’ (Lethinen 1997 in Bonaglia et al. 2006: 172) and were criticised for ‘the poor results of EU development cooperation’ (Arts and Dickson 2004: 2). Since 1990, the EU’s development policy has increasingly moved in a less privileging but more holistic direction, placing an emphasis on conditional and differentiated aid encouraging regionalisation, together with greater overall funding. This changed direction is motivated by the aim of promoting more holistic normative principles (such as good governance, human rights, democracy and rule of law) reflecting a greater emphasis on the results-orientated consequentialist ethics witnessed in the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals which question the centrality of the Commission’s policy of solidarity.

Vicki Birchfield (2011) approaches the study of EU development assistance using normative power as ‘theoretically grounded, empirical framework of analysis’ concluding that, with the exception of two areas, the poli-
cies ‘represent the normative form and the empirical function on the concept as well as the praxis of normative power’. Birchfield explores how material development assistance is related to processes of internal and external normative justification, suggesting that ‘the EU seemingly undergoes and exercise in … an identification and legitimation internal process coupled with an external process of justification and projection’. Birchfield explicitly applies the normative power tripartite analytical framework to conclude that ‘overall the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests a tentative affirmation of the congruence between the notion of the EU as a normative power and the reorientation and execution of its development policies’. Birchfield’s examination of EU development policy identifies the ‘key principles’ as equality and solidarity, although she also identifies the way the EU’s new (2005) development policy concepts of harmonization, results-orientation, ownership, and coherence align EU principles with those of the UN. Birchfield also discussed the question of ownership as a ‘fundamental concepts’ of new EU development policy, concluding that ‘the EU sees ownership by EU partner countries as pivotal for the efficiency and sustainability of its initiatives’.

**Nordic Studies of the European Union as a Global Actor**

The contributing chapters to this book illustrate how well developed the study of the EU as a global actor has become in the Nordic region over the past two decades (see Garsky, Jørgensen and Manners 2012). This critical Copenhagen reflection on the European Union as a global actor will conclude by briefly reflecting on what the book has to say about such Nordic scholarship, and hence what such Nordic scholarship has to say to the study of the EU as a global actor.

Firstly, the introduction by Anja Franck and Fredrik Söderbaum illustrates the way in which scholarship at Gothenburg University is at the peak of Swedish work on the EU as a global actor. In addition to the work by the contributing authors, Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price contribute to CERGU excellence in this field. Secondly, the work of Anja Franck and Patricia Lorenzoni illustrates the extent to which there is excellent Nordic scholarship in postcolonial studies, as work by Catarina Kinnvall (2006a, 2016; and with Nesbitt-Larking 2011); Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson (2012, 2014); and Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ulrich Pram Gad (2013, 2014) demonstrate. Finally, both Ann-Kristin Jonasson and Fredrik Söderbaum’s chapters illustrate the empirical strengths on questions of EU relations with the Mediterranean and Africa (see also Jonasson 2013 and Söderbaum 2015).
Beyond Gothenburg there is also leading excellence on studying the EU as a global actor at Lund University found, for example, in the work of Annika Björkdahl (2015, 2016) on EU peacebuilding and norm importation, Annica Kronsell (2012, 2016) on CSDP and feminism in EU studies, and Catarina Kinnvall on postcolonial Europe. The final Swedish centre for excellence on the EU as a global actor is to be found in Stockholm amongst scholars linked to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, in particular Björn Fägersten (2014), Stefan Borg (with Diez 2016), Niklas Bremerg (2015) Mark Rihard (with Boin and Ekengren 2013), and Anke Schmidt-Felzmann (2008). Four further centres of international excellence on the EU as a global actor are to be found in the Nordic region in Tampere, Helsinki, Oslo, and Copenhagen. In Tampere Tuomas Forsberg and Riski Haukkala (2016), together with Hanna Ojanen (2006), provide a core of expertise on the EU and Russia, as well as CSDP. In Helsinki the Finnish Institute for International Affairs also has a strong research programme on EU as a global actor led by Juha Jokela (2010), Kristi Raik (2004), Sinikukka Saari (2011), and Niklas Helwig (2013). Research expertise in Oslo is divided between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) with Nina Græger (2016), Pernille Rieker (2016), and Kristin Haugevik (with Græger 2011), and the Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State (ARENA) Centre for European Studies with Helene Sjursen (2009) and Marianne Riddevold (2011). Finally, leading Danish excellence on the EU as a global actor is to be found in the Centre for European Politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. Scholars here include Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014), Ben Rosamond (with Parker 2013), Jens Ladefoged Mortensen (2010), Henrik Larsen (2014), Anders Wivel (with Archer and Bailes 2014), Petra Debusscher (2011), Anders Persson (2014), Ruxandra Lupu Dinesen (with Raik 2015), and myself. This list of almost 40 Nordic scholars studying the EU as a global actor is by no means exhaustive, merely illustrative, with an equal number of excellent scholars not listed (for example Knud Erik Jørgensen at Aarhus and Michelle Pace at Roskilde).

Returning to the (sub)title of this volume, what is quite clear is that Nordic studies of the EU as a global actor have now moved a long way beyond arguments suggesting that the EU be considered a ‘force for good’ without critical self-reflection on such claims. As repeatedly pointed out within the NPA (e.g. Manners 2010b: 44; 2011a: 243), it is highly problematic to compound transatlantic discourses of ‘force for good’ with ‘normative power’ without too much reflection on how these have been differently constructed and by whom (see Pace 2008; Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008). Transatlanticist
discourses of the EU as a ‘force for good’ emanated from the New Transatlantic Agenda (EU-US Summit, Madrid, 3 December 1995), and were incorporated into the 2003 European Security Strategy (European Union 2003) as well as subsequent prioritisation of short-term security issues.9

What is also clear is that the long journey in the study of the EU as a global actor and the normative power approach since the mid-1990s has involved a fruitful intertwining of Nordic scholarship and international political theory, informed by critical social theory. There have been many twists and turns on this journey, but the study of the EU as a global actor in the 2010s is now much healthier compared with the 1990s. As pointed out in section 1, and re-emphasised throughout the chapter, space must be found for critical social theory in international political theory, and these approaches must inform the study of the EU in and of global politics.

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9 The 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda stated ‘we are determined to reinforce our political and economic partnership as a powerful force for good in the world’, while the 2003 European Security Strategy stated that ‘the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world’. These different constructions may be seen as embodied in the symbolism of Clare Short’s (former British Secretary of State for Development) discourse of good global development and her 2003 resignation over the invasion of Iraq.


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