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Preface

This year the Centre for European Research at the University of Gothenburg (CERGU) has focused on the importance of cultural borders in Europe and the role they play in European integration. At the annual European Research Day held on March 29, some of the university’s researchers convened with the goal of discussing ‘Cultural Borders and European Integration’. We extended a special invitation to Professor Johan Fornäs of Södertörn University, who, to our delight, gave the first presentation. The researchers from the University of Gothenburg were divided into two panels where they held brief introductory presentations followed by discussions, and then answered the audience’s questions. All of these researchers have been asked to contribute to this annual CERGU book. Since the event was held in English, all participants have chosen to write their contributions in English. The result is the volume in your hands.

The European Research Day has been held every year since 1993, and has resulted in subsequent annual books. Together these books paint a picture of the extensive and timely European research which has been carried out at the University of Gothenburg. The annual books are aimed at researchers, representatives from the public sector and industry, as well as those with an interest in European issues.

CERGU is a multidisciplinary meeting place for researchers interested in issues relating to Europe. The research conducted there includes both large-scale programs and small-scale projects. Projects can be placed at CERGU and can receive funding from research institutions, while still benefiting individual researchers’ home departments.

The research which occurs at CERGU is broad. It encompasses many of Europe’s different areas, from social issues and European integration, to European law and cultural identities. Researchers at CERGU immerse themselves in refugee issues and regionalism, EU institutions and relations with the outside world, in matters of trade, citizenship and sustainable development. Cultural borders is just one of CERGU:s thematic areas.

For up-to-date information about the activities at CERGU, refer to the website www.cergu.gu.se.

Göteborg June 2017
Mats Andrén
A Cultural Perspective on European Borders

Johan Fornäs

What is a cultural perspective on collective identities? How can such a perspective be applied to Europe’s borders? What do recent initiatives to reconstruct narratives of Europe imply? And how are borders thematised in the Eurovision Song Contest, for instance? I will discuss each of these topics, in turn, based on my own research, and more fully presented in a series of publications (Fornäs 2012a and b; 2017a and b).

A cultural perspective

First, what could be considered a cultural perspective on European borders? The answer depends on the concept of culture which is being used. Building on Raymond Williams (1976/1988) as well as my books Kultur (2012b) and Defending Culture (2017b), one can discern four main such concepts.

The ontological concept of culture as cultivation includes everything human-made, in contrast to nature. It is therefore not very distinctive. In this sense, cultural Europe would equal human-made Europe, but in a way Europe is in itself a human-made category and thus thoroughly cultural in this sense.

The anthropological concept of culture as lifeform or ‘a way of life’ would designate Europeanness as a specific lifeform in contrast to African, Asian or American ways of life, including a set of habits, practices and identities. Though this concept allows for a plurality of different cultures, it also risks reifying or essentialising collective identities, as in the debate on com-
munitarian identity politics.

The *aesthetic* concept of culture as the arts can also include popular genres. In this sense, European culture might signify how Europe is narrated or described in literary fiction, drama, music or visual art, or simply art works that derive from the European continent.

The *hermeneutic* notion of culture as the making of meaning through ‘signifying practice’ is my favourite one for theoretical purposes. Culture in this sense combines imagination with communication. Cultural practices associate present things with absent references, thereby representing the past and the future, near and far, and communicating across borders and between the real and the virtual, between fact and fiction. This signifying practice develops in a ‘cultural triangle’ of multiple texts, subjects and contexts. It is important to note that this involves all kinds of symbolic representations, not just written words; it includes emotive associations, not only cognitive images and arguments; and it includes the dynamic interface of meaning and materiality, not just the world of meaning reified as an autonomous textual world.

A transitional form to this hermeneutic concept of culture was a *socio-logical* concept relating either to norms and values of a society or a group, or more generally to the practice of comparing or making differences. However, it is unclear just what precisely the core of this notion is, since differentiations, norms and values can be very different things. There is also the risk of a conservative bias, when culture is restricted to some kind of tenacious stock of existing artefacts or values which resists the fast changes of politics, rather than the creative processes that are also involved in culture.

The distinction between *culture and society* is a complex and difficult issue. Raymond Williams (1976/1988), Clifford Geertz (1973), Paul Ricoeur (1983/1984) and others see this relation as a difference not so much in object matter as in perspective: the social concerns institutions, relationships and practices of interaction when individuals live in an organised community with territorial, institutional and normative dimensions, while the cultural focuses on symbolic dimensions, meaning-making practices or webs of significance. Mixed terms such as ‘sociocultural’ hint at the difficulty in distinguishing the two.

Social scientists sometimes tend to reduce cultural aspects to secondary, superficial embellishments, superstructures or mirrors to the true, real practices that underpin social relations. However, together with Lévi-Strauss, Ricoeur (1976/1994: 130) argued that ‘symbolism is not an effect of society but society an effect of symbolism’. From my cultural perspective, meaning making is no luxury bonus on top of economics and politics, but lies at the
core of human societies. By a double hermeneutic, interpretation is a necessary tool for all social practices but also for all understanding of those practices, since society is made by meaningful action.

My own study of European identities, symbols and narratives is a typical example of cultural research into European border issues (Fornäs 2012a and 2017a). Symbols are roughly equivalent to signs, i.e. textual units that invite and have been created for meaning-making. However, I have used the concept of a symbol in a slightly narrower sense, focusing on so-called key symbols, which are widely acknowledged to signify some core of a collective identity for a nation, a region, a city, a company, an organisation or a group of some kind. Narratives are temporally ordered stories – texts with some kind of temporal organisation. Both symbols and narratives have close links to identities. Ricoeur (1991) talks of narrative identity, when individuals or groups tell stories to express who they are, once were, or want to be. Such narrative identities demand interpretive methods that combine more or less intuitive understanding with distancing and often critical explanation, into what Ricoeur calls one hermeneutic arc.

The concept of identity is itself intrinsically cultural. It covers meaning structures spun around subject positions, in an interplay between the self and the other, inside and outside. Identities are, in principle, never closed, fixed or unitary. Stuart Hall has defended a concept of identity that is not essentialist, but strategic and positional, arguing that identities are ‘never unified and […] increasingly fragmented […]; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are […] constantly in the process of change and transformation. […] Above all […], identities are constructed through […] difference’ (Hall & du Gay 1996: 4).

The EU’s border controls show how borders are linked to identities, and how there is a struggle between transgressions and enclosures. Ethnic cleansing strives to halt this movement and unify identities geographically, so as to avoid hybrid mixtures. Geographical borders are not only dependent upon military and administrative borderlines, but also upon symbolic or communicative boundaries that separate these areas in citizens’ minds.

**European borderlands**

Based on this general background, my cultural perspective of European borders focuses on which clouds of meanings are attached to Europe and its borders, and how Europe is given meaning through an open series of conflicts
of interpretation. It was from this perspective that I analysed a number of key symbols of Europe in *Signifying Europe* (Fornäs 2012a). The idea was to get a glimpse of what European identity could mean, by intertextually interpreting key symbols such as days, mottos, flags, anthems and money.

Through this kind of textual interpretation, I was able to uncover some central layers and dimensions of identification which indicated that the concept of Europe remains an open and living metaphor, with important tensions between stability and mobility, elevation and equality, unity and diversity. Besides noting the persistence of such polarities, I also delved into the centrality of an idea of communication, mobility, dislocation and transition, as well as a more specific theme of resurrection or renaissance, both of which went through several different symbols, both official and alternative ones.

This work is followed up in *Europe Faces Europe: Narratives from Its Eastern Half* (Fornäs 2017a), based on the multidisciplinary research project ‘Narratives of Europe’ (funded by Östersjöstiftelsen). It has seven chapters contributed by my five co-researchers and me, covering different discursive fields and types of narratives from Eastern Europe, mapping, comparing and interpreting narratives in phenomenological philosophy (Carl Cederberg), international geopolitics (Stefan Jonsson), news journalism (Roman Horbyk), social movements (Anne Kaun), visual art (Katarina Wadstein MacLeod) and popular music (myself). In order to develop today’s discussion on European cultural borders, I will refer to two themes from that new book: the EU search for new narratives, which I discuss in the introductory chapter, and the Eastern European narratives of Europe which are found in the Eurovision Song Contest, which I map and analyse in the book’s final chapter.

Borders are important to culture and cultural studies. Meanings and identities are constructed on the basis of differences, and hence of borders. Such borders can be solidified, reified and rigid, but only through some kind of physical or symbolic violence which prevents border-crossing renegotiations and reinterpretations. Russian cultural theorist Yury Lotman (1990) has argued that most creative renewal takes place on the periphery of geographical or cultural regions, since it is on those borderlands that different logics and systems tend to clash and give rise to new ideas, whereas in the central areas, the power structure tends to keep status quo. This makes it particularly interesting to study cultural processes of identity formation in the margins, rather than in the centre. The cultural construction of Europe is put to the test and can therefore be most fruitfully studied in border regions where it is contested by other identity orders. Some such destabilised borderlands are narrow boundary zones separating rather strong and fixed territories; others are wide,
mixed and polysemic fields of interaction and innovation.

Just because borders are culturally constructed, they should not be viewed as illusionary or without consequence. On the contrary, things constructed by humans can have enormously powerful influence on societies and on people’s lives. I find it important to study how borders are made and consolidated, as well as how they are transgressed and contested.

As for external borders that distinguish Europe from non-Europe, these, of course, include the geopolitical borders around the European continent. Upon closer inspection, we can see that these are already rather diffuse, as different ways of demarcating Europe coexist. The Council of Europe comprises 47 countries; the European Union at this moment has 28 member states, of which currently only 19 belong to the Eurozone. There are 29 member states in the European Custom Union and 26 states in the Schengen Area. For each such unit, boundaries may oscillate a bit since there are also more loosely associated countries. Europe looks very different when imagined on a map, depending on which Europe is being depicted. The cultural meaning of Europe thus interacts with political and economic structures, but cannot quite be identified with or reduced to them. Not all CoE members are regarded as equally European by citizens – for instance eastern Russia as well as countries on the Caspian Sea are widely thought to belong to Asia. On the other hand, many outside the Eurozone, like Sweden or Switzerland, tend to be culturally included in Europe anyway.

The internal borders that divide Europe are at least as multiple andcomplexly layered. Such intersecting cultural borders may refer to nation-states, languages, religions or ethnic belongings, but other sociocultural borders are based on classes, genders or generations, and those cannot be as easily visually mapped. Sometimes such divisions lean on strong material factors, for instance state boundaries that are secured by political institutions and ultimately military force. However, the Ukrainian–Russian border is but one example of how cultural factors linked to ethnic belongings can destabilise them.

The European continent has been divided into regions in several different ways. While the United Nations differentiate between Western, Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe, many others prefer to add Central Europe, as well, but there is no consensus on where to draw the boundaries between them. Referring back to history does not help much, since different phases have added new sets of divisions on top of the older ones. Examples include Romans versus Goths, Christianity versus Paganism, Greek-Byzantine versus Latin, Catholic versus Orthodox and Protestant versus Catholic.

There is no way to permanently fix such internal divisions. These are cul-
tural identifications which have been produced, reproduced and transformed by discursive and symbolic practices, including symbols and narratives that legitimate one or the other of these borderlines.

**Narratives of Europe**

It is now time to return to our new book. Narratives are powerful tools for shaping Europe’s formations of identity, as they seek to identify the past, present and future. Europe is always in a process of becoming, always contested and always in a crisis. Ongoing transformations of European identifications may be traced through the shifting narratives of Europe – as an idea, a geographical territory, a political-economic institution and a social community. Since 1989, some of the most intense renegotiations of identity have centred on the post-Communist borderlands of Eastern Europe. How is Europe identified in narratives from its eastern half?

In 2009, the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) initiated a project to look for ‘New Narratives for Europe’, since ‘Europe needs a story to tell’. Like previous initiatives such as ‘People’s Europe’ and ‘Europe for Citizens’ initiatives from the 1970s up to today, ECF’s European narrative project was based on the apparent disconnection between Europe and its people, between the EU and its citizens, which signalled a retreat to national borders. ‘Many people, especially young people, do not see the need for Europe between the local and the global. Europe as a project for peace and shared welfare, which was the vision after WWII, does not “work” any more. Even the magic of 1989 is forgotten.’

ECF’s wish to revitalize European narratives derived from two main factors, one temporal and the other spatial. One problem was the lapse of time and the generation shifts that made the historical motors behind unification slip into oblivion: young people apparently needed something more up to date than the European wars of the previous century to spark any enthusiasm for the EU. Another had to do with the eastward geographical expansion of European institutions that has made necessary a revision of the identification of European values to accommodate Eastern European countries and populations.

In April 2013, José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission (EC), launched another new project devoted to reformulating ‘a new narrative for Europe’. A cultural committee of twenty distinguished members was set up, led by Paul Dujardin as well as Rem Koolhaas, Olafur Eliasson, Cristina Iglesias, György Konrad, Rose Fenton and Michal Kleiber.
One year later, in March 2014, the result was a declaration of a ‘New Narrative for Europe’, which emphasized the ‘shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law’, and the role of culture as ‘a major source of nourishment’ (European Commission Cultural Committee 2014). Indeed, cultural symbols and narratives are increasingly central to Europe’s future prospects, by serving as a means of identification and interaction between the severed halves of the continent.

The report stated that now was the time to present ‘a new narrative for Europe for all citizens’, thus abandoning the idea of plural ‘new narratives’ in favour of the singular: ‘a new narrative’. Despite all initial talk of newness, the report reproduced what could be seen as ‘a European master-narrative: the idea that all European nations have a history of bloody, deep, fundamental divisions that, at some point, were overcome’, in the words of Joep Leersen at the 2010 ECF seminar. Reunification after self-inflicted division is a key aspect of this narrative, which certainly puts borders at the centre of European identity.

The report suggested ‘Renaissance and cosmopolitanism’ as ‘two cultural ideals’ inspiring Europe’s future. Both these concepts can be seen as slightly revised versions of those core values that have long been central to Europe and which are recurrently mentioned when European identity is discussed. For instance, my own study of European symbols identified resurrection and communication as key values, reminiscent of renaissance and cosmopolitanism. Both these themes obviously have much to do with borders, in several senses.

The EC Cultural Committee argued that ‘Europe needs a societal paradigm shift – in fact, nothing short of a “New Renaissance”’. Rather than radical ‘revolution’ or conservative ‘resurrection’, the more liberal term ‘Renaissance’ was used, combining a general idea of rebirth with a memory of those fifteenth- and sixteenth-century ‘revolutions in thought’ that laid the foundation for the modern ‘Knowledge Society’. Just as that Renaissance period based its modernizing ideas on classical Greek and Roman heritage, this new European narrative likewise strives to combine innovative transformation with historical continuity.

For several decades, the cosmopolitan spirit has been on the agenda in political practice as well as in social theory. The report imagined Europe as ‘one great mega-city interconnected by means of transportation and communication’. We can link this to a European tradition of intercultural communication, symbolized by the windows, doors and bridges on the Euro banknotes, but also resonant with the classical myth of the Middle Eastern princess Europa
being transported over the waters to Europe by a bull-shaped Zeus. Translation, mobility and plurality have indeed long characterized this continent, and the focus on the spirit of ‘soft power’ is also recommended in this declaration. Cosmopolitanism combines the more general appraisal of (ethnic, linguistic, national, cultural and political) diversity with an urban sense of hybridity and transience that avoids the trappings of communitarianism and other kinds of identity politics that have threatened to undermine multicultural discourses from within.

One internal cultural division that has been particularly important is that between Eastern and Western Europe, as they were divided by the Iron Curtain with military force separating capitalist from communist countries in the Eastern Bloc. Former Yugoslavia destabilised that neat division, and after the Cold War ended in 1989, this division has become seriously contested. However, certain post-communist traits seem to have remained in place, and the East/West polarity continues to haunt Europe, even though many in the former Eastern Bloc now think of themselves as having returned to Central Europe.

A lesson from Edward Saïd’s Orientalism (1978/1991) and Stuart Hall’s (1997/2013) work on representation is that it is important to avoid or deconstruct stereotypical dualisms which exaggerate external differences between two assumed opposites while blinding themselves from diversities within each side. On one hand, the East and the West actually have lots in common; on the other hand, both the East and the West are more internally diverse than any such simplifying polarity or dichotomy would like to admit. Eastern Europe is thus not a strictly delineated entity. It is also far from homogenous. With radically divergent historical experiences, different countries have chosen distinct paths vis-à-vis the European project of unification – some joining the EU, others staying outside.

**Eurovision**

My own empirical study in this project and book concerns the Eastern European finals and competing songs in the Eurovision Song Contest. The ESC deserves to be taken seriously because it is itself a forum for dealing with current issues of European integration. It actually offers a reminder of how Chantal Mouffe (2012) has advocated an ‘agonistic’ model of political democracy, where the participating artists and nations share ‘a common symbolic space’ and recognise each other’s legitimate right to participate and voice their claims, in a ‘conflictual consensus’.
I admit that televised entertainment and pop concerts do not constitute any form of political association, and that the ESC is, in a sense, not quite ‘for real’: it is a symbolic event, a playful game hardly anybody is prepared to die for. But this in a way makes it even more important as a model arena for exploring how other formations of Europeanness might be developed: it is actually a relatively successful experimental effort at ‘keeping antagonism at bay by establishing institutions allowing conflict to take an agonistic form’ (Mouffe 2012). The impact of such aesthetic and affective communities should not be underestimated. The ESC might be widely ridiculed, but such emotively constituted communal experiences of transnational relations should be taken seriously. This can be connected to when Mouffe argues for acknowledging ‘the crucial role played by affects and passions in politics’.

Using a methodological model for analysing narratives, inspired by Genette (1972), Ricoeur (1981) and Ryan (2004), four key dimensions of narrative were analysed: setup (context and actors), process (sequence of events from past to future), mode (genre) and meaning (in this case identifying Europe). Meanings were interpreted by a contextualising analysis of material and formal textual structures, related to production and reception histories, as well as to intertextual comparisons with other identifying discourses.

The ESC has taken a striking turn to the east since 1989, and particularly since 2000, when the external border of the ESC began to move eastwards at a rapid pace. Among the more than 1,500 songs performed in the finals and semi-finals since 1956, I chose some 90 such songs for analysis, since they explicitly thematised European issues. More than 50 of them were from Eastern Europe. Here is just a selection of typical lyrics for illustration:

We gave tears, and we also gave blood
May we all have peace in the years to come
(Monica Anghel & Sincron for Romania 1996: ‘Rugă pentru pacea lumii’/‘Prayer for World Peace’)

My world is slowly dying
Say it out loud: peace will come
(Diana Gurstkaya for Georgia 2008: ‘Peace Will Come’)

We survived the reds and two world wars
Get up and dance to our Eastern European kinda funk
(InCulto for Lithuania 2010: ‘Eastern European Funk’)


Differences may not be wrong
They enrich things that we know
Different faiths, different views
All we can do is to turn them in key
(Compact Disco for Hungary 2012: ‘Sound of our Hearts’)

The ice will melt again and the leafless tree will blossom
Every end is just a new beginning
The curtain opens again
(Birgit for Estonia 2013: ’Et uus saaks alguse’/‘So There Can be a New Beginning’)

The ESC is full of narratives about Europe, but on closer inspection virtually all are variants of the same master narrative of Europe as resurrecting from past self-inflicted catastrophes. It is the same grand narrative of redemptive resurrection that dominates the narratives of leading European institutions, including the EC Cultural Committee’s talk of a new renaissance, and the cosmopolitan dimension of unification in and through diversity, which is equally omnipresent. Some Eastern European songs add freedom from oppression to peace after war as a leading value, but otherwise the main story is surprisingly constant, hinting at the persistence of this narrative. This resurrection narrative resonates with the founding myth expressed in the EU’s key symbols. The inclusion of former Soviet Bloc countries into the European integration process has given new impetus to those founding narratives, and the Eastern European narratives indicate important continuities between the old and the new. The overcoming of self-inflicted division through communicative transgressions of borders is a very strong and virtually omnipresent subtext to each final event as well as in those songs that thematise Europe.

As for the meaning of these ESC narratives, I was curious to see how Europe is identified. There were three prominent values or tropes for identifying Europe, which recur in songs and final events, each linked to one of the three phases of the master narrative, and all related to the border topic.

A. *Unique universality*. The Eurovision event and many songs about Europe share an idea of Europe as *selected* for a particularly important task and challenge, elevated above other continents. This confirms a theme of nobility or *elevation* that is found in other European symbolism as well. Europe appears to be chosen for a great mission: elevated to *universality*, with a duty to share this with the rest of the world, in the spirit of equality and solidarity.

B. *Resurrecting from division*. If the first phase of the ESC master narrative hearkens back to Europe’s birth as an elevation to universality, then the
second phase speaks of division, war and destruction. Europeans have experienced deep misery, loss and pain, which makes them acutely aware of their vulnerable precariousness, motivating the wish for peaceful coexistence and mutual co-operation. Songs from Eastern Europe, in particular, often focus on having suffered hardships which make them seem either needy or tough. Without a fall into the deepest of agonies, there would not be the strong sense of resurrection that is central to this millenarian narrative. The theme of resurrection is linked to that of elevated nobility, in that it has been wars that destroyed the ancient cultural heritage, but wars also sow the seeds of science, culture and reason through the experience of loss that makes Europeans sensitive to the ethical responsibility for the suffering of others.

C. Communicative mobility. A third key value derives from the third phase of the master narrative: the process or dream of unification. Displacement, dislocation and mobility belong to the core European traits and values which are also cherished in the ESC. Artists travel to the hosting city to meet each other, and their bodies explore new moves on stage, putting the public’s emotions in motion. Many songs describe moves across physical and/or social spaces, and this value of mobility can also be linked to other symbols, from Princess Europa to the windows, doors and bridges on the Euro banknotes. Communication is a central value in the ESC, as well as in the EU. Most Eurovision voices, especially from Eastern Europe, tend to emphasise that peaceful unification must accommodate difference, as in the European motto ‘united in diversity’. Peaceful coexistence is connected to freedom and mutual dialogue. Again, this cosmopolitan value interacts with the other two. The unique mobility of capitalism accumulates riches, rich empires invest in communications, and Europe’s universalism is based on trust in dialogical communication. On the other hand, migrations lead to conflicts and wars produce refugees, so there is also a negative dialectic of mobility and precariousness.

In sum, the role of Eastern Europe in the ESC strikingly confirms rather than contradicts the official EU mythology, expressed in the old founding narrative celebrated on the Europe Day in remembrance of the Schuman Declaration. Virtually all songs with a European message contain fragments of the grand ‘master narrative’ of Europe: a tale of resurrection from a catastrophic state of inner division, with a wish to revive an original greatness and to overcome fragmentation and war. The goal is to communicate and cooperate across borders in order to make the whole world better. This old narrative of Europe seems very much alive and kicking in the ESC today, confirming a tradition that has been in place since the start of the ESC and which has even
deeper roots outside of the ESC.

Let me end with a note on ethics. I believe that cultural aspects which are linked to symbols, narratives and other texts, and thus to meaning-making imagination, communication and interpretation, are crucial to our understanding of Europe and its current and historical borders. Europe also has a task and a duty in this respect. In our new book, Carl Cederberg (2017) stresses that we should avoid collapsing ‘ought’ to ‘is’: Europe should set up utopian goals but never fool itself into believing that they have already been fulfilled; we should never conflate the ideals for future action with an already existing identity. Jacques Derrida (1991) insisted on the acknowledgement of difference and alterity for a ‘Europe still to become’. Zygmunt Bauman (2004) likewise regarded Europe as an unfinished adventure, defined by its lack of fixed identity and yearning for transgression. Étienne Balibar (2004: 235) argues that Europe’s rich history of superimposed differences has lent it a particular capacity to act ‘as the interpreter of the world, translating languages and cultures in all directions’. Paul Ricoeur (1992/1995: 3, 5, 6–7) envisions the future of Europe as a ‘post-national state’ that combines identity and alterity at different levels: asking for a ‘translation ethos’ of hospitality that could mediate between different cultures, and where people could take responsibility for ‘the story of the other’ in mobile identifications through readings that constitute narrative identities.

These visionary formulations do not describe what Europe already has achieved. Rather, they express Europe’s intriguing tasks and its own norms that ask for an immanent critique of the European project, tracing its inner contradictions in order to understand its potentials as well as its necessities, rather than applying abstract and idealistic norms unrelated to the experiences and capacities it has evolved through its long and ambiguous history. While many cultural borders do need to be deconstructed, the one between what has already been achieved and what remains to be done must be kept in mind, as an impetus for renewed efforts.
References


The Memory of Water: Boundaries of political geography and world literature

Katarina Leppänen

Introduction

Somewhere in the far north there is a secret underground well of fresh, cool water. When young Noria attains the title of tea master she inherits the secret of water and the responsibility for an underground network of fresh water distribution in a dusty, parched, insect-ridden, peripheral place on earth. *Memory of Water* is set in the near-future world where the access to fresh water is controlled by the military, while seawater levels have risen and contaminated fresh-water reserves. In this essay, I will read Emmi Itäranta’s novel *Memory of Water* as a work of world literature that subtly drags one’s imagination into an eerie zone of the familiar-unfamiliar. Dystopian low sci-fi at its best.¹

The existence of cultural, linguistic and territorial borders is the paradoxical prerequisite for our understanding of integration, whether it is a question of European integration or integration of migrants in a new cultural setting. What would the world look like if most borders were obliterated? In reading *Memory of Water*, I will pay special attention to its lack of borders and the challenge it poses for the reader to *not* think in terms of borders. I will also demonstrate how the lack of borders, that is, the lack of borders that create alternative comparable units (e.g. nations) passivates people because there are no alternatives to strive for. Literature can in this case work as a test-site

¹ "Low" or "soft” science fiction infers that it is set “closer” to our civilization when it comes to scientific development and social structure. For a short summary read this review: [https://web.archive.org/web/20150305132249/http://www.strangehorizons.com/reviews/2014/08/memory_of_water.shtml](http://www.strangehorizons.com/reviews/2014/08/memory_of_water.shtml), accessed 2017-06-21.
for possible futures.

I will approach the novel from three perspectives. One, eco-cosmopolitan theory will be tried as a way of rethinking possible futures. Two, the established border-zone of the familiar and unfamiliar through near-translatable concepts, phenomena and material objects, the evoking of the *unheimlich*, will be discussed. Three, Rob Nixon’s concept of “slow violence” is introduced in an attempt to understand the psychology of the novel’s human beings. Initially, however, a few words about the novel as world literature.

**The novel**

*Memory of Water* is a novel that launches itself into the folds of world literature from the start. World literature is a contested concept and sometimes used to refer to the sum total of the world’s national literatures. Such a definition is, of course, rather meaningless as a disciplinary category. Usually, world literature refers to the circulation of works into the wider world beyond their country of origin. This phenomenon can be approached from a number of theoretical and methodological perspectives such as book markets, cross border transport, translation, or, as a part of the globalization and commodification of aesthetic objects.²

Emmi Itäranta is a Finnish writer who has lived and worked as a journalist in Britain for several years and she wrote two parallel versions of the book in different languages, Finnish and English. Itäranta explains the implications of the dual process in both practical and creative terms:

> I had to write in English initially, because I was submitting the early chapters as coursework for my university degree in the UK. However, I soon discovered that it was quite useful to get feedback from my Finnish writing group, so I ended up writing each chapter in parallel in English and Finnish. It’s a slow process, but I find that the result is better, more polished, than when I’m only writing in one language. It’s a way of forcing myself to be very thorough and it helps me put some distance between myself and the text.³

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The Finnish version was published 2013 and won several literary awards and an English version was already written and prepared for publication in 2014 (Harper Voyager). To date, the book has been translated into some twenty languages. When it comes to the question of quick global publication, an existing English version is of course a great benefit for a debuting author as it gives access to the transnational world literary networks. More interesting from an aesthetic perspective, I find, is the creation of literature as a multilingual, and therefore a multicultural, process. The literary scholar Emily Apter approaches the issues of translation, or untranslatability, in many of her works. Apter believes that untranslatability is not only connected to the practical difficulty of creating a corresponding text in a different language, rather it is a much deeper philosophical question of cognitive dissonance between languages, cultures and concepts. Apter’s relationship to translation is notably not at all as negative as it appears on the surface, with a title that reads, for example, Against world literature: On the politics of untranslatability (2013). Translation is a cognitive challenge of the transformation (not only transfer) of text and thought into a new linguistic, literary and cultural setting and it is this enlarged understanding of translation that actually allows Apter to relate rather freely, some may think too open-endedly, to the business of translation. She is, for example, appreciative of the French philosopher Alan Badiou’s “hypertranslation” of Plato in La République de Platon (2012). This translation is grounded in what Badiou calls “total comprehension” and results in what Apter then terms “strong translation”. The result is an actualization of Plato in modern French language as well as an actualization of Plato in the modern world, including a freewheeling attitude toward Plato’s original concepts and their traditional translations into Romance languages.

Apter’s theory of untranslatability is complex, as is her view on (against) world literature. Here it may suffice to draw attention to the wording practices of parallel writing. What Itäranta does, is to build her work on two sets of languages and cultures simultaneously. In contrast to the effect of multi or bilingual texts, where distance and familiarity is created by words present in the text, such as slang, foreign words or sentences, or dialect, Itäranta’s text creates a world where differences create a world beyond the assumed British and Finnish contexts. What is created is not a hybrid, but rather an abstraction. It is thus already in the moment of creation a piece of world literature that transgresses culture not only by placing the events in another (fictive) world, but also by the cross-fertilization in making sense of different cultural contexts, the very process of intellectual back-and-forth movement, which

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4 Apter, Against World Literature, 20-25.
cannot be grounded anywhere in-between.

My claims here are hypothetical. In what sense does Itäranta’s novel differ from science-fiction written in (or from) one context? And interestingly, how does it differ from a setting where the author herself or himself translates their own works from one language to another target language? As my questions here suggest I imagine these to be different kinds of cognitive, intellectual and creative practices. This is along the lines of what Apter suggests about the complexity of the translation zone that inevitably includes linguistic, cultural, political and local elements.5

**Continuities: Local, global, historical**

*Memory of Water* is a dystopic novel set in a poor and grim future. The text offers no information leakage for the reader’s benefit, no explanatory level that translates between Noria’s time and ours, outside of the reader’s ability to decipher the relationship between the fictive facts and the present day political reality. The geographic location of Noria’s home is possibly in the present-day Nordic countries, most likely Finland, but called the Scandinavian Union. However, the centrality of the tea ceremony in the novel hints at large-scale shifts in rituals and cultural values of the region. The global-scale military dictatorship might be identifiable as “Chinese”, due to the use of names such as New Qian and Xinjing, and geographic distances that are explained by travel routes when Noria’s mother, a researcher, leaves her northern home for the university that is apparently located near the political power.

This intermingling of identifiable names with strange customs creates that eerie feeling of the *Unheimlich* that Sigmund Freud described in his 1919 essay *Das Unheimlich*, as a reaction which occurs when one is reminded of something that used to be familiar, but which is now unfamiliar, a secret or repressed. The fact that Noria is a young woman who attains the mastership of tea is commented on, which suggests that the gendered order of our own time remains. However, that fact that she is a Scandinavian tea master, a ritual we today strongly associate with Japanese and Chinese cultures, is not commented upon. Furthermore, the fact that very little is said about the physical appearances of the military leaves the reader in uncertain of whether this is an invasion or a union between the Scandinavian Union and New Qian. This is only resolved when it turns out that there is a Finnish sounding name among the soldiers which hints at local collaborators. In fact, it turns out that the whole society builds on a system of informers revealing illegal water usage.

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5 Apter, Emily (2006), The translation zone, Princeton, Princeton University Press
Those found out are ostracized from society and a blue ring is painted on their
door, eventually they will perish or be executed. The interplay of near and
far that is created by the Unheimlich draws immediate attention to our own
predicament. It is relatively easy to imagine water shortage as opposed to the
far flung sci-fi worlds of some dystopias.

Ursula Heise has suggested that we need to develop an eco-cosmopolitan
stance in the face of the global climate crisis. Eco-cosmopolitanism strives
to understand the global connectivity of ecological systems, while recogniz-
ing local and regional differences. In Memory of Water we can follow the
eco-cosmopolitan dynamic of civilizational decay on a global scale and its
effects on the local scale of Noria’s everyday life. But what has disappeared
in this dystopian future is the individual ability to connect these two scales,
between the local and the global. Communication has almost broken down,
there is no information available on what is happening in other parts of the
empire, travel is extremely difficult since there are no fossil fuels. This dis-
continuity of information also relates to history as Noria knows little about
the past-world (our time) because the losses which occurred during the Twi-
light Century seem unbridgeable. Noria’s mother has a large collection of
books because she is a researcher and Noria senses that there are secrets here
to be discovered, just as she knows that her legacy of tea master’s diaries
contain dangerous information. The info-gap is made even clearer when No-
ria’s friend Sanja salvages some CDs and manages to fix a CD player found
in the “plastic grave” that contains many recognizable items that have lost
their significance. The set of CDs recount a research expedition in search of
fresh water.

Throughout the book it remains unclear whether the water shortage is a
real problem or just a way of controlling the population as the reader’s access
to information is as limited as Noria’s and Sanja’s, who only get at scraps
of information from the past world. The young women, however, launch a
search expedition of their own.

The connection to the idea of eco-cosmopolitanism is interesting be-
cause, as a concept, it assumes that the positive aspects of cosmopolitanism,
the feeling of being part of a larger meaningful global whole, make sense. In
Noria’s world only the negative aspects of globalization, the fact that what
happens environmentally in one part of the world risks affecting every other
part, is true. The sense of the local thus has no means of expanding to a sense
of encompassing cosmopolitanism. Heise’s use of the term eco-cosmopol-
itanism is a devise for analyzing aesthetic cultural representations of global
climate change. Yet, it is interesting how closely Heise’s ideas tie in to the
current world with the relatively unhindered flow of information and people across the globe that some of us are used to. This is of course the same criticism that has been directed at all theories of cosmopolitanism, that they tend to represent the individualistic world citizens who hold the right passport and the wallet to match.

The victims of *Memory of Water* are the countless and faceless people who live with the constant lack of fresh water, loss of health and dignity, and who can attain privileges only by snitching on their fellow misfortunates. The whole novel builds on a repressive silence, within families, between friends, at the market. Rob Nixon has coined the term slow violence as a way of describing the opposite of spectacular violence or catastrophe that fits well with media logics of events that only have short term public interest. An explosion in a chemical plant or fires in a sweatshop in Bangladesh, are such spectacular events that momentarily catch the eyes and ears of international media. The slow violence that continues to cause deterioration over years and years to come, losses of lives, orphans, disappeared sources of income that are eating away the social and political fabric of a society or a social order, remain invisible. Decades after mines have been planted, people are killed and agricultural areas are inaccessible, which causes famine. Chemical waste from mines seeps into the groundwater poisoning streams and rivers, etcetera. Nothing really news-worthy or spectacular happens, yet life is made impossible as the low-intensity destruction continues.

In *Memory of Water* it is the withholding of fresh water that makes all normal life impossible and it is clearly an exercise of utmost violence. In the face of such violence the entire social fabric falls apart and we have a silent society of suspicion and distrust that totally passivates individuals and makes all collective resistance impossible. A dystopia close to our own social and political order offers, I believe, a fascinating litmus test for our imaginations of the future. If, for example as in the *Memory of Water*, electronic communication by message pods, as they are called in the book, breaks down and if there is hardly any infrastructure or fuel for physical travel, then the whole idea of planetary eco-cosmopolitanism stands on shaky ground. Such imaginations, in fact, seem to require the kind of eco-modernism of continuous economic growth and technological development that many environmentalists are very skeptical of.

Notably, cultural and territorial borders are missing in Noria’s world and the center of political and intellectual gravity has shifted, so that today’s Europe has totally lost its significance. There seem to be no alternatives to the language of those in power, or else everyone is multilingual to the extent that
shifting languages in conversations need not be commented upon. This lack or borders continues into social relations as dictatorial power and slow violence has made the private-public distinction obsolete. It is, in fact, as if most people totally lack any will.

“Knowledge is power” is written across the cheek of Noria on the cover of the first Finnish and English editions. Noria is blond with icy blue eyes and a serious demeanor. A blue ring, the mark of ostracism, circles her face.6 This paratextual information, not surprisingly, is different depending on edition and target language, and is often replaced by more abstract images, or even covers pointing to the genre of fantasy literature.7 Noria’s access to water, and the access to her parents’ books, gives her a special position in society. She is the only one who seems to have any will to change. Yet, even Noria distrusts her best friend and accomplice Sanja, who she believes may have betrayed her when she does not turn up for their planned escape/expedition to find fresh water. The rest of society is socially dead in the sense that all that remains is distrust and selfishness. Most of all, it is a very silent book.

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6 See http://www.emmitaranta.com/memory-of-water
‘Florence is nothing better than a vast museum full of foreign tourists’. This contemptuous statement on the manifestations of mass tourism sounds strikingly contemporary; yet the words belong to Stendhal and stem from a visit to Italy undertaken exactly two centuries ago in 1817.¹ The traveller’s belittlement of other itinerants as mindless tourists is a common trope of travel writing. It is even an integral part of the construction of self and other on the beaten track.² As Jonathan Culler has observed, ‘The true age of travel has, it seems, always already slipped by; other travellers are always tourists.’³ The two centuries that have passed since Stendhal visited Italy have produced an overwhelming amount of criticism directed towards mass tourism and the negative side-effects of increased mobility. Critics have taken aim at everything from the commodification and eradication of ‘authentic’ cultures to mass mobility’s devastating effects on the local nature and the global climate.⁴ The tourist practice observed already by Stendhal that ‘each nationality

brings with it its own manners and customs” has also been the target of much scorn. Cultural critics have lamented the sun-and-sea tourist’s disinterest in local traditions and the resulting McDonaldization of the tourist experience in order to make the visitor feel at home. Mass tourism, and the greatly increased economic integration and human connectivity that undergirds it has, in many ways, been integral to the globalization processes of the twentieth century. Much of the critique levelled at globalization at large has thus also been directed toward mass tourism.\(^5\)

At the same time, however, academics, politicians, and representatives of the tourist industry have repeatedly insisted on tourism’s valuable role as a vehicle for mutual understanding and the bridging of differences. This article offers a brief history of the idea that tourism can somehow serve as a harbinger of harmony. It begins by briefly reviewing the spurious reasoning behind the argument that tourism produces peace. It then traces the connection of tourism to peace and its coagulation into a popular catchphrase – peace through tourism – embraced by an array of prominent international organizations during the Cold War. Finally, the article concludes that the adoption of the catchphrase was arguably a strategy to legitimize the economic interests of the tourist industry.

The logic behind the argument that tourism leads to peace is undergirded by three assumptions. First, it is assumed that tourism establishes contact between people. Second, it is assumed that this contact fosters mutual understanding and sympathy. Third, it is assumed that increased understanding and mutual friendship dampens conflict. The first and the second assumption build on contact theory, which basically maintains that tensions between different cultural or ethnic groups can be overcome simply by bringing the groups into contact with one another.\(^6\) The pitfalls of this logic are obvious. The success of mass tourism relied to a great extent on the reduction of friction. The jet age allowed for the quick and smooth relocation of the tourist from home to away rather than spending days on end crammed in a bus or on multiple trains. Once at the destination, new seaside hotel complexes equipped with modern amenities and offering full board made the tourist feel comfortable and reduced the necessary interaction with locals to a minimum. Moreover, when tourists and locals interact the relationship is usually very short-term and without common goals beyond the conduct of simple transactions. The third assumption implies that increased interpersonal or intercultural under-


standing is easily translated into international politics of peace and conflict resolution. Although the intercultural understanding of politicians is arguably conducive to the successful realization of foreign policy goals, so many other factors play into the equation that no obvious correlation can be traced, as recent research has demonstrated.7

The roots of the idea that tourism can be a vehicle for international understanding and peace trace back to the various strands of interwar internationalism.8 The international institution invented to safeguard the peace after the First World War, the League of Nations, embodied the internationalist spirit. However, the League of Nations recognized that culture was a potentially dangerous weapon that could be invoked in border disputes and the original pact thus omitted co-operation in that field. Ethnographers and folklorists nevertheless managed to win the institutional support from a League of Nations sub-organization for an international congress held in 1928. The support led to delighted responses. A Belgian journal considered it ‘highly possible that this congress will be an effective tool for universal peace. [Folk] art will increasingly become the flower of peace’.9 The logic behind the argument was that the congress would uncover the shared roots of diverse folklore traditions and thereby ‘serve as an element of reconciliation, the awakening, in some way or other, of a source of friendship, stronger than any diplomatic approach’.10

The Second World War dented these internationalist hopes, but only augmented the importance of building a lasting peace after the war. In this project, the travel industry was envisioned an important role. As The Times reckoned in July 1941, ‘[w]hen peace comes, [Cook’s] will have a great work to do for civilization in helping to reopen the channels of intercourse between the nations.’11 In Nazi occupied Denmark, the labour movement’s travel agency, Dansk Folkeferie, insisted that by ‘getting to know each other better […] our children and grandchildren will not experience the same Ragnarok that our generation has had to endure’.12 Shortly before the peace, Swedish social

8 On internationalism, see Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); For a Swedish perspective on interwar internationalism, see Ingela Nilsson, Nationalism i fredens tjänst: Svenska skolornasfredsförening,fredsförArmy och historieundervisning1919–1939 (diss. Umeå University, 2015).
10 Quoted in Rogan, ‘Folk Art’, 10.
12 Quoted in Anja Warschawsky, ‘Folkeferie – ferieformer, ferieindhold og dannelsesidealer 1938–1988’, Arbei-
democratic internationalists also encouraged post-war tourists to ‘seriously learn and to build friendship with the war-tormented people!’\textsuperscript{13}

Internationalism also guided the pioneers of tourism studies. In 1946 the first issue of \textit{The Tourist Review} appeared, a quadrilingual Swiss-based journal dedicated to the promotion and study of tourism. It included ‘A Plea for International Understanding’ authored by the English Lord Hacking, who insisted that ‘[n]ever in the history of the world has the need for international understanding and amity been more urgent than it is now.’\textsuperscript{14} The remedy, however, was close at hand. ‘There is one easy way by which nations may come to understand each other, and that way is a reciprocal interchange of tourists.’\textsuperscript{15}

A year later, the Marshall Plan was launched aiming to reconstruct European industries and infrastructure. Tourism offered an easy way of counterbalancing the European trade deficit with the US. As a consequence, much effort was put into the selling of European holidays to Americans. Investments in infrastructure, hotels, and advertisement paid off and boosted especially the French tourist industry.\textsuperscript{16} The national European tourist offices joined forces in 1948 and formed the European Travel Commission (ETC) to lobby for the tourist industries and to coordinate the advertisement of holidays in Europe. Early on, the ETC adopted the slogan ‘understanding through travel is the passport to peace’. This slogan was also embraced by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the US government agency established to manage the Marshall Plan. In 1950 the ECA supported a poster competition with prizes awarded to posters which touted travel as the passport to peace.\textsuperscript{17}

The Soviet Union denied its East European sphere of influence participation in the Marshall Plan. Here the leaders regarded international mobility as a potential threat to national security. The Stalinist regimes thus excised pre-war traditions of international travel, and tourist visits to this part of Europe became next to impossible. Tellingly, Temple Fielding’s best-selling \textit{Travel Guide to Europe} – first published in 1948 and reprinted many times since – contained only succinct entries for the countries east of the Iron Curtain, and all of them centred on the new travel impediments.\textsuperscript{18}

After Stalin’s death in 1953, however, measures were taken in the Soviet

\textsuperscript{13} [Ivan Ohlson], ‘Öppna porterna mot världen!’, \textit{Fritiden}, no. 1 (1945), 5.
\textsuperscript{15} Hacking, ‘A Plea’, 8.
Union and its European buffer states to open up to western tourists again. Khrushchev’s discourse of mutual respect and peaceful co-existence proved fully compatible with the optimistic view of tourism as a vehicle for peace and mutual understanding. In August 1955, the first western tourists were allowed into the Soviet Union and a month later, the first Soviet tourists were granted a trip to the West.¹⁹

Two years later, more than hundred diplomats and representatives of the travel industry from 29 countries convened in Prague for a five-day conference on international tourism. The meeting was organized by the Czechoslovak State Travel Bureau (Čedok), and had the promotion of tourism to Czechoslovakia as its primary objective. However, the conference also aimed simply to facilitate contacts and sow the seeds of future collaboration between airlines, railways, and tourist associations on all continents.²⁰

In the opening address the director of Čedok entertained the hope that the conference ‘will contribute to the expansion of international tourism and to the strengthening of that ideal which is so dear to all of us — the ideal of peace and undisturbed work for us all.’²¹ During a subsequent debate, an Air France participant lauded the chance for representatives from the East and West to meet at the conference and insisted that an increase in tourism would ‘foster international friendship’.²² Shortly before the Prague conference, the travel bureaus of the socialist states had held a separate meeting in Carlsbad at which they concluded that ‘the most effective path to mutual understanding and comprehension is for nations to speak to nations in the most direct manner, by tourism.’²³ Six years later tourism across the East–West divide was growing steadily, benefitting from de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe. On the international scene, tourism was once again bestowed with peace-related qualities at the 1963 United Nations Conference in Rome on International Travel and Tourism. The resulting resolution highlighted tourism’s contribution to the ‘promotion of international good will and understanding and to the preservation of peace between peoples’.²⁴


²⁰ Czech National Archives [NA], Státní úřad plánovací II [SUP II], 1177, 471.


From that point on, the assumed positive effects of tourism on interpersonal understanding and international relations attained a seemingly unquestionable status. When the tourist bureaus from Eastern Europe met in Bucharest in 1970 they again declared tourism to be ‘one of the most important instruments of strengthening mutual appreciation’.25 Tourism was included in the Helsinki Final Act’s second basket on economic cooperation which repeated ‘the contribution made by international tourism to the development of mutual understanding among peoples’.26 Although a 1983 review of the Helsinki process’ contribution to the promotion and facilitation of tourism concluded that ‘progress has been slow and tangible results limited’ the industry did not hesitate to repeat the mantra.27 As a matter of fact, the World Tourism Organization (WTO) had already adopted the Manila Declaration on World Tourism in 1980 stating that ‘world tourism can be a vital force for world peace and can provide the moral and intellectual basis for international understanding and interdependence’.28 In 1988, the tourist industry upped the ante again. Under the self-congratulatory motto ‘Tourism – The World’s Peace Industry’, five hundred industry professionals, academics, diplomats, and NGOs from 64 countries convened for five days in Vancouver. US President Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II addressed the participants on taped messages and expressed their support for tourism’s peacebuilding effects.29

The academic literature on tourism which began to emerge in the 1970s had done little to quarry the tourism–peace nexus. On the contrary, one of the pioneering tourism readers stated in 1974 that ‘[i]n creating a better appreciation of other people’s ways of life and institutions, tourism may create goodwill for a country.’30 While this is undoubtedly true, the reader neither problematized the underlying assumptions of the tourism–peace nexus nor considered the necessary conditions behind the creation of goodwill for a country. In an often-quoted literature review published in 1984, Erik Cohen scrutinized the claim that tourism ‘improves international understanding’ and concluded that, so far, advocates, as well as opponents, of the hypothesis had only meagre evidence to show.31 In other words, the jury was still out. With

26 *Helsinki Final Act*, p. 32.
the 1988 convention’s canonization of tourism, however, tourism scholars finally began to question the industry’s enigmatic effects on world peace. As a direct response to the Vancouver conference, two tourism researchers pointed out the obvious: ‘The danger in considering relations between peace and tourism is of reversing causation. Tourism is an institution that does not prosper in the absence of peace. This observation precludes the prospect that tourism causes peace’.32

In the decades since the Vancouver conference tourism research has finally questioned the tourism–peace nexus and put to rest the idea that a growing tourism industry causes a reduction in societal conflicts.33 Much of the ‘Tourism, Passport to Peace’ discourse was arguably a brainchild of blue-eyed interwar internationalism embraced by the tourist industry as it offered a cloak of legitimacy to the nascent mass tourism. In the Cold War, for instance, the regimes of Eastern Europe often sought to gain hard currency through western tourism, but this project was legitimized through appeals to mutual understanding and international peace.34 Nowadays, in the post-Cold War international disorder, the omnipresent threat of terrorism to tourism appears to have rendered the catchphrase obsolete.

Bibliography


[Ohlson, Ivan], ‘Öppna porterna mot världen!’, *Fritiden*, no. 1 (1945), 5.


In contemporary Europe politics is increasingly formulated as a question of identity, be it in forms of nationalism, regionalism or in the name of ethnicity and culture. This is reflected in the production of knowledge on Europe; through research whose fundamental categories are most often nation states, regions or ethnic or cultural minorities groups. There is a large field of studies which focuses on nation-state identity and its relation to European identity. The field can be described as both geographically and object driven. For example, a considerable amount of studies focus on the construction of national identity in relation to collective trauma and memories of war, as well as on the relationship between national and European identity (Richards, 2013, Jarusch and Lindenberger, 2011, Juliá, 2006, Delanty and Rumsford, 2005). One similarity that unites this kind of study is that it generally starts out in a geographically demarcated setting —such as a nation-state— only to produce results that question the borders and distinctions connected to the geographical and consecutive identity demarcation. As Peter van Ham notes, European identity is continuously discussed in the tension between a presupposition of the nation state as a historical given, and the critique of the role of the nation state (van Ham, 2001). From this perspective the relationship between national and European identity can be understood to be in constant negotiation, favouring what is sometimes referred to as multi-level identities (Berg, 2007). This multi-layering of European identity concluded upon in research, should have some effect on how we construct historical and social science re-
search. If European and national identities are to be understood as ambiguous and in a process of negotiation, the choice of material relevant for understanding identity building should be broadened, both in geographical and in object terms. How we postulate the outsets of our studies will affect the results we produce. For example, it is not strange that identities are increasingly described as multi-layered and fragmented, if we measure social, individual and cultural identity-building against a nation-state postulated as stable and unchangeable. It is time for knowledge production on Europe to begin to search for other categories by which to measure phenomena. This would promote new ways of understanding both social and individual identities.

As I argue elsewhere, exile can be understood as a specific milieu that, while questioning nation state identities, still constitutes the basis for alternative and multi-layered notions of community and identity (Enquist Källgren, 2015). This claim is supported by other researchers, for example David Ketttler in his studies on intellectual exile in Europe during the 1930s (Kettler, 2011 and 2010).

In explaining his historical approach, Reinhardt Koselleck writes that we need to consider ideas as they are expressed in texts as well as the social circumstances in which they were produced in order to understand the development of social and cultural ideas. Turning against an earlier approach to history of ideas, in which ideas were analyzed only as to their inner coherence and with no regards as to the historical situation in which they were formed, Koselleck emphasizes the impossibility of understanding thought contents without understanding the institutional, economic and political situation in which they were conceived (Koselleck, 1988). Since most social research does precisely this, connects historically given institutions, regulations and practices – economical as well as political – with ‘softer’ conceptions of identity, political ideas or sexuality (to mention but a few examples), Koselleck’s opinion can serve as an example for a discussion with a larger scope beyond the history of ideas. Because, if cultural and social notions cannot be understood accurately without being connected to a historical situation – understood in the broadest possible sense as the formation of the social in a given historical moment – then it becomes necessary to discuss how we conceive of the historical situations against which ideas and cultural expressions should be measured. The nation-state can be understood as one answer. But, there could be other possible answers too: for example, exile.

There are good reasons for social scientists and historians to choose the nation-state as a measurement in research. The nation-state is a fundamental entity in the contemporary organization of society, responsible for the regula-
tion and distribution of resources, rights and obligations spanning all aspects of human livelihood. From the point of view of the nation-state, a historical situation could be understood as the particular and decisive organization of society in which thoughts are pronounced. So, for a philosopher like Kant, or a politician like Churchill, the particular historical organization of economy and politics in 18th-century Germany and in the pre-war British Empire, will have been decisive of the way that they endeavored into thinking. Koselleck argues that the historical situation can be understood in terms of ‘room of experiences’, and ‘horizon of expectations,’ referring to the organization of reality that composes the room in which an individual or social group makes experiences, and the at once material and imaginary horizon against which the same individual or group of individuals formulate their expectations on the future. (Koselleck, 2004).

An individual or a social collective can of course have a room of experiences and a horizon of expectations that is multi-layered even within the framework of the nation state. So, for example, can one’s horizon of expectations be threatened by the rise of an enemy government in another country or by the fall of a currency somewhere else in the world? In this sense, there is nothing to say that the nation-state, understood as a historical situation constructed by a room of experience and a horizon of expectations within which an individual or social collective lives, cannot also be international and multi-layered. But, within the nation state, experiences and expectations are largely maintained by material, economical and regulatory institutions particular to each state. Whether or not I decide to have a child, or more generally, whether I believe it is possible to create a family in the future, or maybe even, how I view the responsibility towards future generations, will depend on such things as whether or not I have access to maternity or paternity support, and how they are organized (for example, state payed maternity and paternity leave, extended family, child allowance, and others). The room of experiences and the horizon of expectations are mutually connected in a contemporary present, which configures the limits and possibilities of reaction as well as what the individual and collective believes, even though there is no absolute causal link between the historic situation and thinking.

The question is what happens with the room of experiences and the horizon of expectation when someone goes into exile? In the following I pretend to describe what I believe to be some fundamental traits of an exile historic now, which could be used as a measuring stick in a sense, to produce research on that instable and fluctuating social reality that has nevertheless had a stable presence in Europe at least since the religious wars of the 17th century and the
Spanish expulsion of the Moors at the beginning of the same century.

At an outset, exile is a social reality which questions the epistemic categories that we commonly use. Exile questions how we conceive of human rights. For example, human rights as universal but imposed through the nation state – but also the very idea of national and cultural boundaries. The entire system – economic and material - developed to control and make possible global movement is questioned by the exiled person, who moves where he or she should not, and with means not permitted. From the point of view of the nation state the person in exile is associated with a temporary breach in control of borders and orders, but for the exile himself, the exile situation may be stable and extended in time. Exile, is thus also a spatial organization in time, sometimes directly, and at other times negatively upheld by social institutions. Previous research suggests a direct relationship between living in an exiled space – what we could call an exile historic or social situation – and cultural expression.

In his much-acclaimed essay ‘Reflections on Exile’, Edward Said stresses the connection between exile and the organization of space (Said, 2000). Exile is connected to nationalism, according to Said, since nation is a geographical space that becomes ‘habitus’ through the connection of habits (or habitual and common organizations of actions and thoughts) and homeland. By contrast, the space of exile is never fixed but individual, fluctuating and always undermined (Said, 2000). Claudio Guillén similarly underlines the simultaneous confrontation between community, individual and location that occurs in the experience of exile (Guillién, 1998, 91-91).

Exile is thus to be understood as a lived and bodily experience with a concrete historical location, characterized by having broken with the room of experience and horizon of expectations which had hitherto constructed social meanings for an individual or a social collective. The historic now of the exile is thus an insecure place in which certainty – material as well as cultural and knowledge based – is impossible. This forces the exile to be very productive, in the sense of trying to make life understandable again. Guillén argues that many exiles tend to turn to language and literature, what he describes as an increasing literariness of living in exile (Guillén, 1998, 93). Said underscores the tendency among exiles to create new identification through intellectual work, since these are activities that reward mobility and demand little investment in material things, which can often be lacking between exiles (Said, 2000, 137). In the same vein, Michael Siedel calls exile ‘an enabling fiction’ and an ‘imaginative sustenance’ by which the exile produces new strategies of narrative representation or philosophical argumentation (Siedel, 1986, x, xii).
As a historic situation, and in line with the nation state, exile contains political, economic, spatial, as well as cultural components. Exactly how these components construct a historic situation will differ, as they do in the case of the nation state, but there will be sufficient common traits for us to be able to speak about the exile historic situation as a contextual category, i.e. as a historic situation consisting of its own room of experiences and horizon of expectations.

One such common trait is the way in which exile actualizes community, literally in terms of actual economic and material help, as well as through a thought-complex and identification. From the perspective of the materiality of community, exile actualizes other ways of conceptualizing social influence and cohesion. It is common to discuss the experience of exile in terms of nostalgia, as a feeling and longing for the homeland, or place from which the exile is separated (Kettler, 2011). But nostalgia indicates the double connection to the place where the exiled person has arrived, and the place from which he/she has departed, that has a material and logistic aspect to it. It is probably possible to state that the exile is never completely present in the new historic situation, nor in the historic circumstances that he or she has left. Instead, the exile is placed in a room of experiences built on communication which occurs via great distances, historically in the form of letters, and today, through digital communication. Even though these forms of communication are different in many ways, they find common ground in the important and ‘institutionalized’ place that they hold in the exile historic situation. Community is thus established in something more and beyond the values, political views and cultural expressions of the immediate surroundings at the place of arrival. Studying European phenomena with exile as a historic situation would not only entail relating the phenomena to the location in which the exile is present, but also to a larger but more specific international circumstance connected to the present place, through what we could call the logistics of nostalgia.

Since exiles are forced to move, often illegally and secretly, the exile historic situation establishes new travelling routes and destination hubs. This can be seen in the contemporary routes over the Mediterranean from Turkey and Libya, to Lampedusa and Lesbos, which are often spread by word of mouth. Historically there are many examples of the same establishment of routes, for example those taken through northern Spain during World War II by thousands of exiles (recerut.eu). Just as there is a large amount of historic and social science research based on commercial routes and market expansion, it is possible to understand European phenomena from the point of view
of exile routes and destination hubs, many of which would not have had importance otherwise. The case of Lesbos is just one example. Currently one of the most important locations for the implementation of EU exterior politics, this small island has not traditionally been included in the ‘geography of power’ of the EU. For the study of European phenomena, exile as a historic and social situation contributes with a different political geography than what would be conceivable within the framework of the nation state. As Butler and Spivak argues, not even the stateless live in the state of nature, but always in a geography that is defined by the political, legal and economic orders of the nation state, only in a different manner (Butler and Spivak, 2007).

A third common trait of exile as a historic situation is what we can be understood as a referral to a higher order of rights. Since exiles cannot claim rights as citizens, nor based on religion or ethnicity, they must do so by referring to a universal order of humanity (historically) or human rights (more recently). In so doing, the national legal order is questioned by the introduction of a moral order. Even though national politics is often clad in a moral discourse, here distinguished from, for example, a legal discourse, the exile necessarily makes moral obligation and rights a pivotal part of its room of experience and horizon of expectations. For the study of European phenomena the presence of notions of universal values or humanity pushed for by exiles should make for an important category when investigating such things as identity and political views.

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Archaeology and the Making of Cultural Borders. Politics of Integration and Disintegration

Per Cornell

The cultural geography of Europe is not static, and one of the major factors affecting the cultural context is related to politics and to different means of politics, ranging from propaganda to war. Looking at it historically over the last four centuries, there is often a tendency to favour certain integrative forms over others. But the cultural context can never be reduced to one integrative form. The results of historical processes, of state interventions and of different cultural movements play decisive roles.

To illustrate this, we can examine two or three simple examples. In today’s Europe it would be a major mistake to “forget” or minimise the role of integrative patterns of the British Empire, which still exercise, in varied ways, a certain effect on politics. It would similarly be absurd not to see the particularity of the relationship between the Iberian Peninsula and certain countries in the Americas, e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay. One example, which is located outside of Europe, but which still affects Europe, is Central Asia. To understand the integrative patterns here, looking at Czarist Russia and later the Soviet Union remains crucial.

The way integration is organised varies considerably, even if we only discuss these examples. Thus, it is never sufficient to speak of integration, in general, but rather to discuss varied forms of integration (cf. for other kinds of examples Arenas & Cornell 2016, and Cornell 2007, 2015, 2017).

In the making of integration and cultural borders, scholarly work is one
factor influencing the process. Archaeology and anthropology played a role in forging or in attempts to forge integration in the 20th century.

British archaeology and anthropology developed approaches to the theme. One common way of thinking in these fields in the end of the 19th century and during the first decades of the 20th could be illustrated by the work of James Frazer, the well-known specialist on religion. In his thinking, there were different strata of culture within each European nation, and only the elite were fully civilized. This thinking works well in relation to the idea of Empire, in which different cultural groups are allowed, but forming a hierarchical order, in which several cultural patterns are deemed of less value, or even a possible threat, as we can see in the following quotation from 1920 (p.170):

//.../ enquires carried out among the less educated classes, and especially among the peasantry, of Europe, have revealed the astonishing, nay, alarming truth that a mass, if not the majority, of people in every civilized country is still living at the state of intellectual savagery, that, in fact, the smooth surface of cultured society is sapped and mined by superstition.//.../ . We appear to be standing on a volcano which may at any moment break out in smoke and fire to spread ruin and devastation //.../. 

Looking at German scholarship from the same period, we can see that they thought of integration as more fixed on the idea of one people/one nation. The role of the elite is still stressed, but the People, as such, was seen as more homogenous; or rather, that they should be homogeneous. An example of such an approach in Archaeology is Gustaf Kossinna (1858-1931), who worked out a scenario for the development of the German people. In Kossinna’s work, the People is created and forged in a particular natural geography, in the case of the Germans, Northern Europe (including the northern half of present-day Germany). The Germans were of “Nordische Gedanke”, of the Nordic Thinking, of the Nordic Way. To Kossinna, Europeans were always better than any other culture, and this kind of absolute destiny became an important part of his argument. The German People in Kossinna’s view was a mix of 2/3 hard-working peasants (called Indo-Germans) and 1/3 wild savages, the latter with the mind and strength of the warrior. After a complex set of events, the German People was finally constructed in the area around Halle c 2000 BC, according to Kossinna’s scheme (Kossinna 1928, 1909/10).
In relation to the Treaty of Versailles after the Great War, Kossinna wrote a pamphlet in which he argued, based on the discovery of certain types of ceramic pots, that the Germans were the rightful owners of the region around Vistula, the Weichsel River in German, which became Polish after the treaty was signed. Later on, following Kossinna’s death, this short text was printed again, after the German occupation of Poland. In this small volume, one of Kossinna’s students, Hans Reinerth wrote an introduction, which opens as follows, demonstrating how a political rhetoric can evolve (Kossinna 1940, p III).

Das Weichselland ist frei. Durch die Tat des Führers hat uralter
germanischer Volksboden /.../ ihre Rückgliederung ins Reich
erfahren.
The Weichselland is free. Through the deeds of the Führer, old
German Folkland /.../ has experienced to be brought back to the
Reich.

Another German-speaking archaeologist, Oswald Menghin (1888-1973), working from Austria, developed a somewhat different approach. Menghin, like Kossinna, stressed the unique homogenous cultural unit. However, to Menghin the original land of the Germans was located in Central Europe. The idea of the Nordic was important to several strands of cultural movements in the German speaking countries of the time. But to Menghin the Nordic was of Central European origin, and he writes (Menghin 1931, p 554)

The Indogermans ”/.../ auch Skandinavien nordisch gemacht.
The Indogermans ”/ also made Scandinavia Nordic.

Menghin’s archaeology tries to include the whole globe, in contrast to Kossinna’s, but Menghin still placed the Germans at the centre-piece of history. Similarly to Kossinna, Menghin also stresses the warrior in the German. A culture lacking this mind of a warrior cannot a priori be German (Menghin 1931, p 554)

Die bandkeramische kultur zeigt aber auch nicht die entsprechende Expansions- unt Beharrungskraft, wie sie von der indogermanischen gefordert werden muss.
The Bandceramic culture had neither the clear expansion-power or power to dominate which any Indogerman group must have.
To Menghin the homogenous in culture is paramount. When he identified ceramics in Scandinavia corresponding to what Menghin considered an African-Nilotic culture, this, in a sense became a problem. However, he concludes that this “enigmatic” episode had no lasting effects.1

Menghin was an influential scholar in the 1920s and 1930s. He has a wide scope, and is also active in cultural movements favouring the integration of Austria with Germany. He also dedicated a chapter to “Jews” in a book on archaeological and anthropological theory, in which he concludes that Jewish culture has no place in Austria (Menghin 1934). Despite this, however, he succeeds in convincing the famous philosopher Edmund Husserl to give a speech in Vienna in 1935. At this occasion, Husserl spoke positively of Menghin.2 However uses Menghin in a rather special way, stating that Menghin demonstrates that many cultures have lived in Europe simultaneously during any time period. From this, Husserl concludes that Europe can only be defined in terms of a wealth of difference, a conclusion Menghin certainly would not have accepted.

In order to examine questions of integration and disintegration, and the role science and the humanities play in such processes, we need to develop a more nuanced way of thinking about integration. It is impossible to attain perfect 100% true integration, in which all social, economic and cultural elements follow the same model. But with this being said, viewing integration as partial bundles or assemblages is of major importance in looking at historical process. The way such particular bundles operate, and the thinking which corresponds to such operative forms, is crucial. We have noted above in the anthropological and archaeological discussion that two distinct, general approaches can be discerned, namely, whether a homogenous bundle is the ideal, or if difference is acceptable. In the latter case, which is frequent in empires and similar political forms, there is often a strict social hierarchy between the different “Peoples” or “Cultures” within the bundle. If a homogeneous bundle is the ideal, there is often a strict process of exclusion operating in the integrative process. In the examples discussed here, these models are used not only to address the contemporaneous, but also to discuss the past, even a distant prehistoric past. When applying the homogenous model, we see a difference between models supposing a correspondence between a nat-

ural geographical framework and the homogenous culture, and those that are, to some extent, more flexible in this regard. There is also a difference as to which geographical area to favour, despite obvious ideological similarities. Further analysis along these lines would certainly be interesting, and would make our approach to integration and culture more productive.

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Cultural borders as obstacles to European trade union cooperation

Bengt Larsson

In comparison with other global regions, trade union cooperation is well developed and institutionalised in Europe (Gajewska 2009; Rhodes 2015; Prosser 2016). This cooperation has three main purposes: First, to coordinate national strategies through exchanges of information, organisation of training, and coordination of trade union action; Second, it aims to deliver common statements and agreements through social dialogue and negotiations with European employer organisations – both at the cross-sectoral level, and at the industry level through 43 sectoral social dialogues. Third, trade union cooperation aims to influence EU policies and legislation through lobbying and consultation.

Cross-national cooperation is seldom easy. There are many obstacles, including cultural ones (Larsson 2012). There is much research on trade union cooperation in Europe that shows rather that explicitly analyses the role of culture and cultural divergences. For example, it has been shown in research on European Works Councils (EWCs) how linguistic skills, identity and national “rootedness” differ and create problems (Huijgen et al. 2007; Knudsen et al. 2007; Müller and Rüb 2007; Stirling and Tully 2004). It has also been shown in analyses of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the European Trade Union Federations (ETUFs), and the social dialogues, that not only ideological differences, but also differences in values, identities and expectations have been factors undermining the cooperation (Dølvik 1997; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 172ff.; Larsson et al. 2016; Mitchell 2007).
However, cultural factors are often approached as a convenient ‘emergency’ variable to account for the ‘unexplained residua’ of other explanations in trade union and industrial relations research (Meardi 2011: 336; cf. Barbier 2013: 65ff.). Cultural differences are seldom put in the centre of empirical studies, but are rather touched upon more incidentally. This chapter discusses the role of cultural obstacles to trade union cooperation and transnationalisation in Europe more explicitly. The aim is to understand what cultural and other difficulties trade unions themselves believe to be hampering cooperation in Europe, and why.

Empirically, the first part of the chapter builds on a survey from 2011-12, answered by 241 trade unions in Europe.¹ The analyses presented in Tables 1 and 2 are compared means with ANOVA statistics to show regional differences on the individual items. Multiple regressions were also performed for the items significant in the ANOVA analysis to check significance when controlling for sector and size of the organisation. The regressions are not presented in detail, but significant results are indicated in the compared means tables.

The second part of the analysis is qualitative and based on 38 interviews with centrally placed representatives of trade unions from across Europe.² Nine of the interviews were done in 2012 and 29 in 2015-16. Both the survey and the interviews targeted only one representative to answer for the whole organisation—presidents/vice, general secretaries, international secretaries, etc. In a few interviews, a second representative took part when suggested by the targeted respondent. Thus the number of people interviewed was 46, though representing 38 organisations. The analyses presented here are condensed versions of a longer text under preparation.

**Cultural and other obstacles to trade union cooperation**

There is a strong commitment to transnational cooperation between trade unions in Europe. Over 90% of the unions in the survey stated that such cooperation is positive for European workers (Larsson 2012). Many reported an active involvement, but also pointed to major obstacles for cooperation.

Table 1 presents the results for the survey question: *To what degree are the following factors obstacles for union cooperation within Europe?* Since

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¹ The survey was conducted in 2011-12 and funded by the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research. For detailed descriptions of methods and materials, see Larsson (2012; 2014).
² Interviews were conducted with trade unions from the following countries: BE (2), CZ (3), DE (8), ES (3), HU (3), IT (5), LV (3), SE/Nordic (8), UK (3). Quotes are slightly edited to increase legibility. The interviews were conducted by Bengt Furåker, Bengt Larsson, and Kristina Lovén Selden. The research was funded by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.
the items are ranged by the total means, the first column shows that “difference in financial resources” is generally seen as the greatest obstacle of the 10 factors listed, while “differences in national cultures and traditions” is the least important obstacle. Also, the other two items that indicate cultural factors (in bold) are at the bottom half of the ranking, that is, “differences in union leaders’ mother tongue and language skills”, and “diversity of unions’ ideological, political or religious orientations”. However, this does not indicate that cultural factors are unimportant, only that they are less so than other factors, with even the last one having a total mean of 2.51 on a scale ranging from 1 to 4.

Table 1. Obstacles to trade union cooperation (means†) (n241)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>CWE</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>IR/UK</th>
<th>CEE</th>
<th>F Anova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differences in financial resources</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>3.53³</td>
<td>4.43**</td>
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<tr>
<td>among unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity of labour market policies</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1.26</td>
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<td>and regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low priority among union leaders</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers’ “divide-and-rule” strategies</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.47¹</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.28³</td>
<td>6.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low interest among union members</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference in leaders’ mother</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.62¹</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>2.27³</td>
<td>3.09³</td>
<td>4.94***</td>
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<td>tongue &amp; lang. skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition between high and low</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>3.25³</td>
<td>3.27*</td>
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<td>wage countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity in ideological/pol/</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.20²</td>
<td>3.35*</td>
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<td>religious orientations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differences in union membership</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differences in national cultures</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.65³</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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<td>and traditions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

† Scale 1-4 (Not at all = 1, to a low degree= 2, to some degree = 3, to a high degree = 4). “do not know/no opinion” is coded as “missing”, which explains the variation in n. Anova: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Explanation to OLS-regressions: + p<0.1; all others are at the level of p<0.05 or better
¹ Significantly diverges from CWE without control for other variables.
² Significantly diverges from CWE with control for sector.
³ Significantly diverges from CWE with control for sector and size of organisation.

Moving on to the differences between regions of Europe, we see from the means and the regression results that Central Eastern European (CEE) trade unions find the lack of resources, competition between high- and low-wage countries, and the power strategies of employer organisations to be a bigger
problem than trade unions in the reference category (Central Western Europe-
an, CWE). In contrast, trade unions in the North find employers’ power stra-
tegies to be significantly less important. This seems intuitively reasonable, as
is southern European trade unions finding the power strategies of employer
organisations to be a problem, though this result is not statistically significant
in the regressions.

Further, comparing the regions on the three cultural factors revealed dif-
ferences that, to some degree, also hold when performing regressions with
control for size and sector. First, trade unions from Ireland and the UK (IR/
UK) find language issues to be less of a problem than the others, which is
understandable since English is the dominant language, as we will see from
the interviews. There is also a tendency for language issues to be toughest for
trade unions from CEE; however, the OLS regressions were not significant
for the latter when controlling for other variables. Second, trade unions from
the South emphasised the diversity of unions’ ideological, political or reli-
gious orientations as an obstacle, which is not surprising since they are quite
ideologically fragmented nationally. There is also a tendency for trade unions
from CEE to find this problem of less importance than the others; however,
once again, that result is not significant in the regressions. Third, differences
in national cultures and traditions are particularly emphasised by the Nordic
trade unions.

In order to validate these results, I will now turn to another part of the
survey. The survey also contained the question: To what degree are similar-
ities in the following respects important for successful union cooperation in
Europe? The results, which are presented in Table 2, confirm some of the
results from Table 1. From the total means, we see also that when asking what
is important for successful cooperation, the cultural factors (in bold) are of
less importance than the other listed factors, and the order of the three cultural
factors is the same as in Table 1: language is of more importance than ideo-
logical, political or religious differences between unions, whereas national
culture is of least importance of the six factors listed.

In addition, we see some important regional divergences in means. First,
the Central Eastern European unions, who also scored highest on language as
a problem for cooperation, emphasised the importance of language skills for
successful cooperation the most. Second, the importance of similar ideologi-
cal, political and religious orientations seems to be somewhat (though not sig-
nificantly) emphasised by Nordic unions, and significantly more so for the IR/
UK unions, as compared to the reference category (CWE) in the regressions.
Third, the regressions show that the southern trade unions find the sharing of
similar national culture and traditions less important than the trade unions in CWE (the reference category).

Table 2. Factors of importance for successful TU cooperation (means†) (n241)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>CWE</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>IR/UK</th>
<th>CEE</th>
<th>F Anova</th>
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<tr>
<td>Similarities in labour market poli-</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<td>cies and regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Similarities in occupational inter-</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.65³</td>
<td>3.34³</td>
<td>2.52*</td>
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<td>ests among unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union leaders’ personal networks</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.19¹⁺</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.21¹⁺</td>
<td>2.87³</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.11*</td>
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<td>and relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union leaders’ mother tongue</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>3.26³</td>
<td>3.16*</td>
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<td>and lang. skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Similarities in ideological /pol./</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.83³⁺</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.62</td>
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<td>rel. orientations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Similarities in national cultures</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.17¹</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.75</td>
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<td>and traditions</td>
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<td>34-35</td>
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<td>232</td>
<td>100</td>
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† Scale 1-4 (Not at all = 1, to a low degree= 2, to some degree = 3, to a high degree = 4). “do not know/no opinion” is coded as “missing”, which explains the variation in n. Anova: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Explanation to OLS-regressions: + p<0.1; all others are at the level of p<0.05 or better
1 Significantly diverges from CWE without control for other variables.
2 Significantly diverges from CWE with control for sector.
3 Significantly diverges from CWE with control for sector and size of organisation.

Even though these results may be burdened with errors in measurement due to variations in response rates, they are supported by the interview study. Previous analyses confirm that both the lack of and divergences in financial recourses are very important obstacles to transnational trade union cooperation (Larsson et al. 2016). Also, differences between countries in terms of policies, regulations, industrial relations systems and trade union organisation were emphasised as great obstacles. As the qualitative analysis of the cultural factors will show below, these also create problems for European trade union cooperation.

I will now turn to the interview study to detail what the cultural obstacles to transnational trade union cooperation in Europe are—what problems exist, how and why cultural differences create problems, and what cultural borders the respondents find within Europe. The analysis will connect to the quantitative analysis above in that the three surveyed cultural factors will be discussed in the order of importance, as uncovered by results above. First, I will discuss how and why language differences create problems. Thereafter
I will turn to obstacles connected to trade unions’ ideological, political or religious orientations. Finally I will discuss what the interviews have to say about cultural obstacles connected to differences and borders between national cultures and traditions.

**Linguistic borders**

The interviews confirm that differences in mother tongue and lack of language skills are great obstacles. CEE respondents, in particular, see the language barrier as “strong”, “essential”, “huge” or even “the major obstacle” (cf. Henning 2015b). A few from the English- and German-speaking language areas see less of a problem, since good translations and interpretation exist. Others, however, acknowledge these difficulties:

> We’re very lucky because [we’re] English (laughter), selfishly! In fact, some of our ETUF meetings are only conducted in English, so that can be a barrier for other organisations. [...] Some people come and they never say anything. And then other organisations, they can only send someone who is quite good at speaking English. (#23 UK)

At the ETUC and ETUF congresses there is funding for up to six language interpretations. At committee meetings, there are fewer interpretations, while seminars and working groups generally are in English only, forcing participants to speak “some kind of joint bad English” (#14 SE). There are, however, difficulties in using “international English”, since some participants do not have the skills and others are unwilling: “The French never go along with it. Spaniards: very, very bad. And now that we have the entire East side! [But] they’re better, I may say, in English” (#13 SE).

Those lacking English skills thus have to forgo or bring their own interpreters (cf. Henning 2015b). Interpretation is not unproblematic either, since the precision or even substance gets lost when translating “from one language to another, to another, to another” (#30 HU). Terms and concepts are embedded in, and always refer to, a cognitive (and often normative) content and a common world of reference (Barbier 2013: 109; cf. Hyman 2004). This creates difficulties both in translating and using “bad English”:

> The Nordic countries [have] a different understanding of what “austerity” means; what “crisis” in the public sector means. [...] You need to build a common vocabulary [...] to understand
what the others are saying. And if the words are different – like “privatisation” or “public sector” or what the meaning is of “autonomous”, “independent”. [...] This is the major obstacle. (#36 IT)

As a consequence, translations of central documents may create problems, since “it can become so immensely wrong, and then there can be misunderstandings in the documents that are produced” (#15 SE).

These linguistic problems are not only costly and hamper understanding, but they also reduce the possibility for some trade unions to influence the discussion. They are forced to choose between having representatives staying silent or sending representatives on the basis of their language skills rather than their expertise (#23 UK):

If we have two or three people who are capable of speaking in English, the same people have to be competent in various themes and specific subjects, and it’s very hard to do that at a good level. [...] It’s very hard to come out with an argument or a competent opinion of things. (#21 LV)

The absence of a joint language also makes trust-building harder, since “small talk” gets “difficult” (#22 DE), and “that’s where you develop trains of thought” (#11 SE). The effect is that language influences who you cooperate with, since you develop personal relationships on the basis of “talking in between”, and “the real business gets done in the meeting beforehand or over lunch” (#24 UK).

### Ideological borders

Let’s now turn to how and why trade unions’ ideological, political and religious orientations may create problems in cooperation. As is well known, there are trade unions with different political and religious roots. Some are more of “business unions” mainly representing their members’ interests, while others are more of political or “movement unions” trying to represent the interests of the working class or workers in general. Further, there are differences between organisations connected to radical left political ideas, as well as more reformist and consensus-oriented unions, and even some that are considered to be more conservative (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 1ff; 152ff.; Henning 2015a; Hyman 2001).

The deepest rift in trade union ideology is said to be between consensus-
and conflict-oriented traditions. These are not neatly enclosed regionally, but a main geographic borderline is generally drawn (cf. Henning 2015b; Larsson 2014): “In the Nordic countries you have more of a cooperation model. […] In the South we approach our relationship as a struggle” (#38 IT; #34 IT):

There is a clear division North-South. We mobilize the workers at the social and political level; we have general strikes, mass demonstrations in the streets. The Nordic unions have collective bargaining at the sectoral level or national level. […]It is, therefore, not easy to establish one [common] way of trade union action at the European level. (#1 ES)

Nordic representatives confirm that their relations with employers is “cooperative”, emphasising the wellbeing of both members and companies. This is contrasted with a more “universal” and a “far more confrontational” southern approach (#16 SE; cf. Lovén Seldén 2014). Trade unions in the South are said to be more “campaign organizations” that do not take place at the negotiating table, but instead “go in the streets and shout” (#10 Nord).

Such divergences create problems. Whereas the Nordics try to work “with the employers, also at the European level”, and “be a bit more constructive”, and give “alternative proposals” instead of “just saying no” (#11 SE), they believe others find them a bit “wimpish”, “not passionate enough”, or “woody”. As stated by an Italian representative, “we can’t hide that the vision, the points of view are different” (#34 IT); or in even stronger terms:

They are less European. […] This is a difference of culture, because in some countries it is a tradition to protect only affiliates. […] We come from a tradition in which the unions fight for all (#1 ES)

But this difficulty in understanding obviously runs both ways:

To work jointly with the employer as we do in the North. […] That is not in the mind-set of our colleagues further south. They think that is a hole in the head. They think that we are sitting in the lap of the employer. […] There is a general lack of understanding, I think. And many times also unwillingness actually to even discuss. Of course: I might feel the same reluctance, because I do not want their system. (#14 SE)

From the Nordic perspective, the strategies of some southern unions also cre-
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ate problems in relation to both employer organisations and EU institutions. They become sceptical and “quite hostile”, which makes it difficult to have a dialogue (#16 SE); “But when we present solutions that may also help them, I think you can notice a change in attitude. [...] That we are actually explicitly invited” (#10 Nord).

Beside the North-South division, respondents also talk about a West-East difference (cf. Henning 2015a). Some CEE unions are said to have “a completely different view” (#10 Nord), particularly those that have their roots in the former communist or “post-Soviet system” (#17 SE), or have strong connections to political parties (#30 DE). To some extent, CEE trade unions that still “have union leaders from Soviet times” (#32 LV) acknowledge this, or view their own national political culture as being more “hierocratic” and “post-communist” than “democratic” (#30 HU; #31 HU). Others, who do not acknowledge this, find it problematic that they still are “stuck with the stigma” of being government organisations (#28 CZ).

These North-South and West-East divisions are, of course, too schematic, which many also acknowledge. Many unions “are somewhere in the middle” (#5 BE), and there are also different traditions even within regions and countries, with some being more homogenous, and some more fragmented: “There is much more variety in the group of the new member states [...] it is not a homogenous group like the old [EU] 15” (#6 DE; cf. Visser et al. 2009; Henning 2015a; 2015b). Such national heterogeneity or fragmentation is, however, also seen as an obstacle, since it is difficult to cooperate with trade unions that are not even on speaking terms within their own country.

Borders between national cultures and traditions

The factor of least importance in the survey was differences in national cultures and traditions. This is a question on a more abstract level than the previous ideologically related issue, which mainly concerns trade union organisations and traditions. There are, of course, some overlaps between the two issues, but the one on national cultures and traditions concerns broader issues that have to do with more general differences in practices and values across Europe. Obstacles relating to such cultural divergences were mentioned in the interviews: “We have different cultures – that’s the basics” (#38 IT). When discussing what divergences exist in Europe, we once again get some schematic divisions. North-South:

It is easier for us [Italians] to have cooperation with the Med-
iterranean countries – I’m talking about Spanish and French […] – because we have more or less the same culture, and it’s easier for us to have good relations. […] When we talk with our colleagues from Scandinavia, it’s complicated [for them] to understand our problems, because, you know, they are very far from us. (#37 IT)

This difference is mirrored with the Nordics, who sometimes find representatives from some other countries to be “impossible to cooperate with. They have a different tradition” (#10 Nord). In a similar vein, a British respondent viewed their relations with their French colleagues as difficult, and that “that’s partly about language, but it’s also about the traditions and the way they do things” (#23 UK). This cultural divide is connected to the ideological divide discussed above, but it is seen as going deeper than that:

The Nordic countries are used to negotiating, the Germans are, and we [British] are. […] It is culture! And it is easier for us to do business with the Nordics and the Germans because they understand, or we have a common interest in doing a deal. Whereas it seems to me – and I am aware that I am stereotyping culturally – the French and the Spanish and the Greeks in particular, come to those meetings to make a point, to make a speech. (#24 UK)

These differences are not only in basic values and conceptions, but in traditions and everyday practices: “You have slightly different views on what is expected in social situations; and you express yourself in very different ways” (#10 Nord). This includes everything from how delegates from various countries adhere to the starting times of meetings, to how much they talk and how they interact socially. These things may seem trivial, but they affect the internal processes in their joint European organisations. One example is the difference between the more “talkative” southern delegates and the more “taciturn” Nordics, as shown in a study of speech patterns at ETUC Executive Committee meetings (Furåker and Lovén Seldén 2015). At such meetings, the Nordics are strongly coordinated through their joint organisations: their position is already negotiated and they have little room and need to mark a unique position: “So we give a few statements to explain our position, and then the others get to talk” (#16 SE). This is said to lead to confusion and even irritation from others, who, in contrast “must express their organisation and its ideas, values and agenda”, irrespective of others voicing a similar line of
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argument (#10 Nord).

Cultural differences are also important to how member organisations perceive both the content and legitimacy of joint decisions. One Nordic representative thought that the decision-making in these organisations “does not have the same strong formalistic approach to democracy that we have here” (#10 Nord). There is seldom any voting except in congresses, and the process is rather one of consensus-seeking, followed by an attempt to spell out the decision in an understandable summary:

We have our model in Sweden—how to do it. The Germanic model: then you have the question “Who is for; who is against; someone who abstains?” We don’t do it like that here. This must be learned. If you don’t, you immediately will kick up a row. And why: because then they will not understand what they have decided [...] So, clearly, cultural differences makes it difficult. And that’s why it is necessary to understand these cultural differences. [...] I have seen those who have failed with that. The consequence was crazy decisions – if any decisions at all. (#13 SE)

The consequences of cultural differences can thus be quite serious. They affect not only whether decisions are perceived as legitimate, but also how their content is understood—and may as a consequence also affect how well they are implemented.

Also, some cultural borders between the East and the West are mentioned, and they connect quite closely to the question of ideology above. Some CEE societies are said to be “hierocracies” and “post-communist” rather than “democratic” (cf. Henning 2015a). This is acknowledged both by respondents from the West and from some CEE respondents. There is, however, also some resistance to such categorisation: A respondent from Latvia emphasised that the Baltic states are not part of a CEE culture, but have more in common with the Nordic countries “in legislation, in our approach, in our, let’s say cultural mentality” (#32 LV). Also, a Hungarian representative dismissed the idea of a great cultural divide, arguing that the cultural divergences in Europe are nothing compared to that between Europe and other continents:

Today in Europe, this is no problem; more and more people work in England, Germany, Sweden. More Hungarian people work in Sweden. I think there is no distance in culture. No problem. Other nations: Asian nations, Muslim, or African na-
tions have other cultures, but Hungary, no problem. Hungary is very, very similar to Germany. We have a lot of German companies. (#35 HU)

This kind of relativity of cultural borders is also shown when focusing on regions that are presented as culturally homogeneous. For many, the Nordic countries make up such a region: they “live in the same cultural world” and “see things the same way” (#13 SE; #11 SE). However, when viewed more closely, that similarity dissolves. In practice, there may actually be such cultural heterogeneity that the joint Nordic organisations brought in consultants to increase understanding:

The Danish […] are very straightforward [...]. If you are quiet, you have nothing to say, from a Danish perspective. While in Finland, it may well be that you are talking in a different way, you have a bit longer pauses and so, but if you sit in a meeting you are expected to be asked by the chairman of the meeting about what to do. And if you are not asked, you leave the meeting feeling trampled on. (#10 Nord)

Discussion and conclusions

Let me end this short empirical analysis of cultural obstacles to European trade union cooperation with a few conclusions and some reflections.

A first conclusion is that cultural divergences make up quite some obstacles to transnational trade union cooperation, even though some other structural or institutional factors are even greater obstacles. However, in this connection, it is important to note that I worked without a precise concept of culture, though still with the influence of a general sociological approach in which culture often is thought of as collective values, conceptions, identities and practices (Smith 2016; Porpora 2016). For the future, it seems important to theoretically elaborate more specifically upon the cultural aspects of factors that matter, on what level, and why.

Second, different aspects of culture seem to matter to differing degrees across Europe. Language is less of a problem for organisations from the big language areas, particularly the English-speaking ones, but also for the quite English-proficient Nordics. It is a much bigger problem for trade unions in the CEE areas, in which trade unions are also often smaller and have fewer resources and personnel for transnational work. In contrast, the CEE trade unions find divergences in ideological, political and religious orientations to
be less of a problem, while trade unions from southern Europe find them to be more significant than other trade unions do. As concerns more general national cultures and traditions, it seems that the Nordics have a particular problem with these, both according to the survey and interviews. There are, in other words, cultural and other factors that influence what aspects of culture that are seen as more or less important obstacles for cooperation across Europe.

Third, cultural differences and cultural homogeneity are relative. As seen from the analysis, what is similar, and what is different, depends on choice of comparison. There are multiple ways to depict cultural borders within Europe, and cultural difference is always understood from the context of the observer. There have been, of course, attempts to measure cultural differences in more “objective” fashion (e.g. Black 2005). The method chosen in this study was, however, a “subjective” approach. That is, we have asked the trade unions themselves how culture creates difficulties in their work.

A problem with this approach is that the accounts of cultural differences might be based on prejudice or stereotypes. However, if you are interested in cultural differences that affect transnational cooperation, it does not really matter whether the respondents’ experiences are “correct” or “biased”, since they affect cooperation in any case, in line with the Thomas theorem: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928: 572). A prerequisite for the analysis to not be too biased, however, is that the analysis views experiences from different cultural horizons in Europe. In this case, we see that there exist similarities in how differences are depicted across cultural horizons.

As a final point, I would like to highlight the importance of not over-exaggerating these results. With a focus on culture, you will end up seeing cultural difference. As implicated in some quotes above, it is not impossible for actors to overarch these. As stated by an Italian representative: “It’s not easy at the very beginning. But if you participate in many meetings, during many years, you can do it.” (#38 IT). In order to work with that, however, it is crucial to understand how these differences are experienced for representatives from different parts of Europe.

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Integrating Europe
– The integration of Islam into Europe:
Handbook solutions

Klas Grinell

You are part of the mess, part of the power games (be they petty or substantial), part of the problem, [...] acknowledging this situatedness is not a dead-end, but a beginning.
(Hannula 2009:36)

My daily research work revolves around the connection between the fields of Islam and cultural heritage, often in European settings. One of the most frequent question posed to me when doing public presentations, and in conversations, is whether it is possible for Muslims to integrate into Europe, and how can they go about this. It is a question I haven’t really figured out how to handle. I struggle to find ways to avoid it. The thing is that I think the debate surrounding ‘Islam in Europe’ actually has very little to do with Islam (regardless of how we define ‘Islam’). ‘Islam’ is often merely a label for concerns that have much more to do with the future of European nation states, European identities, and the crisis of multiculturalist ideologies. Of course, this leads to real anti-Muslim discrimination and hate crimes that should not be taken lightly by any means (Kaya 2015). But to try to enter the discourse on ‘Islam in Europe’ via conceptualizations such as ‘Islam’, or ‘Islamophobia’, risks buying into perceived ‘problems with Islam’ (Larsson & Spielhaus 2013). Accepting a discussion on which kinds of Islams are possible to inte-
grate into Europe, and which ones are not, also means that we should accept a Europe which is both reified, and at the same time, floating, one which is left without definition or scrutiny. Europe seems to be that which is threatened by ‘Islam’ (Grinell 2016). Any example labeled Muslim can be thrown in as an example of the essential incompatibility of Islam with Europe. The academic answer is to ask for definitions of the categories ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’, but this seldom satisfies the interlocutors.

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In the introduction to the *Oxford Handbook of European Islam* Jocelyne Cesari discusses the state of this field. It is all about Islam and Muslims; there is nothing about what Europe is imagined to be by all the different institutions amassing data on the presence of Muslims in Europe. In the 800 pages of the Handbook there is almost nothing about European Islam, about how perceptions about Islam and Europe merge with or affect each other. There is also very little about the historical formation of the two categories of Islam and Europe, nor of the genealogies of their perceived dichotomous relationship. As my anecdotal experiences has indicated, most research on Islam in Europe addresses questions such as “Is Islam compatible with democracy and secularism? What are the causes of radicalization among Muslims in Europe? (Cesari 2015:3)”.

It is interesting to compare the Handbook of European Islam with the Handbook of European Studies. The relatively few mentions of Islam and Muslims in *the Sage Handbook of European Studies* are centered on migration, changing demographic patterns in Europe, conflicts and terrorism. Although there is a critical debate surrounding the reasons for these conflicts, such as a secularist bias which views religion, as such, as a problem, Islam and Muslims are still only seen as being a problem for Europe (Devji 2009, Fokas 2009).

Instead of fighting over what Islam is or is not, it might be more productive to investigate the cultural borders that are being used to define Europe. Using *The Sage Handbook of European Studies* as my gateway into the field, one can see that: “the vast majority of books published on ‘Europe’ are concerned in some way with chartering, explaining or elucidating the progress of the [European] integration process (Rumford 2009:2).”

In order to talk about integration there has to be a defined entity into which one is attempting to integrate. The handbook says that “the point of studying Europe is to explore its multiple constructions, meanings, histories,
and geographies.” And “European studies is centrally concerned with questions of cultural identities, of Europe’s relation to the rest of the world, of transnational communities, of cross-border legacies, and of heritage of a multiplicity of European peoples” (Rumford 2009:3,2). The handbook states that European Studies should be more concerned with culture than with European integration. I want to follow that lead, partly because I am surprised that almost all of the 35 chapters following this statement are very much focused on intra-European questions based on the assumption that European integration as a normative goal is both positive and vital.

Imagine an academic field centered on the integration of the Muslim ummah. Taking that as a given positive axiom would most probably meet with some raised eyebrows. Similarly it is not often you see a call for papers on the question of “Can Europeans be integrated into the Muslim world?”, whereas asking whether Muslims can be integrated into Europe is legion within the two handbooks and far beyond their pages. It could be argued that it is natural that European academia is interested in the welfare of Europe. This is a valid argument. Still, it clashes with the ideal that research should be unbiased and strive to develop universal explanations (Popper 1959[1935]:59). The main problem I see, however, is that European studies, as well as Islamic studies, avoid the question of whether ‘Europe’ (whatever it is taken to denote) is an appropriate frame for investigating a phenomena. Most often Europe is studied to understand Europe. But doesn’t this mean that too often the study avoids defining the empirical field deemed suitable for answering the question posed?

Another problem is that there is no discussion of the fact that Islam and Europe are asymmetrical categories. The terms can denote two separately constructed civilizations, each with their own territories and traditions of knowledge, religion and culture. However, the terms name comparable conceptions only in part. The term Islam stands both for a religion, a civilization and a geographical entity (Islamic world), whereas the religion of Europe is called Christendom and its civilization Western. At its core, Europe is mainly a geographical category, whereas Islam is a religious one. Then again, if Europe were merely a geographical entity, then there wouldn’t be much need to ask whether it is being threatened by the religion of ‘Islam’. It is obvious that Europe is much more than a place. Like Islam it is a highly ideologically charged concept.

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I cannot claim to study Europe. But what I am trying to do in this essayistic sketch is to gather some reflections on the lack of comparative perspectives in (The Sage Handbook of) European Studies. The constructions of Europe are built on the interplay between exceptionalism narratives and narratives contrasting Europe with others (Andrén 2001). What these two aspects share is that they are solely focused on understanding Europe through thinking about Europe. The contrasting narratives very seldom build on empirical comparison with the perceived other (Rumford 2009).

Also, the cultural borders of Europe seem to be defined mostly in majoritarian terms, making it an entity that has never included all European dwellers (Delanty 2009). What is neglected in the two handbooks I am using to define the field under discussion is that Europe has always been (partly) Muslim. Islam is an essential part of Europe. Not a major one, but an aspect of life in the Western outskirts of the Euroasian landmass that has been there as long as the efforts to demarcate and define this piece of the continent as Europe (Lewis 2008, Grinell 2016). It is therefore problematic to treat the two terms as though they are describing distinct and separate entities. There are European, African and Middle Eastern Islams in just the same way as there are European, African and Middle Eastern Christianities. Around the First World War, many viewed Great Britain as being the largest Muslim Empire, side by side with the Ottoman Empire. In the mobilizations leading up to the war the categories of Islam and Europe were more intertwined than they are today, even if the Muslim imperial subjects were not seen as Europeans (Aydin 2017). Great Britain, Russia and the Netherlands were some of the largest sponsors of Muslim pilgrimage (Kane 2015, Slight 2015).

* My main question concerns the theoretical and methodological starting point of the investigations surrounding ‘Europe’. Whatever theory of science you take as your starting point it could be argued (I will posit it as a fact) that they all, in some form or another, accept Karl Popper’s idea that a valid result must not only be a collection of positive examples found (Popper 1959:27). A scientifically sound investigation must define a question and a material, what Popper says is a “suitable criterion of demarcation” (Popper 1959:34). Even if many aspects of Karl Popper’s strict criteria for scientific work have been shown to be difficult or impossible to live up to, there is still a core to his argument which is foundational for academic work, and which can help us determine when to utilize ‘Europe’ as a category to demarcate our empirical
material. If this question is not posed, as it seems not to be in the many writings about European exceptionalism which take for granted that the answer should arise from a study of only ‘European’ materials, then, according to a Popperian perspective, we should see this as un-falsifiable (Popper 1959:43, 78-92). No comparison with the other possible materials that could show similar traits is made.

Popper’s view of science is nomothetic, it is about finding laws that govern how the phenomena under study functions. If we study a specific case, and then conclude that the results of the study only apply to that individual case we break with the nomothetic idea. But much of European Studies seem to be more ideographic than nomothetic. In an ideographic study every case is seen as unique in some respect, since we are aiming to study an individual case in all its specificity. What is important then is to remember that we cannot move from an ideographic empirical study to a nomothetic conclusion. We know more about the phenomena we have studied, but not about how it relates to other phenomena in other times and places (Windelband 1894).

As I have said, this is very basic theory of science. The irony is that many of those who state that precisely this scientific method is one of the unique products of the European tradition fail to live up to it (Gadamer 1989). Using their own logic, this means that they fail as Europeans and can’t be defined as such, even if they happen to live in a European nation-state.

Setting out to look for signs of European integration, or things that would be considered uniquely and positively European does not stand up to scientific standards. This is a biased investigation. A rude and direct answer to questions such as “what is uniquely European?” could of course be – colonial imperialism and its neocolonial offspring. Especially for people outside of Europe this stands out as something that makes it possible for Europe to consider itself as the normality from which world history should be described and measured (Asante 2007, Mignolo 2011).

For the sake of argument, I would propose that ‘Europe’ is not the appropriate frame for an empirical investigation for most empirical questions about phenomena in the world. If we are looking for patterns of integration into systems of exchange at a specific location in Europe, they will always be both more local and more global than Europe (Wallerstein 2004). The modern world is a global place and in order to understand and be a part of it we must study “the map of interactions, the actual and often productive traffic
occurring on a day-by-day, and even minute-by-minute basis among states, societies, groups, identities” (Said 1994:20). Within historical studies there has been a lot of critique of methodological nationalism, that is, of course directly applicable to methodological Europeanism, or Eurocentricity (Beck & Sznaider 2006). I am actually quite surprised by how smoothly the Handbook of European Studies moves from descriptive to normative arguments on European integration (Rumfeld 2009). Islamic Studies can be characterized by a constant critique of any effort to examine Islamic theology within the university (Larsson 2017). But looking at European identity ideology within European Studies seems to be quite accepted (or maybe the view through a single handbook has misinformed me?).

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What then is Europe? Defining the cultural borders of Europe often seems to entail a blending of geography, culture, aesthetics, and political structure (Bhambra 2009).

There are presently some 50 million Muslims living in what we consider geographical Europe. Islam has had a history in different parts of this territory since the 8th century, not only in the oft-quoted al-Andalus, but also in Bulgaria, Belarus, Russia, Poland, the Baltics, Greece, Italy et al as far back as the Early Middle Ages (Grinell 2016). The problem here is rather that this history has not been integrated into the common discourse on European heritage. Neither is the shared Greek classical heritage acknowledged as being both Muslim and Christian, Asian and European (Grinell 2017).

The political structures of Europe have been deeply formed by Christian legacies, though. Many of these political structures have ruled over Muslims, as well. In one of the first modern Enlightenment constitutions of Europe, the May 1791 Constitution of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth gave representation to the Tatar Muslims (Grinell 2016).

In 1848 Algeria was declared a part of France, and remained so until 1962. Thus, the celebration of the EU’s 60 years of peace totally ignores the 1 million causalities in the Algerian War of Independence. Algeria is more than half the size of today’s 28 European Union states when added together, and was twice the size of the “European territory” of the Treaty of Rome member states (Lorcin 2006). In those years the early European integration debate contained arguments about how to create a stable Eurafrica under European control, and two thirds of the EU territory in the late 1950s was in Africa (Hansen & Jonsson 2014).
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I should probably expand some on my implicit critique of Eurocentricity. Besides my work as a researcher I am also a museum curator in a museum of world culture. The combination of reading world history through Islamic sources, an education in post-colonial criticism, and dealing with the legacy of European ethnographic collection on a daily basis makes me quite foreign to the field of European Studies. I have trouble grasping its implicit boundaries and axioms. It seems that I have a different bias towards Europe. I will try to unpack it:

During recent history, over the last few hundred years, several European powers have managed to put themselves in the center of world history, economy and science. This represents only a brief moment in the global cultural life of man. Still, we live very much in the shadow of this period, with many of its results deeply affecting global relations: postcolonial injustices, industrial ecocide, and academic eurocentrism. Europe has drawn our maps, divided the earth into continents and civilizations, collected information and objects, and created museums in order to understand why Europe is more advanced than other cultures. This was identity formation and conquest driven by a European superiority complex – it was far from a benign attempt to understand other cultures (Wallerstein 2006).

The category of non-Europe that both underscores and results from the traditional sorting of cultural heritage only makes sense when the focal point is Europe. The prevailing continental and civilizational categories are European and only make sense from a European perspective (Lewis & Wigen 1997). This is an explanation as to why there are sections of Asian art, African or American ethnography in European museums. The objects being displayed were not originally produced within these categories. European men collected non-European objects from their specific cultural traditions in order to create these broad categories.

Africa, Asia, the Americas, Oceania, and the modern understanding of Europe, are categories that exist only because of European colonial history. For example: the landmass of Africa engages in different systems of exchange via land and water. It has never been a cultural or economic unit (Wallerstein 2004). We can take this even further using a simple atlas: the landmass of ‘Africa’ is three times bigger than ‘Europe’, even though this is not reflected in the Eurocentric Mercator map projections most often used. China is four times bigger than Greenland, Asia more than four times bigger than Europe.
The Global North is some 50 million square-meters, the South twice that size, and so on. What does all of this mean? It means that the focus on Europe in the collected world-wide academic output is disproportional when compared to its size, and population. This implies that a colonial and economic bias informs many other areas. There are areas where the importance of Europe, outside of a taken-for-granted focus on Europe, might be more limited than what the prevailing academic order would lead us to believe.

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It might seem as if I am trying to toss the whole question of integration out the window, but this is not true. I think commonality is both good and natural, even though no community is natural – it is always negotiated, chosen, performed, and narrated. What I fail to understand is why European integration is given priority, rather than a broader human integration.

Especially in the 1990s it was common to argue that European integration was a part of a new regionalism. According to Jürgen Habermas, who was a prominent voice in this debate, this would function as a step towards a deeper coordination and development of global interior world politics (*Weltinnenpolitik*) (Habermas 1998:156). New regionalism was seen as a spontaneous process which stemmed from the regions themselves, in a similar fashion as the earlier phase of nation building. It took place in a new multipolar world order and an integrated world economy as a part of a structural transformation of the post-Cold War global order. Foreign policy was predicted to move from bilateral relations to inter-regional ones and the creation of a multi-regional world order (Hettne et al 1999). This debate had an institutional focus and the optimism underlying it seems to have faded dramatically in the last decade, in part due to the problems facing European integration. Instead Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory slowly gained currency, as did its more competitive view of regions and a return to national security perspectives (Huntington 1993). Today, regional integration can be seen as a way to protect regional interests from outsiders, and thus work against a broader human integration.

Each understanding of the options available will always be localized and situated, and for us working in Europe they will, in some way or another, be European and even Eurocentric (Grinell 2017). I am not arguing for a pluriversal, decolonial epistemology that says that European scientific methods are just one among many ways of approaching the world, even if I have a strong affiliation with the emancipatory projects of decolonial thinking (Mignolo
The challenge is to simultaneously criticize the Eurocentric formulation of scientific claims to universality, as well as its commitment to continue to strive for a non-Eurocentric universalism in which we maintain an ongoing search for truths beyond cultural enclosures. Still, world history, for example, is thought to be analyzable through categories obtained from Europe, while a corresponding claim that we should analyze European histories using concepts and models from, for example, Islamic history is unthinkable (Chakrabarty 2000). European narratives do not need to see their connections to others.

In his *An Afrocentric Manifesto* Molefi Kete Asante says that ‘the researcher must take an auto-locative stance in order to know where she or he stands in the process’ (Asante 2007:25). This is done through a thorough investigation, and affirmation, of her own grounding and belonging. Such a stance, he argues, can help African-American scholars escape becoming ‘self-absorbed in some notion of Europe as the categorical universal for the world’ (Asante 2007:107). European scholars, and scholars studying Europe, also need this, even if we cannot use the same auto-locative method to escape the self-absorbed notion of Europe.

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I have drifted quite far from my strict Popperian beginnings. I should probably turn to other theories of science. Even if I still believe that we should strive to follow Popper’s well-argued theoretical positions for universal knowledge, I find Paul Feyerabend’s position equally convincing: “the world, including the world of science, is a complex and scattered entity that cannot be captured by theories and simple rules” (Feyerabend 1995:142).

Feyerabend’s (in)famous book *Against Method* was, when it appeared in 1975, subtitled *Outline of an Anarchistic* * Theory of Knowledge*. The footnote indicated that his identifications with anarchism were not wholesale. The footnote led the reader to a chapter which was partially deleted in the 1988 edition when Feyerabend said that he then preferred the term Dadaist over anarchistic, partly because it had no connection to political violence (Hacking 2010:xiv). Feyerabend has often been misunderstood as a total iconoclast and relativist. His sincere and still important claim was that life, and even the regulated practice of hard natural science, is too ambiguous to be governed by method and theory. Therefore he begins his book by stating that “theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress
than its law-and-order alternatives” (Feyerabend 1975:1). This leaves me at a crossroads:

I could easily be convinced of the merits of almost any view. Written texts, my own text included, often seemed ambiguous to me – they meant one thing, they meant another; they seemed plausible; they seemed absurd (Feyerabend 1995:145)

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The field of European Studies seems unnecessarily Eurocentric to me. Europe is of course not “the categorical universal for the world”. Still, when trying to critique these tendencies I turn to European discussions on universalism. Popper encourages us to constantly strive for producing universal explanations and finding and critiquing the lapses in our particularistic way of thinking. At the same time, Feyerabend reminds us that every new effort will also fail and be particular. Theoretical reflection can help us to remember this, and engaging in true comparisons with other traditions, geographical areas and histories can also help to identify the biases of our inevitable self-centeredness.

To put this differently: I suppose the simple point I want to make is that despite the abundance of empirical presentations of Islam and Muslims in Europe I still struggle to find a proper analysis of what ‘European problems’ really are, and the extent to which Islam can really be seen as an explanatory factor in understanding them.

**Bibliography**


The conflict between cultural borders of minorities and majorities and how this might affect European integration

Ingmar Söhrman

Most European countries have historical minorities within their borders. This can often create conflicts due to varying interests and misinterpretations on both sides based on history, or what is (often erroneously) considered to be the historical reality (the images of history), which often leads to certain questions about the future of the countries, as well as of the EU. On the one hand the minority might demand autonomy and cause the dissolution of an existing state such as we have seen happen in both former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand it may lead to an integration and perhaps even a newfound respect within the country or simply an ongoing intent to understand each other, which, unfortunately, seems to be the less preferred option.

History is a means that is often used erroneously as an excuse to put forward politically favoured ideas, and these ideas may or may not have anything to do with history, but for political reasons they are presented this way. Of course there are other political events that affect a region due to political decisions that are not well received in the region, such as the Brexit in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The consequences of this remain to be seen. Perhaps this will lead to renewed violence in Northern Ireland and/or the dissolution of Great Britain, and what would this imply?

Here I will briefly discuss two different cases within the EU: Catalonia
and Romania, which illustrate the complications and also raise many questions that ought to be discussed pragmatically in the EU. The intention here is to ask relevant questions connected to the border situation, but not necessarily to solve the questions. This article is based on many years of travels and research in both countries and since the main purpose is to put forward questions that deal with minority issues and cultural borders in Europe and European integration, there will be no bibliography.

**Catalonia:**

Catalonia is a region within Spain which offers a “minority” perspective to the question, whereas Romania is a country, so perspective is that of a state, which raises other questions. Historically, Catalonia was a part of the Aragon realm, actually the most important part of this realm, and it also included southern Italy and the Balears for many centuries. Of course, all these territories passed on to Spain after the unification of the Catholic kings, Isabel and Fernando (Ferran) at the end of the 15th century

After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain became a democracy and was organized as a decentralized state with 17 autonomous regions, which was not what the traditional minorities (Basques, Catalans and Galicians) wanted. These three historical minorities wanted to have their own autonomous regions but they did not wish the same for other regions in the country. These other regions were supposed to be parts of Spain without any autonomy or with at least less autonomy than the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia, that would receive special treatment due to historical reasons, including cultural and political (and linguistic) ones. Now, when the whole country was more or less on an equal level, no region really stood out. The Catalans would still talk about “Coffee for everyone” (Café para todos), i.e. giving all the regions the same autonomy, which, as it turned out, was unfortunately not the whole truth as Euskadi (the Basque autonomous region) was given an independent right to administrate taxes which Catalonia has yet not got. This was possibly due to the fear of the Basque terrorist independent movement, ETA. However, this has remained a major issue for the regional Catalan parties in their conflict with the central government. It also has to be pointed out that when these legal changes took place the Spanish democracy was still very young and unstable, so the founding fathers of the new democracy did not dare challenge the traditional Francoist powers (very strong in the military surroundings), and, actually, a coup-d’état was attempted in 1981. This made many politicians hesitant, but could also be seen as an excuse for the central
government to avoid supporting Catalan autonomy.

Conflicts have arisen between the Catalan bourgeoisie, which has dominated Barcelona and the economic life in Catalonia, and the Andalusian “immigration,” which has been an ongoing process. Andalusians may feel less Catalan and seem to be more in favour of staying Spanish. Unfortunately, the results of the regional elections in 2016 have left many in a tough situation. The parties who wanted to remain a part of Spain won slightly more votes than the parties who were fighting for Catalan independence, but these won more seats in the regional parliament. The conflict is the result of historical conflicts stemming from the unification of Aragon and Castile in the 15th century.

With this more or less 50-50 percent in favour of and against the separation of Catalonia there are other facts and questions to take into consideration such as:

- Who is Catalan?
- What separates Catalan culture from Spanish culture?
- Which language do people use and in which situations?
- Is there an ongoing loss of Spanish competence in Catalonia as some suggest?
- What will be the consequences of a possible separation?

Can you be a Catalan without speaking the language, which all young people do these days, since they have learned it at school and use it regularly? Does this promotion mean that Catalans have a more difficult time speaking Spanish now than they did before, and what does this mean for their cultural, social and professional futures – and their personal cultural identity? Are borders crossed or made more difficult to traverse? A separation would probably not make such a big difference in real life, but would Spain allow an independent Catalonia to become a member of the EU, and if not, what would be the economic or political consequences for Catalonia – or for Spain? And, of course, how would such a situation affect the EU, especially in its weakened state following the aftermath of Brexit?

Another conflict is the differences between Catalonia and other Catalan-speaking regions, such as Valencia and the Baleares (Mallorca, Menorca and Ibiza) and their internal relations! Where are the borders? And what about the Catalan-speaking minority in Aragón, which borders Catalonia?
A very tricky question is the difference between a language and a dialect. Several linguists have said that a language is a dialect with an army and a fleet. Regardless, the difference is political rather than linguistic, and while the Valencians maintain their linguistic autonomy, e.g. the Kosovars have “submitted” to standard Albanian. However, this linguistic variety is based on the Tosk dialect (Southern Albanian) while it the Geg dialect is spoken in Kosova. In this case the linguistic unity is more important than the regional varieties. The difference between a language and a dialect is a very intriguing question. Norwegian and Swedish are good examples. Are they really that different? Probably the concepts have to do with the prestige of a linguistic variety.

What do languages mean and to whom? What role will they play in the issue of independence? Language is an easily identified criterion and, as such, often used, but how relevant is it? Do you have to speak the language or the dialect to belong, or is this just an easily sortable criterion which divides people into groups?

It seems that regional Catalan authorities are enforcing a referendum that the central government considers illegal, and the central government hopes to extinguish the independence movement by ignoring it and saying very little. Neither of these strategies appears fruitful for the future, but it seems reasonable to at least imagine a separation. Would this then support a Scottish separation? Political actions in one country may easily lead to new situations in other parts of the European Union.

**Romania:**

Romania is a country with a long history of minorities. For a very long time Transylvania was dominated by German (so called Saxon) and Hungarian cultures, politics and languages. The Romanian majority cultivated the earth and had little actual power. Without going into ideological interpretations of Transylvanian history we can just take for a fact that all three groups had coexisted there since the Middle Ages, and that the question of which group arrived first is absolutely irrelevant after almost a millennium together. However this issue has been used to their advantage by nationalist parties (mainly Romanian) in Romania.

While the majority of the Catalans live as a minority group in Spain, the Hungarian-speakers in Transylvania have the support of the majority of a neighbouring country (Hungary) with a rich culture. This is similar to the Swedish-speakers in Finland, who have a rich Swedish culture that produces
books, films etc. as a support, although the Swedish culture in Finland has an impressive autochthonous production which is underestimated in Sweden.

But an important question is what identity these Hungarian-speakers in Transylvania have? Do they consider themselves Romanians? In Spain many politicians use the word *citizens* (ciudadanos) in order to avoid a conflict with people who do not consider themselves Spaniards, as is often the case in Catalonia.

Some Romanian nationalist politicians tend to see the Hungarian-speakers as a fifth column. Does this nationalistic view have any truth behind it, or is it just an invention of the Romanian nationalists? And then, of course, whose interests do the UDMR (Hungarian regional party) in Transylvania represent? What is the role that Hungary plays in Romanian politics? With the present political situation in Hungary this is an important question for all EU members. Although it is far too easy to see conflicts and to question what may or may not be quite normal and functioning, these ideas cannot automatically be disregarded.

Another interesting and very important issue is not only which languages are taught at school, but more importantly, IN which language subjects are taught. It is, of course, of utmost importance that speakers of minority languages not only maintain their linguistic competence but that they are taught many subjects in their first language, which in Romania include, primarily, Hungarian and German, although there are Serbian and Ukrainian minority groups as well. It is important to note the perspective from which things are taught, especially when it comes to subjects such as history, geography and the social sciences. This is of importance in the case of Catalan, , but in Romania the use of books printed in Hungary might mean that it is no longer a question of the state’s versus minority group’s interests, but of an ideology of another (and not always friendly) neighbouring state. Since the relationship between Romania and Hungary is complicated, there is ample opportunity to see or create problems, and it is fundamental to keep a cool head and not fall into the first trap that is set. A similar case would be the Italian-speaking minority in Switzerland, but this is not as politically contaminated as is the situation of the Romanian Hungarian-speakers, so it functions relatively harmoniously, even if the Rheto-romance situation in the Grisons in south-eastern Switzerland can complicate things.

What is then the role of historical events? Romania is a young country which drew its present borders after the First World War. Earlier it consisted mainly of the three principalities of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldova which were dominated by the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and the
Austrian Empire (including Hungary) at various times.

It is interesting that the current president of Romania represents the German-speaking minority. He also took part in a manifestation against the socialist government’s attempts at reducing the punishment for corruption at the beginning of 2017. How much does the old Warsaw Pact mean today, especially in regards to its tradition of admitting a vast corruption? Does this play a role in EU-membership when it comes to corruption and EU-migrants?

A special minority issue in Romania and some other Balkan countries is the existence of a large Roma minority. The Roma have been excluded from society and not always wanted to be part of it, but it is easy to see that they have been treated badly for centuries, and as a consequence of this and of Romania being a member of the EU, we find many Romanian (and Bulgarian) beggars all over Europe. That this has caused a lot of controversy is clear, but how is this best dealt with? Can the EU find a solution and promote active political commitment in these countries?

Historical traditions and loyalties certainly play a more important role than we are willing to admit, but the problem is real and has to be dealt with in a decent way.

Finally

It all comes down to whether minorities are seen as an obstacle to the often favoured (false) idea of the ‘unified and homogenous nation-state’ or whether they contribute to a pluralistic society with all its complexity. As it has been shown, this is much more complicated when it comes to political practices, but the EU must find solutions if we hope to avoid an explosive and disastrous situation. Respect and unconventional approaches might be a good start!
What knowledge and background assumptions do we recruit when we encounter metaphors? This is one of the vital questions researchers ask nowadays when analysing metaphor. Another way of phrasing this is what borders of knowledge and background assumptions can the metaphors we draw on or shape while talking about our research reveal? How can we transcend these? Such questioning implies that metaphors are understood not simply in terms of linguistic creativity but as a central mechanism of human cognition: a tool by means of which sensory or embodied data is conceptualised and exchanged in simplified form (Ortony 1979; Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

Without going too much into “Conceptual Metaphor Theory” or CMT itself, I want to present here some of the ways in which systematic metaphor analysis is used in qualitative research and offer some reflections based on my own research on metaphors in translation studies as a starting ground for thinking through the research on the borders of Europe with metaphors.

While many consider the study of metaphors a linguistic or aesthetic problem, because of how it is approached in CMT, it is much more akin to socio-cultural or anthropological studies. I am often labelled a linguist, which I am not. I am a scholar of reading, writing and text from a multimodal, multidisciplinary perspective, which I identify as situated in the field of Comparative Literature. For my project, entitled “The Politics of Translation Metaphors: Shaping Translation Studies, Situating the Translator”, I looked at how metaphors might transform a person’s thinking about translation. I reviewed a number of metaphorical studies from the last two decades, interviewed translators and, by way of qualitative metaphor analysis, tried to see if
there were any connections to be found between the theoretical literature and the practical field of translation via metaphors.

**Conceptual Metaphor Theory**

As you may know metaphor studies has enjoyed a lot of attention over the last four decades in translation studies and other fields. This is largely due to the work of Ortony (1979), Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and others, who propose that metaphors are “primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 153) The theory behind their work is that metaphors are cognitive manifestations of conceptual thinking, called “conceptual metaphor theory” (CMT) or “embodied metaphor theory”; meaning that abstract, complex things (target domains) are systematically understood in terms of concrete, sensorily and bodily apperceived things (source domains). For example, ARGUMENT IS WAR and LIFE IS A STORY are both conventional metaphors that summarise a number of pragmatic, life-like experiences into a linguistic representation of perceived (as opposed to factual) aspect of reality.

With regard to translation, such metaphors as TRANSLATION IS LOSS or TRANSLATION IS TREASON or TRANSLATION IS AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK are quite conventional. The important fact to realise is that a certain discourse, person, or institution that holds a certain amount of power might display a particular preference for one metaphor and they might enforce or sanction actions in correspondence with this metaphor. In a grossly simplifying way thus the attacks on the translators of Salman Rushdie’s controversial book, *The Satanic Verses* (1989) could be linked to TRANSLATION IS TREASON.

**Systematic Metaphor Analysis**

Metaphor is used in several ways in qualitative studies and there have been a number of attempts to categorise existing research in translation. I have found Schmitt’s discussion of qualitative metaphor analysis in the context of social-scientific research the most useful to mark out different methodological practices (Schmitt 2005). I believe it is also the most transferable.

Schmitt lists altogether nine patterns of use:
1) rhetorical instrument: individual metaphors are decontextualised and used as evidence for or proof of an opposing position;
2) therapeutic tool: the metaphor is used to present a problem in a solu-
tion-friendly framework;
3) description of the qualitative research process: metaphors serve as orientation and delimitation of ‘messy’ qualitative research processes;
4) specified metaphors searched for in the material: a critical theoretical frame is used to limit the search and analysis of metaphors in a given data set, for example, gender theory is used to search for sexist metaphors in the selected material;
5) description of the results of qualitative research: similar to the description of the research process metaphors are used to reduce the multitude of heterogeneous pieces of processes and information produced by qualitative inquiries;
6) explicitly elicited from research participants: by way of interviews, surveys, etc., metaphor-use is being prompted which are then used to expose a link between theory and practice in a given field (the underlying idea is that theoretical literature provides metaphors that participants will draw on to shape their narratives of practice and self-reflection);
7) reconstruction of research participants’ metaphorical points of view and of cultural phenomena: a stronger version of 6) in the sense that the assumption that all understanding and agency is dominated by metaphorical projection no longer needs to identify metaphors on the first level of investigation;
8) part of a wider research strategy: metaphors are used as a way to link different parts of a broader linguistic of functionalist or cross-cultural investigation;
9) self-reflection tool: metaphors and the practices associated with them are brought to the conscious level to enable criticism and new directions of thought.

Using Schmitt’s systematic categorisation of qualitative metaphor research was particularly illuminating for reviewing metaphor in translation studies (MIT). I discovered that explicit delineations of how a given researcher uses metaphor and CMT are rather rare. Few move past the now-compulsory acknowledgement, often in the form of a single citation, to Lakoff and Johnson. The link between action and metaphor - that metaphors can become self-fulfilling prophecies, limit the way we perceive the world and act upon it - is heavily emphasised in theoretical discussion of how metaphors are used to describe translation but rarely matched with practical, ethnographic reconstruction. For example, a number of scholars have claimed that introducing metaphors such as TRANSLATION IS PERFORMANCE as opposed to reiterating TRANSLATION IS BRIDGE might improve the perception of the
symbolic cultural status of translation as it implies a shift from inanimate structure to active agent. But one rarely finds these works providing a survey of metaphors in use or circulation, or any other data supplied which evidences such practical effect.

The idea to shape, create and circulate, in other words, to consciously use (new) metaphors, is a significant theoretical shift away from Lakoff and Johnson, who focused on subconscious metaphor usage. This is not to say that Lakoff and Johnson reject such an approach. Studies that focus on creative and interactive CMT tend to distinguish themselves from Lakoff and Johnson and favour the work of scholars such as Max Black (1977) and David Donaldson (1978) instead (Forceville 1996, 2017).

Studies that do not explicitly argue this shift decontextualise CMT and reduce metaphorical analysis to a rhetorical feature without much practical hold. They further lose sight of or distract from the fact that the metaphors that they discuss are less significant – from Lakoff and Johnson’s point of view – than the metaphorical language that is being used to discuss them. Thus, for example, a significant shift towards conceptual metaphors such as TRANSLATION IS BUSINESS or TRANSLATION IS VISIBILITY is noticeable in the meta-language in translation but has so far not been sufficiently analysed.

Schmitt’s categorisation reveals that many studies in translation, including my own, draw on more than one use of metaphors. I can now identify different usages with different developmental stages of my own project and instances of methodological overlaps or blending. Thus I would describe the early stages of my research as rhetorical (1). Following the current trend, I was arguing that fresh and active metaphors, such as the translator as agent, performer or musician, might lead to improved perception of the importance of the work of translators and interpreters and their working conditions. At the same time, I had announced that I was going to conduct semi-structured interviews to elicit metaphors from translators (6) and that I intended to use the friction metaphor as a filter to delineate the analysis (3) of the data collected during the project (Kölling 2014). Further into the project, in particular after the conclusion of the interviews at the Leipzig book fair in 2015 and further field work at the book fairs in Frankfurt (2014) and Gothenburg (2014, 2015, 2016), I also used metaphors to describe preliminary findings (5) and to reconstruct a summative metaphorical point of view of (7). This reconstructive step also led to my making more explicit connections with other types of research (8). For example, I drew heavily on “small world problem” research (Stanley Milgram 1967) after using FRANKFURT IS NETWORKING to describe
one of the major functions of the book fair (Kölling 2016); and I am now intensifying my analysis of some of the visual data that I collected in connection with visual and multimodal metaphor theory in line with TRANSLATION IS VISIBILITY.

**Metaphor is CAN OF WORMS**

Schmitt’s categories are a useful tool to revise and re(de)fine certain steps of a research project or to review metaphor studies because they concretise the two larger difficulties of working with metaphor analysis, as, for example, identified by Cameron (1999): 1. conflation of different forms of metaphor analysis (linguistic/theoretical and process/empirical); 2. managing degrees of metaphoricity (differential metaphoricity) (107).

An example of 1. is the above mentioned problem that a theoretical discussion might focus on a linguistic metaphor (TRANSLATION IS LOSS) to draw conclusions for further research, often in form of binary opposition, (TRANSLATION IS GAIN) without anchoring this in empirical data; or worse, making claims that an artificially introduced shift in metaphor usage, for example from metaphors that imply that translation is secondary and passive to those that focus on creative and active qualities (TRANSLATION IS A BRIDGE to TRANSLATION IS MUSICAL PERFORMANCE) will change life-like realities of translators.

An example of 2. is that different metaphors activate different experiences in people. The metaphor TRANSLATION IS LOSS depends on particular knowledge of translation (as a linguistic and cultural problem) as well as certain experiences of loss (as an uncanny or sad feeling) to be understood in terms of metaphor (something remains untranslatable) and not just in terms of practicality (a word is missing from the text in translation).

Working with metaphor remains highly interpretive and individualistic. The solution lies in explicitly identifying the contextual, theoretical and empirical parameters (theoretical assumptions, socio-cultural groups and discourse communities from which samples are taken, etc.) (Cameron 132). Sometimes the solution also lies in asking whether CMT is a satisfactorily necessary or useful step in one’s study – or just a CAN OF WORMS!

**I never metaphor I didn’t like**

Does this mean metaphors better be rooted out? Yes, but only in the sense that a thorough establishing of connections between images of thoughts needs to consider the rhizomatic (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 [1980]) quality of met-
aphors in the sense that a metaphor “has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo.” (27) Metaphors have become a convenient but also fruitfully creative way to connect and construct singular events (the utterance or use of a particular metaphor of one person) into a larger supposedly interacting system of ideas. But one needs to resist the idea that, just because metaphors simplify complex embodied data, one can settle for forging connections between similar verbal images. The metaphoricity of the EUROPE IS BORDERS metaphor, for example, depends to large extent on the theoretical or practical, sensorial and bodily knowledge we have of borders. There is, as the other contributions to this volume show, a wide potential for images of thought to be – intentionally and unintentionally - interpreted as borders. And while there is perhaps no property that can be considered common to all, the strength of bringing these together in one publication rests on more than linguistic coincidence.

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Entanglements: Comments on Cultural Borders and European Integration

Mats Andrén

Cultural borders are of great significance to the divisions and clashes that are presently affecting European societies. The British vote for Brexit followed after a campaign of building cultural differences, especially towards Eastern Europeans. The economic policies towards Greece are embedded in ideas of different economic and working ethos. We can see that cultural differences are stressed, and that this concerns Northern versus Southern Europe as well as Western versus Eastern Europe, as well as the borders between Europe and the Middle East and Africa, which have been brought to the fore thanks to the discourse on refugees. Cleavages on how to understand Islam are central to the political debate. The discourses on terrorism and security are perpetuated as issues of cultural borders. For some, migrants are not welcome because they do not share the European culture or its national identity. Choice of clothing is considered a political issue, even when it comes to how women are dressed on the beach.

Looking at this historically, nothing is new. There is a long history of British ambivalence in their relationship with Europe. The Plantagenet kings came from France and for centuries they ruled areas on both sides of the English Channel and had claims on the French crown. British armies fought on European ground against Napoleon and Germany, but British leaders have also argued for strong cooperation and even federations with other European states. The narratives of differences between Northern and Southern Eu-
rope also have a long history, which goes back to the Renaissance. When the Reformation was established in the Northern states, the Catholics in the South looked upon the North as flooded by the sinful words of Luther and the atrocious armed forces of the Swedish king, while the Protestant northerners stressed that the South was lagging behind and ruled by decay (Davidson, 2005). When values of citizenship, individual freedom and the rule of law found its way into political thought after the French revolution, Northern Europe came to be seen as more advanced. From a stagist theory of European history, mainly France, Germany and Britain were considered to be leading the development, with Italy and Spain lagging behind (Dainotto, 2007). Not to mention Greece, with its long history of belonging to the Ottoman Empire.

Today, the main political challenge to peaceful development and integration in Europe as a whole, including the EU members and the other states in Europe, are populist movements. From the point of view of an intellectual historian, these movements are the main contemporary carriers of nationalism. However, we should keep in mind that nationalism is something much more widely spread than populism and more deeply entangled with the history of modern Europe, which I will soon come back to. Michael Billig (1995) has paid attention to how a nation is not only proclaimed with flags, national days, and manifest declarations of national values, but that it can also be found in our daily lives because, in the minds of citizens, a nation is likely to be taken as a social inevitability, a kind of natural order beyond historical contexts. Anyway, key issues for our time are the notions of nation and nationalism. They are largely about cultural borders and I will discuss two particular kinds of cultural borders; religious and linguistic.

With this in mind, we should recall that linguistic difference is historically a later marker of cultural borders and especially so in comparison with religious borders, which have been of great significance from the Middle Ages up until today. It has been argued that language is the most important indicator of ethnic communities and that it plays the most significant role in the making of the nation state. That language occupies this place of prestige in nationalism and the nation state is remarkable, as language did not begin to play such a decisive role in defining borders before the nation state area. Religion did, and history as well, but the role of languages was not evident until fairly recent history. The prince did not care about which language the peasants spoke with each other, but he had a need to communicate with his equals. Latin was the lingua franca of the elites, and this was later amended to French. Only after the making of the printing press and the Reformation did publishing in vernaculars begin to spread. It was only two centuries ago that the idea
of linguistically homogenous nation states began to gain traction. Once this was imposed the political borders began to coincide with specific languages; sharp linguistic borders are a modern construction. However, they have never been perfectly enforced. Some states kept more than one official language and all European states had and continue to have linguistic minorities.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the cultural borders of national identities have been of importance for building states and for mobilizing resources. A German map from 1871 illustrates the entanglement of political and cultural borders. It depicts Germany as one single state, since it was drawn in the same year as the unification of Bismarck, as well as the newly united Italy. It shows the political borders and slightly fewer than twenty European states, including the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly enough, two appendix maps accompany this political map. One lists the religions of Europe, including Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant and Islam. On this, we can see that Europe includes Islam as one of their religions whilst Judaism is omitted together with the different brands of Protestantism and Orthodoxy. The other appendix map divides Europe into twenty-five nationalities, which is more than the amount of states. Both supplementary maps show a similarity to the political map. However, there are differences with e.g. the Habsburg Empire keeping several languages, some states having linguistic minorities and some having more than one religion. Most striking is the importance given to both the linguistic and the religious factors.

The entanglements of cultural borders and European integration have been strong factors in the history of the EU, as well as before its formation. The most obvious example is how the cultural borders of Europe has been addressed through the idea of European unity. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the European idea often emphasized that Europe would be better off if there were one shared religion. Even if Novalis did dream himself back to the communal church of the Middle Ages, it was neither Catholicism he had in mind for the future, nor Protestantism, but something that would integrate the old and the new (Novalis 1996 [1799]). His was the vision of a new church of unity (Svennungsson 2014), that would overcome not only the religious divides but be a cornerstone in the creation of European unity. Napoleon also talked of unity which was meant to transcend borders. For a period he was the leader of a European-wide empire and argued that it really consisted of one religion. In seeing Europe as united he was radical; it had just one people, consisted of a single nation with one tradition (Thompson 1994).

Such radical views soon became exceptions. Instead, a kind of realist
vision of European cooperation came onto the scene, one that accepted many cultural differences and national traditions. The question then became how far political unity could be taken with the cultural borders as a prerequisite. Religion was played down as an essential factor from both Catholics and Protestants that pleaded for a European federation. This is not that surprising since the proposals written by Germans after the unification did, in fact, overcome the long historical divide between Catholics and Protestants. However, the same willingness to go beyond the historical differences within Western Christianity was shared throughout this discourse. The limits of a possible federation were pointed out, and this unity did not include the Ottoman Empire or their parts of Europe. In such a context it could be said that Islam would be disqualified. When religion was mentioned as a unifying factor it was simply Christianity which was emphasized. Moreover, one theme of the discourse of European federation has been the exclusion of Russia. That is, in the discourse on European unity Orthodoxy has been left out of the discussion. (See e.g. Bluntschli 1879, Lorimer 1884, Schmidt-Phiseldeck 1821)

In regard to language borders, the entanglement is more complex. The question posed concerning the idea of European unification or cooperation was this: Which language should be used by communal institutions? William Penn (1693) proposed a European Parliament where the sessions ‘must be held in Latin or French: the first would be very well for the Civilians, but the last most easie for Men of Quality.’ French was the first choice for a long time, but it became more complicated when ideas promoting the rights of citizens began to spread, saying that all governance ought to receive its legitimacy from the people it represented. Karl Krause (1814) wanted all treatises, laws and decisions made by the European federation to be ratified in all its languages. However, no strong objection to the use of French in federative bodies was voiced. Thanks to the proliferation of French, it was argued by the era’s most ambitious explication of a federation, linguistic obstacles no longer posed a problem to putting a federation in force. (Schmied-Phiseldeck 1821)

However, the growth of linguistic nationalism challenged the pre-dominance of French. After the German defeat of France in the War of 1870, there was some discussion of a European federation, not the least of which was underpinned by the peace movement. Victor Hugo (1898/1870) had long been in favor of such as the best way to avoid warfare on the continent. But even for him it was unthinkable to have any other language of the federation than French; if the European Parliament were to speak German, then Europe would move backwards three centuries: French it must be! Others
went for a multilingual solution to the federal organization. Bluntschli’s plan included fifteen states from the federation (that is, almost all of the European states, with Russia and Turkey as the main exceptions). Among those, two or three should be community languages. Not surprisingly, he suggested English, French and German. (Bluntschli 1879) The leader of the Pan-European movement in the interbellum, Coudenhove-Calergi (1934), was leaning towards French and English with an alternative of using an artificial language that would be neutral for all nationalities involved.

Although the issue of the language question has continued to be on the agenda, it is remarkable how successful the EU has been in terms of its language policy and extensive translation activity. The challenge is this: if language is one of the main, or even the main, indicator of the nation, how would it be possible to set up communal bodies for several countries? The parts must agree that certain languages should be used and/or that the proper languages of the participants should be used with the assistance of translations. This kind of agreement could be considered a consequence of a fundamental change in the way that Europe is depicted, joining together with a discursive turn regarding European cooperation which hearkens back to the 1920s.

After the gunpowder dispersed following the Great War a new map of political borders appeared. The idea of independent nation states resonated in Europe (Armitage 2013) and a number of new states emerged with the dissolution of the Austrian, German and Ottoman Empires. If a population identified itself as a nation with a language, history and traditions of its own, if it was large enough to carry on by itself, and if it was concentrated in a certain area, then the demands for independence did not seem so farfetched. This is the moment when the long term development of Europe has shifted to an ongoing and increasing number of nation states, and this continues even today, when we have some fifty European states. Thus is the new Europe that has emerged.

British journalist Stephen Graham (1923) lamented what the drawbacks of these newly drawn borders meant for travelers, with the amount of time it took to get a passport and visas, the loss of money when exchanging currency, and the distress at the borders when local officials only spoke the national language. He was one of many who saw disadvantages of the new era. A manifold of voices identified the new borders as hindrances for trade, as communications became aggravated and each state had their own tariffs for goods. Economists blamed the borders for causing economic decline. Others saw the divisions as the main reason for Europe’s decline in the world, challenged as it was from American and Asians powers. Some talked of a decline of the
European civilization, and crisis was on everybody’s lips. The notion of a European crisis constituted the discourse on European unification, offering a strong argument of the need to stick together; the internal strife had weakened them all and the divisions would mean that Europe’s downward spiral would only continue, with the US and Japan surpassing it on all fronts.

The notion of Europe as divided, on decline and in crisis was essential for the mindset of European integration after 1945. Cultural borders and national identities were simultaneously considered to be fundamental since decline and crisis had to be counteracted. The necessity of cooperating was proclaimed in a cultural landscape that had previously espoused national identification. It was from this that the concept of postwar European integration gained momentum.

However, in contemporary Europe we see a new trend towards cultural borders fueled by fear. Preachers of hard, fixed borders and exclusion are not afraid to make themselves heard. It is not so much language as religion which is in focus, particularly Islam and non-European migrants. The choice today is whether we will approach cultural borders with an inclusive mind or as an excuse for expulsion. We turn to cultural borders in order to ask what kind of European integration we hope to have.

References


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